The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents\u27 Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action by Banks, R. Richard
Articles
The Color of Desire:
Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' Racial Preferences
Through Discriminatory State Action
R. Richard Banks'
CONTENTS
I. CRITIQUING RACE-BASED ADOPTION POLICY:
AN ASYMMETRICAL INQUIRY ........................... 886
A. A Race-Matching Critique That Undermines
Facilitative Accormnodation ......................... 887
t Clerk to the Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr.. United States Distict Court for the Southern
District of New York; Reginald F. Lewis Fellow. 1996-1997, Harvard Law School: J.D.. 1994. Harvard
Law School; A.B., A.M., 1987, Stanford University.
Many people contributed, in varied ways, to this Article. I owe special thanks to three people. Duncan
Kennedy, Randall Kennedy, and Joseph Singer. As many readers will recognize, my work draws on much
in each of theirs, certainly to a greater extent than footnotes could attest. Many people read one of the
many drafts of this Article. Others offered their thoughts on race and adoption at a ttme when my own
thinking was at a level of sensibility and intuition rather than analysis and thesis. Bnan Bix. Greg Chin,
Peggy Cooper Davis, Richard Fallon, Philip Frickey, Joan Hollinger, Ruth-Arlene Howe. Mma Kim. Jim
Liebman, Frank Michelman, Martha Minow, Rachel Moran. Twila Perry, Kerry Rittich. Dorothy Roberts.
David Rosettenstein, Gerry Spann, and Laurence Tribe improved this Article substantially.
Thanks go to Harvard Law School and Vice Dean David Smith for providing the opportunity and
resources to research and write this Article during my year as the Reginald F. Lewis Fellow. Jean Thomas
provided the first forum for the ideas on which this Article is based. Thanks also go to Professor Elizabeth
Bartholet. Her unconventional stand on transracial adoption and our discussions prompted me to take a
position even more removed from the mainstream, and her criticisms of my argument prodded me to refine
it and saved me from many inaccuracies. The adoption researchers and professionals listed infra in note
83 also gave generously of their time and expertise in helping me to understand an important and
complicated issue.
Although we did not discuss race and adoption, Charles Lawrence was more helpful than he probably
realizes, providing consultation and encouragement at a time when it was sorely needed. Molly
Hammerberg provided diligent and committed research assistance without which I would have been less
able to begin, much less complete, this Article.
Helping in ways that are difficult to summarize, but not to appreciate. and which arc apparent
throughout this Article and my life, has been my wife, Jennifer Eberhardt.
876 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 107: 875
1. Ubiquity and Potency of Racial Preferences .......... 887
2. Nonracialist Vision of Family and Intimate Connection ... 888
3. Public Law and Private Values ................... 891
4. Application of the Antidiscrimination Norm to Adoption .. 891
B. Affirmation of Racial Autonomy ...................... 893
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE OF FACILITATIVE ACCOMMODATION .. 896
A. Overview of the Adoption Process .................... 897
B. Current State of Adoption Law ....................... 899
C. Challenging Facilitative Accommodation ................ 900
1. Harm of Facilitative Accommodation ............... 900
2. Strict Scrutiny of Facilitative Racial Classification? ..... 903
3. Application of Strict Scrutiny ..................... 908
4. Liberty, Privacy, and Personhood Defenses ........... 910
D . Summary ...................................... 913
III. SOURCES OF THE ANOMALY ........................... 914
A. Individualism: An Interpretive Prism .................. 915
1. Individualism and State Action .................... 918
2. Individualism and Racial Preferences ............... 920
B. Definition and Identification of Race-Based Claims ........ 922
IV. MODELING RACE POLITICS ............................ 927
A. Contemporary Basis of Race-Based Claims .............. 928
B. Historical Origins of Contemporary Race-Based Claims ..... 932
C. Modeling Race Politics ............................ 935
D. Race Politics and Racial Inequality ................... 937
V. STRICT NONACCOMMODATION: A PROPOSAL IN OPPOSITION
TO RACIAL PREFERENCES ............................. 940
A. Purposes of Preference Eradication ................... 941
B. Mechanics and Substance of Strict Nonaccommodation ...... 943
C. Best-Interests-of-the-Child Standard ................... 947
D. Constitutionality of Strict Nonaccommodation ............ 950
E. Nature of Adoptive Parents' Preferences ................ 951
F. Feasibility of Nonaccommodation ..................... 955
1. Political Will ................................ 955
2. Inevitability of Racial Preferences ................. 956
3. Parental Resistance ........................... 956
4. Beyond the Feasibility of Nonaccommodation ......... 958
VI. CONCLUSION ................................... .. 963
Racial Preferences in Adoption
Power is at its peak when it is least visible, when it shapes
preferences, arranges agendas, and excludes serious challenges
from discussion or even imagination.'
The role of race in adoption has been an intensely and
widely debated topic during the past decade, attracting the
attention of legal scholars,2  social scientists, 3 journalists,' and
1. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court. 1986 Term-Foreward: Justce Engendered. 10l HARV L
REv. 10. 68 (1987).
2. See, e.g., Katharine Cannady, The Use of Race as a Variable in Adoptve Placement Proceedings.
I SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 503 (1993); Chip Chiles. A Hand To Rock the Cradle: Transractal Adoption. the
Multiethnic Placement Act. and a Proposal for the Arkansas General Assembly. 49 ARK. L REV. 501
(1996); Zanita E. Fenton, hi a World Not Their Own: The Adoption of Black Children. 10 HARV.
BLACKLEITER J. 39 (1993); Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests
Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503 (1984); Ruth-Arlene \V. Howe. Redefining the Transracial
Adoption Controversy. 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 131 (1995): Mark C. Rahdert. Transracial
Adoptioni-A Constitutional Perspective, 68 TEMP. L. REV 1687 (1995): David S. Rosettenstem. Trans.
Racial Adoption and the Statutory Preference Schemes: Before the -Best Interests- and After the "Melting
Pot," 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 137 (1994); Jacinda T. Townsend, Reclaiming Self-Determination. A Call for
Intraracial Adoption, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 173 (1995): Barbara Bennett \Voodhouse. "Are You
Mv Mother?": Reconceptualizing Children's Identit' Rights in Transractal Adoptions. 2 DUKE J GENDER
L. & POL'Y 107 (1995); Juliet A. Cox, Comment, Judicial Enforcement of Moral Imperatives: Is the Best
Interest of the Child Being Sacrificed To Maintain Societal Homogeneity'. 59 MO. L REV 775 (1994);
Jo Beth Eubanks, Comment, Transracial Adoption in Texas: Should rite Best Interests Standard Be Color.
Blind?, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1225 (1993); Kim Forde-Mazrut. Note, Black Identt and Child Placement.
The Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children. 92 MICi. L. REV. 925 (1994); Timothy P. Glynn. Note.
The Role of Race in Adoption Proceedings: A Constitutional Critique of the Minnesota Preference Statute.
77 MINN. L. REx'. 925 (1993); Davidson M. Pattiz. Note. Racial Preference in Adoption: An Equal
Protection Challenge, 82 GEO. L.J. 2571 (1994); Myriam Zreczny. Note. Race.Consciaus Child Placement:
Deviating from a Policy Against Racial Classifications. 69 CHI.-KENT L_ REv. 1121 (1994); D. Michacl
Reilly, Constitutional Law: Race as a Factor in Interracial Adoptions. District of Columbia Survey. 32
CATH. U. L. REv. 1022 (1983).
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM FEEGELMAN & ANN SILBERMAN. CHOSEN CHILDREN" NEW PATTERN OF
ADOPTIVE RELATIONSHIPS (1983); L. GROW & D. SHAPIRO. BLACK CHILDREN, WHITE PARE%S: A STUDY
OF TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION (1974); R. McRoY & L. ZURCHER, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTIO N AND INRACIAL
ADOPTEES: THE ADOLESCENT YEARS (1983); JOAN F. SHIRE.MAN. GROWING UP ADOPTED: AN
EXAMINATION OF MAJOR ISSUES (1988); RITA J. SIMON ET AL.. THE CASE FOR TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION
(1994); RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES AND TIEIR FAMILIES (1987)
[hereinafter SIMON & ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES AND THEIR FAMILIESI: RITA JAMES SIMON &
HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION (1977) [hereinafter SIMON & ALTSTEIN. TRANSRACIAL
ADOPTION]; RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN. TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION: A FOLLOW UP (1981):
Jacqueline Macaulay & Stewart Macaulay, Adoption of Black Children: A Case Study of Epert Discretion.
in I RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 265 (Rita J. Simon ed.. 1978); Elsie GJ. Moore. Ethnic Social
Milieu and Black Children's Intelligence Test Achievement, 56 J. NEGRO EDIC. 44 (1987); Elsie GJ.
Moore, Family Socialization and the IQ Test Performance of Traditionally and Transractally Adopted Black
Children, 22 DEV. PSYCHOL. 317 (1986); Sandra Scarr & Richard A. Weinberg. IQ Test Performance of
Black Children Adopted by White Families, 31 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 726 (I 976); Joan F. Shireman & Penny
R. Johnson, A Longitudinal Study of Black Adoptions: Single Parent. Transracial and Traditional. 31 SOC.
WORK 172 (1986).
4. See, e.g., Mindy Fetterman & Desda Moss. Adoption Debate Again Focuses on Issue of Race. USA
TODAY, May 10, 1996, at 4A; Steven A. Holmes, Bitter Racial Dispute Rages over Adoption. N.Y. TIMES.
Apr. 13, 1995, at A 16; Kids Need Good Adoptive Families of Ihatever Color. ATLANTA J & CONST.. May
7, 1996, at 20; Norman A. Lockman, Cruel Bars to Trans-Racial Adoption Keep Black Kids Waiting.
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 26, 1996, at 3; Make Adoption Color.Blind, BOSTON HERALD. May 10.
1996, at 24; Sue Anne Pressley, Facing the Color Barrier Families. L.A. TIMES. Jan. 12. 1997. at E l; Rom
Rabin, Can Black Children Raised by White Parents Develop a Positive Sense of Self and a Strong Racial
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politicians.5  The allure of the race-and-adoption controversy is quite
understandable. Adoption policy, which implicates our most deeply held beliefs
and values about family, community, and identity, impacts the lives of tens of
thousands of children in need of adoption and untold numbers of adults who
might seek to adopt.6 Race remains perhaps the central dilemma of American
society, constantly debated but never resolved.
The intense and protracted race-and-adoption controversy has centered on
the practice of race matching.7 Race-matching policies require that children
be matched to adoptive parents on the basis of race; 8 black children are placed
Identity?, NEWSDAY, July 13, 1995, at B4; Michael Rezendes, Debate Intensifies on Adoptions Across
Racial Lines, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13, 1994, at 1; Trish Williams, Interracial Adoption: Still Difficult, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 17, 1996, at 4E.
5. See, e.g., Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum, S. 1224-In Support of the Multiethnic Placement Act
of 1993, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 165 (1995). There have also been a variety of reports on race and
adoption produced by legislative committees and task forces. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON TRANSRACIAL
ADOPTION, OFFICE OF POL'Y & MANAGEMENT, A STUDY OF TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION IN THE STATE OF
CONNECTICUT (1988).
6. Precise figures on adoption are difficult to come by because records are maintained individually by
states. According to one estimate, over 130,000 adoptions are granted each year, slightly less than half of
which are between unrelated persons. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 2 (1994). Because
slightly more than half of all adoptions occur between related parties, even a conservative estimate of
100,000 adoptions per year would put the number of adoptions between unrelated parties at almost 50,0Q0.
See Kathy S. Stolley, Statistics on Adoption in the United States, 3 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 26, 30 (1993).
7. Nearly all overviews of adoption law consider race matching, both in terms of its desirability as
social policy and its legal permissibility. These discussions of race matching oversimplify a very
complicated issue by focusing on two considerations: racial attitudes and racial group membership.
Supporters of race matching often argue that the racial attitudes of adoptive parents should be taken into
account. See, e.g., Fenton, supra note 2, at 61; Howe, supra note 2, at 160, 164. Considering racial
attitudes, however, is not the same as matching parents and children based on racial group membership.
The racial attitudes stance, for example, logically suggests that the racial attitudes of all adoptive parents
should be considered, no matter from what race they hope to adopt. In contrast, consideration of racial
group membership would involve no particularized inquiry into a prospective adoptive parent's racial
beliefs and attitudes, an approach that might be thought of as creating an irrebuttable presumption that
racial commonality furthers a child's best interests. I owe this insight to Rachel Moran.
Popular and scholarly discussions of race matching, as well as judicial opinions, frequently conflatc
the issues of racial attitudes and racial group membership. In one case, for example, a court upheld the
removal of a black child from the home of his white foster parents and the denial of the foster parents'
adoption application on the basis of race, noting the importance of "considering the racial attitudes of
potential parents." Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1205
(5th Cir. 1977). There was no evidence, however, that racial attitudes, as opposed to racial group
membership, had anything to do with the agency's decision to remove the child.
8. Race-matching policies are a residue of earlier policies that matched children with parents based
on a variety of characteristics, including hair color, eye color, intelligence, social class, and ethnic
background. See LESLIE HARRIS Er AL., FAMILY LAW 1185 (1996) (noting that "the dominant approach
to adoption has until fairly recently been the 'complete substitution' theory, in which adoptions are made
to mimic biological parent-child relationships as much as possible"). For a discussion of this historical
practice, see Fenton, supra note 2, at 42 n.19; and Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 3, at 280. See also
Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Race as a Factor in Adoption Proceedings, 34 A.L.R.4th 167, 169-70 (1984)
(observing that "[a]doption agencies have traditionally sought to implement a policy of ethnic and racial
matching between the child and the prospective adoptive parents, frequently maintaining that the best-
interests of the child were ordinarily served by correlating the physical appearance of the child to that of
the parents"). Courts have also discussed the earlier policies of matching based on a variety of physical
characteristics:
[A]doption agencies quite frequently try to place a child where he can most easily become a
normal family member. The duplication of his natural biological environment is a part of that
program. Such factors as age, hair color, eye color and facial features of parents and child are
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only with black parents and white children only with white parents. Voices in
the race-and-adoption debate range from those who strongly support race
matching9 to those who strongly support transracial adoption.'" Race-
matching proponents argue that it is in a black child's best interest to be placed
with a black family" and that placing black children without regard to race
therefore subverts the best-interests-of-the-child standard, the guiding principle
of child welfare policy.'2 Proponents of transracial adoption, in contrast,
argue that adoption agencies should accord less importance to race and should
be willing to match children and parents across racial lines.' 3 They claim that
race-matching efforts harm black children by denying or delaying their
adoptive placement. 14 They also note that race matching represents race-based
considered in reaching a decision. This flows from the belief that a child and adoptive parents
can best adjust to a normal family relationship if the child is placed with adoptive parents who
could have actually patented him.
Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1205-06.
9. In 1972. the National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW) issued a position paper in
which the organization took the following stance:
"Black children should be placed only with Black families whether in foster care or for
adoption. Black children belong, physically, psychologically and culturally in Black families in
order that they receive the total sense of themselves and develop a sound projection of their
future.... Black children in white homes are cut off from the healthy development of
themselves as Black people.... [Proper socialization] is impossible if the child is placed with
white parents in a white environment."
SIMON & ALTSTEiN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION, supra note 3. at 50 (quoting The National Association of
Black Social Workers Conference. Nashville, Tenn.. Apr. 9-12. 1972. Position Paper [hereinafter NABSW
Position Paper]). The NABSW's categorical stance against transracial adoption is rare. Most commentators
do not take the position that transracial adoption should never occur. The debate, instead, is about how
much weight the parents' race and racial attitudes should be accorded in the placement decision for a black
child. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 2, at 133-34. 136-37. 159-61; Townsend. supra note 2. at 177-82.
10. The best-known advocate of transracial adoption is Harvard Law School Professor Elizabeth
Bartholet. See ELIZABEni BARTmoLET. FAMILY BONDS (1993); Elizabeth Banholet. Where Do Black
Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption. 139 U. PA. L REv. 1163 (1991). For
arguments by other strong supporters of transracial adoption, see Michelle M. Mini. Note. Breaking Down
the Barriers to Transracial Adoptions: Can the Multiethnic Placement Act Aleet 77us Challenge 7 22
HOFSTRA L. REv. 897 (1994), which argues that race matching constitutes discrimination against black
children; and Pattiz. supra note 2. which argues that de facto bans on transracial adoption are
unconstitutional.
11. In support of their position, proponents of race matching offer three basic arguments, which relate
to identity, culture, and coping skills. The identity claim asserts that black children need black parents in
order to develop a proper racial identity. See. e.g.. Fenton. supra note 2. at 61; Howe. supra note 2. at 160;
Townsend, supra note 2, at 179-80. The culture claim embodies the notion that not placing black children
with black parents severs the children's ties to black culture. See. e.g.. Fenton. supra note 2. at 61; Howe
supra note 2, at 160; Townsend, supra note 2. at 181-82. The coping skills claim suggests that white
parents generally will be unable to teach a black child the skills necessary to survive and thrive while black
parents can draw upon their own reservoir of coping skills. accumulated through their experience as black
people in American society. See. e.g., Fenton. supra note 2. at 60-61: Howe. supra note 2. at 133-34;
Townsend, supra note 2, at 177-78.
12. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Chiles, supra note 2, at 502 (arguing that Arkansas should prohibit the consideration of
race in adoption); Rosettenstein, supra note 2. at 195-97 (arguing against race-bascd preference structures);
Pattiz, supra note 2, at 2605-09 (proposing a race-neutral adoption statute).
14. See. e.g.. Bartholet, supra note 10. at 1248 (concluding that "racial matching policies should be
abandoned ... because they do serious injury to black children in the interest of promoting an
inappropriate separatist agenda"); Mini. supra note 10. at 899-900; Pattiz. supra note 2. at 2572-73
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state action, which is presumptively unconstitutional. 5
Both proponents of race matching and proponents of transracial adoption
contend that their chosen policy is best for the children involved. Yet the best-
interests-of-the-child standard is of remarkably little use in defining the role
of race in adoption. The meaning of the standard with respect to race is itself
a matter of race politics insofar as different determinations regarding the
significance of race in adoptive placement reflect divergent ideological visions
of the "proper" role of racial identity in socialization. As long as ideological
differences remain significant, so will varied interpretations of the best-
interests-of-the-child standard.
Both supporters and opponents of race matching often assume that putting
an end to the practice would make adoption policy colorblind.16 The race-and-
adoption debate, then, is framed as a contest between those who believe that
race-conscious state action (race matching) furthers the interests of black
children, and those who believe that colorblind state action (transracial
adoption) does so. Contrary to the assumptions that underlie the debate,
however, race matching is not the only form of race-based state action that
structures the adoption process.
Adoption agencies' classification of children on the basis of race 7
facilitates and promotes the exercise of racial preferences by prospective
adoptive parents.18 I term this practice "facilitative accommodation."' 9 When
15. See infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text; infra notes I I 1- 112 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 660
(2d ed. 1987) (stating that applying the holding of Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)-that race-bascd
social preferences may not be taken into account in child custody proceedings-to adoption "would achieve
a useful result in eliminating racial considerations entirely"); Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 IOWA L. REV. 145,
167 (1994) (advocating an end to race matching in order to attain a colorblind adoption process); Chiles,
supra note 2, at 522-23 (assuming that a prohibition on race matching would make adoption colorblind).
But see Twila L. Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and
Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 33, 103 (1993-1994) (observing that, without race
matching, adoption would not become colorblind because white parents would still maintain nearly
exclusive access to white children and would be able to decline to adopt black children). Professor Perry's
analysis is insightful. She is one of the few critics to note that the end of race matching would not make
adoption colorblind. Yet she does not seriously entertain the possibility that adoption should be colorblind.
See id. at 102-04.
17. As Bartholet writes: "An initial order of business of most adoption agencies is the separation of
children and prospective parents into racial classifications and subclassifications. Children in need of homes
are divided into black and white pools. The children in the black pool are then classified by skin tone ......
Bartholet, supra note 10, at 1186. Bartholet describes these practices only in terms of race matching; she
does not identify them as integral to accommodating parents' racial preferences.
18. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER'S EGG 219-22 (1995) (noting that adoption agency
forms asked her whether she had a racial preference). The adoption application used by nearly all agencies
in New York State asks prospective adoptive parents to state a racial preference. See New York State
Department of Social Services Adoption Brochure (visited Apr. 17, 1997) <http://www.state.ny.us/dss/adopt/
brochure.htm#The Adoption Process>.
19. Currently, adoption agency personnel ask prospective adoptive parents what race they would
prefer. Indeed, in most states, adoption agencies, consistent with the applicable state law and regulations,
create lists of children by race. If a prospective parent states a desire for a white child, then the only
children that agency personnel will suggest for adoption will be children from the "white" list. The
prospective parent might be given the list of white children to peruse as well. Having made clear his or her
desire for a white child, this parent would never see the "black" list, nor would agency personnel suggest
[Vol. 107:8975
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engaged in by public agencies, facilitative accommodation, like race matching,
is an instance of race-based state action. In both cases, adoption agencies
racially classify children. Through race matching, the state mandates the
placement of children with parents on the basis of race. Through facilitative
accommodation, the state's racial classification promotes the race-based
decisionmaking of prospective adoptive parents by framing the choice of a
child in terms of race, encouraging parents to consider children based on the
ascribed characteristic of race rather than individually. In both cases, a court,
in finalizing the adoption, validates the actions of the adoption agency.
As a result of facilitative accommodation policies, most black children in
need of adoption are categorically denied, on the basis of race, the opportunity
to be considered individually for adoption by the majority of prospective
adoptive parents. 20 This could not occur were it not for current policies of
facilitative accommodation. 21 The racial classification on which facilitative
accommodation practices rely is the type of harm prohibited by the Equal
Protection Clause.22
Worse, facilitative accommodation reinforces and legitimizes the type of
race-consciousness that produces unjustified racial inequality, both in adoption
and throughout American society. Adoptive parents' racial preferences
dramatically diminish the pool of potential parents available to black children
relative to that available to white children. The pool of parents available to
black children is also of lower average quality than that available to white
children, in part because many of those whites who adopt black children do so
because they are considered by agencies to be among the least desirable
that the parent consider adopting any child from the "'black- list.
Facilitative accommodation policies may also be tacit, by which I mean that the agencies allow
parents to choose based on race without forthrightly asking about the prospective adoptive parents' racial
preferences or compiling race-based lists of available children to aid adoptive parents in exereising their
preferences. Agency personnel might be aware of the centrality of race to an adoptive parent's
decisionmaking and do nothing to discourage or guard against race-bascd decistonmaking. Agency
procedures might still (inadvertently) facilitate an adoptive parent's expression of racial preference. For
example, agencies might show the potential adoptive parent a picture of each child available for adoption.
20. The overwhelming majority of adults seeking to adopt are white and few of these adults would
consider adopting a black child. According to one commentator, only 68,000 of the approximately two
million white couples who said they would like to adopt in 1984 were even willing to consider adopting
a child of another race. See SIMON & ALTSTEIN. TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES AND TIIEIR FAMIUES. supra note
3, at 6 (referring to a 1984 estimate by the President of the National Committee for Adoption). Moreover.
whites who adopt transracially are five times as likely to adopt nonblack children than they are to adopt
black children. See Stolley, supra note 6, at 34. A study conducted in California found that adoptive parents
were less willing to adopt a black child than to adopt a drug-exposed child. See D. Brooks & R.P Barth.
Preferred Characteristics of Children in Need of Adoption Services: A Comparison of Public/Pnvate
Agency and Independent Adopters and Workers' Responses to Expressed Preferences for African American
Children tbl.2 (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
21. For children from the preferred group, race is one factor that may result in their placement, while
for children from the unpreferred group, race is often the determinative factor in their exclusion
22. Cf. Adarand Constructors. Inc. v. Pena. 515 U.S. 200. 225-35 (1995) (holding that all racial
classifications imposed by state actors must be analyzed with strict scrutiny): Richmond v I A Croson Co..
488 U.S. 469, 493-98 (1989) (plurality opinion) (same). For an analysis of facilitative accommodation's
constitutionality, see infra Part II.
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parents for white children. The severity of the social inequality produced by
adoptive parents' preferences is made starkly clear by a fact too often accepted
as inevitable, albeit lamentable, rather than as a predictable outcome of our
own preference-promoting policies: Black children are simply worth less than
white children.
Yet not one legal analyst has argued that public adoption agencies23
cannot (as matter of law) or should not (as a matter of policy) promote
adoptive parents' racial preferences through facilitative accommodation.24
This is especially noteworthy in the case of proponents of transracial
adoption,25 many of whose criticisms of race matching are applicable to
facilitative accommodation as well. Moreover, consideration of facilitative
accommodation follows logically from consideration of race matching (that is,
once one determines that the state should not place children on the basis of
race, one must consider whether it should encourage parents to choose children
based on race). Yet a federal statute that prohibits race matching by adoption
agencies that receive federal funding says nothing about accommodation.26
Thus, current adoption policy allows both facilitative accommodation and the
exercise of the racial preferences that it presupposes. The asymmetry in the
scholarly and public policy analysis of these two instances of race-based
adoption policy is the anomaly that propels this Article.
Analysts assume that adoptive parents' racial preferences cannot or should
not be altered and accept without question that parents should be able to
choose the race of the children they adopt.27 Yet there are alternatives to
23. 1 focus on public adoption agencies because of the constitutional issues implicated and on private
adoption agencies because they are regulated in substantially the same manner as public agencies. The
majority of domestic adoptions between unrelated persons are arranged by adoption agencies. See HARRIS
ET AL., supra note 8, at 1182.
24. So far as I have been able to determine, the issue of facilitative accommodation has never been
litigated. The few commentators who have mentioned facilitative accommodation have done so as a
rhetorical device, in order to demonstrate the implausibility and undesirability of a nonaccommodation
policy. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 16, at 103-04 (criticizing transracial adoption proponents for not
endorsing genuine colorblindness through the prohibition of racial preferences by adoptive parents). Perry
is one of the only commentators even to recognize the race-based nature of adoptive parents' preferences.
See id. Her insight is an important one, upon which this Article builds.
25. This is not to say, however, that my analysis does not apply to proponents of race matching as
well. The gap is apparent in their arguments also, although it is not so conspicuous because their avowedly
race-conscious position could be understood as consistent with facilitative accommodation; the practice does
not contradict their stated norms, values, and ideals. The gap is only troubling in the case of race-matching
opponents because the facilitative accommodation issue is such an obvious and undeniable implication of
their own legal analyses and normative visions.
26. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 671(a)(18), 1996b (West Supp. 1997).
27. Bartholet, for example, dismisses the possibility of not allowing parents to select children based
on race in three brief sentences. See Bartholet, supra note 10, at 1254. Zreczny, in her analysis of race
matching, concludes that "race should never be considered by an administrative body in any placement
proceeding, including the initial adoptive placement setting." Zreczny, supra note 2, at 1151. She then
states, without any empirical or logical support, that "prospective parents should be the only parties allowed
to consider race in their adoption choices. An adoptive family should be permitted to adopt whatever race
child it wants, and administrative agencies should not interfere." Id.
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facilitative accommodation. 28  The alternative that this Article embraces
challenges white same-race preferences, in adoption and elsewhere. I propose
a strict nonaccommodation policy that not only ends current practices of
facilitative accommodation, but ultimately seeks to rid adoption of the racial
preferences that systematically produce racial inequality in contemporary
American society. This approach assumes that personal racial preferences are
not natural, but rather are products of the ways in which legal rules and social
policy have shaped racial identity and race-consciousness. Strict
nonaccommodation is part of the broader project of confronting the white
same-race preferences that create racial inequality in contemporary American
society and reorienting our national debate about racial inequality.
My goal is to recast racial preferences as expressions of social phenomena
rather than merely individual choices. Only if racial preferences are
denaturalized can they be seen as something other than self-evidently
innocuous and individual choices, as the embodiments of the same sentiments
and sensibilities that give rise to racial inequality in a variety of contexts.
White adoptive parents' racial preferences for white children are emblematic
of the race-consciousness that serves as the linchpin of racial inequality.
This Article therefore pursues two related lines of inquiry. First, it
examines the substantive policy issues implicated by the race-and-adoption
debate. Second, it treats the controversy as a case study in the law and politics
of race,29 such that the analysis of race and adoption yields insight into the
nature of race politics and racial inequality more generally. Through an
exploration of the role of racial preferences in adoption, we may better
understand the nature of contemporary racial inequality. Relatedly, the
difficulty of removing racial preferences from adoption may be a measure of
the formidability of those barriers to racial equality that result from and reflect
the same type of race-consciousness that shapes adoption policy. The
particulars of the race-and-adoption controversy suggest a rethinking of both
28. There are three "pure" types of adoptive placement schemes where race is concercd race
matching, facilitative accommodation, and random placement. Race matching could in pnnciple be based
on either racial commonality or racial difference. Facilitative accommodation may take into account the
preferences of birth parents as well as adoptive parents. In practice, the three ideal types may be mixed.
producing a "hybrid" scheme. For example, although race might be a consideration in the placement
process, the agency could attempt to fulfill the adoptive parents* stated preferences. Finally. both hybrid
and pure adoption schemes may be applied differently depending on the race of the parent and child
involved. One might, for example, accommodate the desires of adoptive parents for a transracial placement
but not for a same-race placement. In this Article. I generally focus for analytical purposes on the pure
forms of adoption policy.
29. In taking this approach, I assume that adoption policy and debate N iih respect to race. at least in
part, are shaped by race politics. In this view, the dynamic of the racc-and-adoption controversy is
emblematic of race politics generally. The issues posed by the racc-and-adoption conundrum represent
fundamental questions about the role of race in Amencan society and in social policy, and about the
sources and nature of racial inequality. Of course, the myriad elements of the problem of the color line are
not all refracted through or reflected in the race-and-adoption controversy. But adoption may be
representative enough to provide a helpful way to think about the mechanisms of racial inequality and the
dynamics of contemporary race politics.
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the mechanisms of racial inequality and the nature of contemporary race
politics. The model of race politics suggested by an analysis of the controversy
describes racial inequality as a necessary, rather than contingent or incidental,
feature of the legal and political norms of contemporary American society.
This Article unfolds in five steps. Part I examines the work of a prominent
proponent of transracial adoption, Professor Elizabeth Bartholet. I focus on
Bartholet's work, primarily her 1991 article Where Do Black Children Belong?
The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption,30 because her argument regarding
race and adoption is especially lucid, compelling, and comprehensive, and
because she is the best-known and most outspoken advocate of transracial
adoption. 31 A close examination of Bartholet's work dramatizes the anomaly:
While race matching has been analyzed in great detail, facilitative
accommodation is all but ignored. Bartholet follows this pattern, even though
many aspects of her argument agAinst race matching could be applied to
facilitative accommodation as well. Related to the minimal attention she
accords facilitative accommodation is her failure to describe adoptive parents'
racial preferences as relevant to the racial equality concerns that animate her
work. Her position that adoptive parents should be able to select a child on the
basis of race thus resolves a tension that she does not identify between the
liberty and equality interests of adoptive parents and children, respectively.
30. Bartholet, supra note 10. Bartholet has written several other analyses of race matching, as well
as a variety of articles on other aspects of adoption. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Beyond Biology: The Politics
of Adoption and Reproduction, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 5 (1995); Elizabeth Bartholet, International
Adoption: Current Status and Future Prospects, 3 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 89 (1993); Elizabeth Bartholet,
Transracial Adoption: Race Separatism in the Family: More on the Transracial Adoption Debate, 2 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 99 (1995); Elizabeth Bartholet, What's Wrong with Adoption Law?, 4 INT'L J.
CHILDREN'S RTs. 263 (1996). With respect to race matching, these writings reiterate the views that Where
Do Black Children Belong? put forth. In addition to this legal scholarship, Bartholet has written a
succession of editorials in support of transracial adoption. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Adoption Is About
Family, Not Race, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 5, 1993, at 23; Elizabeth Bartholet, Blood Parents vs. Real Parents,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 13, 1993, at A19; Elizabeth Bartholet, In Foster-Care Limbo, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17,
1992, at 17; see also Elizabeth Bartholet, Letter to the Editor, Rethink Adoption Policy, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 17, 1994, at 14.
31. Where Do Black Children Belong? is now regarded as the centerpiece of the controversy over race
matching in legal scholarship, and is perhaps the single most important defense of transracial adoption.
Indeed, the recent intensification of the scholarly and political debate surrounding race and adoption arose
in part because of Bartholet's forceful writings on this issue. Most of the recent articles about race and
adoption are in conversation with the arguments Bartholet puts forth, even if only implicitly. See, e.g.,
Zreczny, supra note 2. The most insightful legal analysis of transracial adoption prior to Bartholet is
Howard, supra note 2.
Bartholet's work has received a significant amount of attention beyond the legal academy as well.
Her book has been widely reviewed or excerpted in publications ranging from the New York Tines to
Vogue magazine. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Family Matters, VOGUE, Nov. 1993, at 102; Harriet S. Meyer,
Adoption, Assisted Reproduction, 270 JAMA 2383 (1993) (reviewing BARTHOLET, supra note 10); Howard
Davidson, Adoption in the 90s, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 93 (same); Daniel Goldstine, What's the
Difference?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1993, § 7 (Book Review), at 21 (same); Antoinette Martin, Families
by Choice, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July II, 1993, at 6J (same); Carolyn Moore Newberger, Their Bottom
Line: Children Need Families, BOSTON GLOBE, May 23, 1993, at B42 (same).
Bartholet has had some influence on the legislative process as well. See, e.g., Adopting Across Racial
Lines, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 18, 1994, at 12 (noting that Senator Howard Metzenbaum promised a change
in the Multiethnic Placement Act as a result, in part, of "prodding by Bartholet").
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Part II analyzes the constitutionality of current facilitative accommodation
policies in order to demonstrate that the minimal scholarly attention devoted
to the policies cannot be justified on the ground that they present no
constitutional difficulties.32 Facilitative accommodation by public agencies
represents the type of governmental racial classification that the Supreme Court
has rejected. Under current interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause, these
racial classifications should be subject to strict scrutiny and invalidated as
unconstitutional. 33  My conclusion that facilitative accommodation is
unconstitutional, however, should not be misread to suggest that such policies
are the only problem. Many pernicious social practices operate beyond the
reach of the Constitution, often with the aid of policies that, albeit
constitutional, should be condemned as bad policy. The exercise of racial
preferences in adoption is one such practice.
Part Ill describes the causes of the anomaly and sketches its implications.
In the first half of this part, I locate the cause of the anomaly in a widely held
conception of the self and the role of the state vis-,t-vis the individual. The self
is thought to be self-constituting, at least with respect to those values, choices,
and beliefs most integral to individual identity and autonomy. The role of the
state is to make possible the exercise of individual autonomy based on the
subjective values and idiosyncratic desires that each unique individual freely
chooses to embrace. Those expressions of individual choice that are understood
as integral to individual autonomy are not scrutinized for the possibility that
they are socially detrimental expressions of the sort of race-consciousness that
American society might be better off without. Whereas state action raises the
specter of an imposition of coercive orthodoxy, individual decisionmaking
suggests a varied set of outcomes based on subjective, idiosyncratic choice.
In the second half of Part III, I trace the implications of the anomaly. The
differences in perception and interpretation that constitute the anomaly are
much more significant than they might initially appear. Facilitative
accommodation and race matching are not simply different adoption policies;
they are also race-based claims. The anomaly, then, shapes our
interpretation of the role of the claims of blacks and whites in the transracial
adoption debate and, indeed, molds our understanding of the debate itself,
obscuring the systematic role of racial preferences in adoption.
32. As adoption is largely a matter of state law. adoption practices 'ary from state to state Whilc
nearly all states allow facilitative accommodation, the policies may be implemented differently in different
states in ways that would affect their legal validity.
33. "Tacit" facilitative accommodation policies, however. would not be unconstitutional "Tacit" or
"implicit" facilitative accommodation policies are those in which the adoption agency would not ask
prospective adoptive parents to state a racial preference, but the agency would not prohibit parcnts from
selecting a child on the basis of race. The chief difference in the adoption process is that. under a tacit
facilitative accommodation policy, prospective adoptive parents would hase to consider children
individually; the agency would not enable prospective parents to preclude summarily consideration of an
entire race of children.
34. For a definition of race-based claims, see infra Section III.B.
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Part IV generalizes the analysis of the anomaly, developing a model of
race politics that accounts for the creation of racial inequality. If facilitative
accommodation and race matching correspond to the typical forms of race-
based claims of whites and blacks, respectively, then the same processes that
obscure facilitative accommodation and highlight race matching may function
in politics to mask the race-based claims of whites and underscore those of
blacks. In the model of race politics to which my analysis of the adoption
controversy gives rise, racial inequality is a necessary and predictable (rather
than contingent) outcome of "ordinary" political processes.35 As in the case
of adoption, racial inequality results from the apparently isolated,
uncoordinated, personal choices of individuals-race-based choices that the law
allows under the guise of neutrality. I characterize both this process and its
outcome as atomized inequality.
In Part V, I propose a policy of strict nonaccommodation that would
prohibit invidious racial discrimination on the part of adoptive parents in the
selection of a child to become a member of their family. This policy is as
consistent with the best-interests-of-the-child standard as the policies
propounded by proponents of transracial adoption or race matching. More
importantly, it would recognize the fact that racial preferences warrant
particularly close examination because race remains the fault-line of American
society. Indeed, on this view, the principles that strict nonaccommodation
applies are not novel. Instead, the policy draws on established judicial and
legislative approaches and applies them in a novel context.
The potential benefits of strict nonaccommodation are substantial,36 but
so are the impediments to its successful implementation. In addressing
anticipated objections to my proposal, I sketch possible outcomes that might
result from its enactment. The significance of the proposal does not, however,
turn wholly on its political and practical feasibility. The very acts of discussing
and analyzing the proposal could, by themselves, meaningfully alter subsequent
debate about the nature of race politics and the causes of racial inequality.
I. CRITIQUING RACE-BASED ADOPTION POLICY: AN ASYMMETRICAL INQUIRY
How we deal with race in the intimate context of the family says a lot
about how we think about and deal with race in every other context
of our social lives.37
35. In this model, racial inequality is produced primarily in the political, rather than the economic,
realm. In contrast to other theories of inequality, my model of racial inequality could come about without
the aid of discrimination. A norm of nondiscrimination, whether on the part of the state or private parties,
is thus not a sufficient safeguard against racial inequality.
36. For one, it would produce a vastly increased number of homes for racial minority children in need
of adoption. It would also change common expectations and understandings regarding race in a way that
would make racial inequality a less integral feature of American society.
37. Bartholet, supra note 10, at 1174.
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An examination of Elizabeth Bartholet's framing of the issue of race and
adoption is illuminating in two ways. First, her analysis dramatizes the
anomaly of vehement opposition to race matching coupled with minimal
attention to facilitative accommodation policies. She notes the prevalence and
potency of adoptive parents' racial preferences and rigorously applies the
antidiscrimination norm to adoption.38 She acknowledges that public law
influences private values and wholeheartedly embraces a vision of familial and
intimate connection not predicated on racial commonality. These aspects of
Bartholet's analysis should lead her to scrutinize facilitative accommodation;
yet she does not.
Second, Bartholet does not identify any racial equality concerns as
resulting from the racial preferences that, by her own account, shape the
adoption process. While race matching, in Bartholet's analysis, clearly
implicates matters of racial equality, racial preferences and facilitative
accommodation do not. Preferences are assumed to be both pervasive and
somehow innocuous. Racial preferences, and hence facilitative accommodation,
become an unquestioned given, rather than a focus of inquiry.
A. A Race-Matching Critique That Undermines Facilitative Accommodation
1. Ubiquity and Potency of Racial Preferences
Throughout Where Do Black Children Belong?, Bartholet notes the
importance of race to adoptive parents.3" Indeed, the article begins by
observing the importance assigned to race in adoption: "When I first walked
into the world of adoption, I was stunned at the dominant role race played....
It was central to many people's thinking about parenting. And it was a central
organizing principle for the agencies which had been delegated authority to
construct adoptive families."' The prevalence of race, she argues, assumes
38. See id. at 1252 (concluding that "even a mild [racial] preference is unwise as a matter of social
policy" and that the "generally applicable legal rule that race should noi be allosed to play anv role in
social decisionmaking should be held to apply in the adoption area as well" (emphasis added)) Bartholct
is among those legal scholars most opposed to race matching. One of the few transracial adoption
proponents more extreme than Bartholet is Jim Chen. who believes that transracial adoption is important
because "family ties across racial lines will more quickly consume racial animus than any other social or
legal force." Chen, supra note 16, at 167.
39. While asserting that "many [white families] are interested in adopting black children and older
children with serious disabilities." Bartholet. supra note 10. at 1205-06. Banholet acknowledges that "most
prospective white adopters prefer to adopt healthy white infants." id. at 1205.
40. Id. at 1164-65. Bartholet observes that "[r]acial thinking dominates the world of international
adoption as well." Id. at 1167. Those countries that offer white children for adoption are seen as more
preferable places from which to adopt than those counties that offer brown.skinned children for adoption
For example, Brazil is "low on the desirability list for many prospective parents" because many of its
children available for adoption are dark-skinned, while Chile "is considered a highly desirable country
because it has such a white population .... Latin Amencan counties with significant indian or mestizo
but limited black populations generally fall between Chile and Brazil on the desirability list because the
adoption 'market' rates indian as lower than white but higher than black." Id. at 1167
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a special significance in light of the imbalances between the numbers of white
as opposed to black children and the numbers of white as opposed to black
adoptive parents. As Bartholet points out,
The large majority of the people actively looking to adopt in this
country are white and for the most part they want white children, at
least initially. The familiar refrain that there are no children
available for adoption is a reflection of the racial policies of many
adoption agencies and the racial preferences of many adoptive parents.
The reality is that there are very few white children by comparison to
the large pool of would-be white adopters. But there are many
nonwhite children available.4"
Put simply, adoptive parents, most of whom are white, prefer white children
to black children.42 Bartholet does not endorse the racial attitudes of adoptive
parents, however.43 Such a view necessarily would conflict with her own
normative vision of race, family, and community.
2. Nonracialist Vision of Family and Intimate Connection
Bartholet forthrightly embraces a vision of family not predicated upon
racial commonality. It is this vision that fuels her normative critique of the
ideology of race matching and her promotion of transracial adoption. Her
rejection of racialism in the family is part of her rejection of the biological
family as the model against which adoptive families should be compared.4
A core element of Bartholet's overall critique of issues of family and
41. Id. at 1166 (footnotes omitted).
42. As with adoption generally, recent national data on the placement rates for black and white
children and the time they spend waiting to be adopted is not readily available. But all available data
suggests that black children are both less likely to be adopted than white children and likely to spend a
longer time waiting to be adopted. Judith McKenzie notes that "(tlhe proportion of [children of color] in
foster care is three times greater than in the nation's population.... More than half of the children waiting
for adoption nationally are children of color, and this population is rapidly increasing in most states." Judith
K. McKenzie, Adoption of Children with Special Needs, 3 FTrrURE OF CHILDREN 62, 68-69 (1993).
43. See Bartholet, supra note 10, at 1204. Although she does not want agencies to match parent and
child on the basis of race, she does think that agencies should "encourage parents to explore their feeling
with respect to race," which, presumably, might result in more parents deciding to adopt transracially. Id.
at 1253. Bartholet also believes that "(it is important for agencies to try to help parents think through what
they should do to affirm their child's racial identity." Id. at 1254.
44. One element of the biological model of the family is that children and parents should be as
physically similar as possible. I term this the "look-alike urge." The look-alike urge is fundamental to both
race matching and the adoptive parents' desire for a child of the same race. Bartholet believes that
[it could] be an advantage for an adoptee to grow up in a family that is so obviously not
fashioned in imitation of the biological model. Studies indicate that trmnsracial adoptive parents
are more open in discussing adoption with their children and that the children are more likely
to identify themselves as adopted. These findings raise the interesting possibility that, in
transracial adoptive families, the unblinkable difference of race may encourage a healthier
acceptance of the fact that their family is in various other ways not the same as a biological
family.
Id. at 1223 (footnote omitted).
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reproduction is that biological connectedness is unnecessarily elevated to an
ideal that people then strive to fulfill."
Bartholet criticizes the racialist thinking that serves to fuel adoptive
parents' preferences as well as to promote support for race matching. Treating
these attitudes as one species of widespread racialist thinking, she observes:
This adoption world is part of a larger social context in which there
has always been a strong sense that racial differences matter deeply,
and a related suspicion about crossing racial lines. Both black
nationalists and white segregationists promote separatism, especially
in the context of the family, as a way of promoting the power and
cultural integrity of their own group. Even those blacks and whites
generally committed to integration often see the family as the place
to draw the line. 6
Bartholet seems not to want to draw that line. She would like to see more
racial integration in the family, especially given the potential benefits for black
children.47 She criticizes the fact that "recruitment [of adoptive parents] has
not been used in a positive way to encourage white parents to adopt hard-to-
place minority children,"48 and bemoans the fact that "Ithose who believe in
maintaining the separateness of the white community can take comfort from
the fact that current racial policies provide a near absolute guarantee that white
children will not be placed with black parents or with interracial couples.'4 9
Race matching is problematic, in part, because it "serve[s] to prevent racial
integration in the intimate context of the family."'
45. As Bartholet puts it: "Adoption professionals have idealized the biological family and structured
the adoptive family in its image. They have argued that biologic sameness helps make families stork. and
so have promoted the goal of matching adoptive parents with their biologic look-alikes - Id at 1246 These
aspects of Bartholet's thought are developed more fully in her book See BAR'nIOittr, supra note 10 Other
commentators have similarly critiqued the way in which biological, and presumably heterosexual. families
are privileged over other types of families. See. e.g.. Mindy Schulman Roman. Note. Rethinking
Revocation: Adoption from a New Perspective, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv 733, 752 (1995) (arguing that current
law regarding a birth parent's revocation of consent to adoption reflects the fact that judges and statutes
privilege the biological link of the birth mother over the relationship developed %%ith the child by the
adoptive parents).
46. Bartholet, supra note 10, at 1246.
47. Some race-matching commentators, in contrast, beliee that black children ma, suffer from
growing up in a white family because they will lose their cultural identity as black people See. e g.
Townsend, supra note 2, at 180 (claiming that transracially adopted black children "pay a pnce in order
to fit in [and that] children can only act White for so long before they mourn that they are not White-).
Woodhouse, supra note 2, at 127-28 (arguing that transracially adopted children hase identity rights in their
culture of origin).
48. Bartholet, supra note 10. at 1204. Race-matching proponents also focus on the inadequacy of
recruitment, but of black parents rather than white parents. See. e g.. Fenton. supra note 2. at 47-48
(arguing that the adoption system should better meet the needs of black children and that part of that
process involves additional recruitment of black parents): Townsend. supra note 2. at 186 (suggesting ways
of expanding the number of black adoptive parents). For an analysis of the barriers to same-race placement.
see TOM GILLES & JOE KROLL. BARRIERS TO SAME RACE PLACEMiEN%,T 12-15 (1991)
49. Bartholet, supra note 10, at 1246-47.
50. Id. at 1233.
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To document the effects of transracial adoption, Bartholet reviews an
impressive array of studies comparing children adopted transracially to those
adopted by families of the same race and to children raised within their
biological families. In her view, "the studies provide an overwhelming
endorsement of transracial adoption."5' They offer "no basis for concluding
that placement of black children with white rather than black families has any
negative impact on the children's welfare .... [and in fact] provide persuasive
evidence that transracial adoption serves the interests of children. 52
Bartholet especially applauds the racial attitudes of transracially adopted
children insofar as they are characterized by openness and acceptance:
The studies show that black children raised in white homes are
comfortable with their blackness and also uniquely comfortable in
dealing with whites. In addition, the studies show that transracial
adoption has an interesting impact on the racial attitudes of the white
members of these families .... The white as well as the black
children are described as exhibiting an unusual absence of white racial
bias, and as unusually committed to the vision of a pluralistic,
multicolored world in which a person's humanity is more important
than his race.
The studies show parents and children, brothers and sisters,
relating to each other in these transracial families as if race was no
barrier to love and commitment. They show the black adopted and the
white birth children growing up with the sense that race should not be
a barrier in their relationships with people in the larger social
context.
53
As Bartholet correctly points out, whether one views these conclusions as
positive or negative depends entirely on one's political perspective.54 The
perspective viewing them in a negative light, however, only arises within the
context of an "inappropriate separatist agenda ' 55 that has not been legally
sanctioned. In contrast, for one who "believes that blacks and whites should
be learning to live compatibly in one world, with respect and concern for each
other, with appreciation for their racial and cultural differences as well as their
51. Id. at 1208.
52. Id. at 1210. In summarizing several research studies, Bartholet writes:
With astounding uniformity [the] research shows transracial adoption working well from the
viewpoint of the children and the adoptive families involved. The children are doing well in
terms of such factors as achievement, adjustment, and self-esteem. They seem fully integrated
in their families and communities, yet have developed strong senses of racial identity. They are
doing well as compared to minority children adopted inracially and minority children raised by
their biological parents.
Id. at 1209.
53. Id. at 1225-26 (footnotes omitted).
54. See id. at 1216.
55. Id. at 1248.
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common humanity, the evidence is positively heartwarming. "' 6
3. Public Law and Private Values
Bartholet's opposition to race matching is also animated by her sense that
public law shapes private values. She notes that adoptive parents' racial
attitudes "are shaped and conditioned by messages they receive from adoption
workers and the broader society, as well as by the adoption process."" For
one who values integration, race matching's reinforcement of sentiments
opposed to racial integration provides a reason to oppose it. One benefit of
abandoning race matching, then, is that doing so would encourage greater
openness to racial integration, including transracial adoption.
The observation that public policy shapes private values is significant
because a strong argument in favor of facilitative accommodation is that the
policy has no effect on racial preferences. If the expression of racial
preferences were to remain unchanged in the absence of facilitative
accommodation (as it would if preferences were exogenous to policy), then
ending the policy would be an exercise in futility. On the other hand, if
preferences at least in part reflect the values expressed through policy, then
changing the policy may change the preferences. The prevalence of the
preferences could no longer be invoked as a justification for the policy that has
produced them.
4. Application of the Antidiscrimination Norm to Adoption
Bartholet's legal analysis of race matching emphasizes the importance of
the generally accepted norm of nondiscrimination and highlights the fact that
it has not been applied in the adoption context.5" She concludes that the
nondiscrimination norm should preclude most instances of race matching
because there are no persuasive reasons to suspend its applicability to
adoption.59
56. Id. at 1216.
57. Id. at 1249.
58. Numerous other commentators have analyzed the constitutionality of race-matching policies See.
e.g., Rahdert, supra note 2; Glynn, supra note 2: Pattiz. supra note 2: Zreczny. supra note 2 Other
commentators have considered the analogous issue of the role of race in custody determinations See. e g .
Lisa Jonas & Marshall Silverberg, Comment. Race. Cusiody; and [ie Consttution. Palmore % Sidoti. 27
How. LJ. 1549 (1984).
59. See Bartholet, supra note 10, at 1231. Bartholet also contends that the current regime of race
matching does not promote the best interests of children in need of adoptive families See id at 1254-55
This argument rests on two empirical claims. First, she asserts that the policy of race matching keeps black
children in foster care for prolonged periods and creates incentives to place black children in substandard
(same-race) family environments, both of which are detrimental to black children See id at 1193-95
Second, she argues that the beneficial effects of transracial adoption and its lack of negatis e outcomes make
it preferable to the alternatives of no adoption (i.e., keeping children in foster care) or severely delayed
adoption. See id. at 1210. Bartholet concludes that current race-matching policies subvert the bcst-interests-
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Bartholet first identifies the scope and impact of the antidiscrimination
norm, noting that the Federal Constitution, state constitutions, and other
federal, state, and local laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of race by
public entities, as well as by private entities exercising significant power over
our lives: "In the past twenty-five years this body of law has grown so that
today there are guarantees against race discrimination not only in housing,
employment, and public accommodations, but in virtually every area of our
community life." 6 The antidiscrimination principle applies regardless of
whether a challenged action was intended to result in harm. "[E]ven 'benign'
racial classifications are highly suspect and must be limited to narrowly
defined situations."'6' Bartholet cites Palmore v. Sidoti62  and Loving v.
Virginia63 for the proposition that "the state is not permitted to insist that race
count as a factor in the ordering of people's most private lives.
64
Bartholet concludes that current race-matching policies are in conflict with
constitutional and statutory prohibitions on race discrimination and should be
illegal in most cases.65 As she notes, "The fact that race is a recognizable
factor in decision-making is enough under our general anti-discrimination norm
to make out a case of intentional discrimination. Adoption agency policies
make race not merely a factor, but the overwhelmingly significant factor in the
placement process. 66 After considering in detail various possible reasons why
adoption may be exempt from the generally applicable antidiscrimination norm,
Bartholet notes that, although race matching seems, in some sense, benign, it
"fit[s] none of the recognized exceptions to the antidiscrimination norm."67
Race matching does not respond to exigent circumstances, nor does a failure
to race-match pose any serious threat to the preservation of black culture or of
of-the-child standard and contravene the antidiscrimination norm that animates the applicable constitutional
and statutory law. See id. at 1254-55. Thus, race matching is not only bad social policy but may be illegal
as well. Both the legal and policy analyses draw upon Bartholet's normative vision of the role of mce in
the family, including the benefits that she believes will result from racial integration in the family.
60. Id. at 1226.
61. Id. at 1228.
62. 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that consideration of social prejudices based on race is
unconstitutional in custody determinations based on the child's best interests).
63. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional).
64. Bartholet, supra note 10, at 1227.
65. See id. at 1226.
66. Id. at 1229. Bartholet's analysis predates the enactment of the Howard M. Metzenbaum Multicthnic
Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 4056 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1996b
(West Supp. 1997)), and is no longer completely applicable to the extent that MEPA prohibits race
matching. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
67. Bartholet, supra note 10, at 1231. This argument begs the question of whether the best-interests-of-
the-child standard constitutes a compelling governmental interest. If the best-interests-of-the-child standard
is a compelling government interest and if race matching is narrowly tailored to serve that interest, then
race-matching policies would, essentially, be an exception to the antidiscrimination norm's prohibition on
race-conscious state action. This is the approach that many courts have taken. See, e.g., In re R.M.G., 454
A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute that contemplated consideration of race and
holding the statute valid because it allowed the consideration of race as one of many factors). For a
summary of the case law on the use of race as a factor in adoptive placements, see Zitter, supra note 8,
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black Americans as a community.68 Moreover, race matching does not fit
within a diversity- or remedy-based affirmative exception to the
antidiscrimination norm.69 Bartholet concludes that "the powerful preference
for same-race placement embodied in many of today's policies violates
guarantees against discrimination contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
and in the Constitution."70 These same guarantees against discrimination also
make the case against current forms of facilitative accommodation.
B. Affirmation of Racial Autonomy
Bartholet does not treat facilitative accommodation as a race-based social
policy. Although her own observations indicate the prevalence of white
parents' preference for white children, and she believes that race-based policy
promotes race-based preferences, Bartholet identifies no race-based social
policy, other than race matching, to which such preferences are linked. She
comprehensively analyzes race matching but offers almost no critique of
facilitative accommodation.7'
Bartholet could argue, of course, that the race-based state action
characteristic of facilitative accommodation should not be viewed as skeptically
as the race-based state action involved in race matching. She could attempt to
justify race-based state action in furtherance of private preferences. But she
does not make either of these arguments. Bartholet does not treat current
facilitative accommodation policies as even plausibly unconstitutional.
Moreover, she expresses no doubt about the desirability of facilitative
68. See Bartholet, supra note 10, at 1231.
69. See id. at 1232-34.
70. Id. at 1243.
71. In fact, the invisible presence of facilitative accommodation indirectly fuels Barnholct's attack on
race matching. In her analysis, the adverse placement outcomes of black children. which result in pan from
preferences and facilitative accommodation, are attributed to race matching. Given her failure to perceive
the contingent nature of facilitative accommodation, race matching is the only policy to which she can
contemplate linking the undeniably lamentable placement dispanties. The practical outcome is this If one
wants to change social policy to help children in need of adoption, the logical place to look is race
matching, for that is the only adoption policy that is understood to bear on race. Like Barholet. race-
matching proponents do not identify facilitative accommodation and adoptive parents* racial preferences
as causally related to the disparate adoption rates of black and white children.
Given the difficulties of proof, any of three factors could defensibly be identified as the "cause- of
the differential adoption rates of white and black children. A lack of black adoptive parents. race matching.
or facilitative accommodation coupled with adoptive parents' racial preferences could logically cause
differential rates of adoption according to race, insofar as a change in any of these factors might
substantially affect the rate of adoption for black children. There is no empincal evidence that any of these
factors is likely to be more responsible for the differential in adoption rates than the others Race-matching
proponents focus on the relative lack of black adoptive parents while transracial adoption proponents focus
on race-matching policies. Because neither race-matching nor transractal adoption proponents focus on
adoptive parents' racial preferences, they do not consider, in anything but the most cursory fashion, whether
or how racial preferences should be confronted. Moreover, neither group identitfies a race-based state policy
that facilitates such preferences. This is a characteristic Bartholet shares with others who have assessed the
legality of race matching. See Rahdert, supra note 2; Glynn, supra note 2; Pattui. supra note 2. Zreczny.
supra note 2; Reilly, supra note 2.
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accommodation as a social policy. Bartholet recognizes that adoptive parents'
racial preferences shape the adoption process, 72 but she does not identify the
policy of facilitative accommodation as in any way complicit with the
operation of these preferences.73
Consistent with her failure to scrutinize the policy of facilitative
accommodation, Bartholet endorses the expression of adoptive parents' racial
preferences. Indeed, instead of critiquing them, Bartholet indirectly affirms
them. Bartholet couples her recommendation that race matching be abandoned
with an endorsement of parents' right to choose a child from a state-funded
and managed adoption agency on the basis of race. Toward the end of her
article, in discussing the future of adoption policy, she states:
Agencies could and should allow prospective parents . . . to decide
what role race should play in the adoption process .... It is wrong for
the state to presume that a racial match is central to the happiness of
every coupled parent and child. But it is equally wrong for the state
to insist on arranging parent-child couplings without regard to the
racial feelings of the people involved.74
Bartholet's condemnation of race matching and endorsement of parental
autonomy represent a reasonable response to the dilemma of race and adoption.
The cessation of race matching may alter the disparate adoption rates of black
and white children.75 Yet Bartholet's solution wrongly suggests that adoptive
parents' racial preferences raise no issue of racial equality. The fact that race
matching harms children does not mean that facilitative accommodation and
adoptive parents' racial preferences do not. Racial preferences produce
inequality just as surely as race matching, even if they produce it differently.
Adoptive parents' racial preferences deny to black children access to a pool of
potential adoptive parents comparable to that available to white children.
72. See supra Subsection I.A. I.
73. It is entirely possible that Bartholet is aware of the facilitative role of facilitative accommodation
but lacks evidence that these adverse outcomes would not persist in the absence of an explicit facilitative
accommodation policy. After all, adoptive parents might strive to satisfy their racial preferences irrespective
of adoption agency policies or procedures. This explanation is inadequate, however, to explain Bartholet's
lack of analysis. Even in her thorough critique of race matching, Bartholet acknowledges the lack of
conclusive proof that race matching accounts for the adverse outcomes she identifies; as such, she chooses
to draw inferences. She states simply that "there is a strong causal connection between the policies [of race
matching] and the delays and denial of placement that minority children face." Bartholet, supra note 10,
at 1202. She cites the imbalance in the number of black and white adoptive parents relative to black and
white children as providing "significant evidence that the reluctance to place transracially is responsible
for delaying and denying placement to black children." Id. at 1202 n.103.
74. Id. at 1254.
75. Some analyses suggest that promotion of transracial adoption would decrease the racial disparities
in adoption rates. See, e.g., Richard P. Barth, Effects of Age and Race on the Odds of Adoption Versus
Remaining in Long-Term Out-of-Home Care, 76 CHILD WELFARE 285, 302 (1997) (concluding that
"reducing the emphasis on racial matching must be a component of any serious plan to provide equal rights
to a family for African American children").
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Even if the end of race matching causes black children to be adopted in
greater numbers, patterns of racial preference would continue to leave black
children with a smaller pool of potential adoptive parents. Ending race
matching, by itself, would not address this sort of racial inequality, which is
the result of white adoptive parents' racial preferences. The goal of the non-
race-matching system favored by Bartholet would be to allow those white
parents who want to adopt black children to do so, not to change the views of
those who would refuse to do so. Any change in preferences would be a by-
product of the policy rather than its purpose. Such an endorsement of parental
choice represents a resolution to a tension that Bartholet does not squarely
address, between the liberty interests of white adoptive parents, on the one
hand, and the racial equality interests of black children in need of adoption, on
the other.16 Should the right of parents to choose demarcate the limits of
racial equality for children?77
Although Bartholet does not view racial preferences as unalterable, she
does believe that "most black and white prospective parents are likely to
continue to choose same-race children to the extent such children are
available." 79  Adoptive parents' racial preferences, then, become an
unfortunate, yet unquestioned, feature of the social terrain. While Bartholet
critiques the practice of race-based matching by state agencies, she would
allow race-based matching by individual adoptive parents. She thus strikes one
balance between autonomy and equality. As I explain in later parts of this
Article, I strike another. My goal is to put forth an adoption policy that, in
addition to addressing the racial inequality that besets adoption, may also serve
as a model for illuminating and challenging the sources of racial inequality in
a variety of contexts.
76. For path-breaking discussions of the reciprocal nature of legal rights. see W,ley Nevcomb
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning. 23 YAL L- 16 (1913).
and Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning. 26
YALE L. 710 (1917). For a discussion that illuminates the significance of Hohfeld's %%ork by placing it
in historical context, see Joseph William Singer. The Legal Rights Debate tn Analitical Jurispndence from
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 986.
77. For a discussion of the tension between racial equahty and autonomy. see Dorothy Roberts. The
Priority Paradigm: Private Choices and the Linits of Equality. 57 U Prr. L REv. 363 (1996). For an
explanation of this issue in the context of public accommodations laws, see Joseph William Singer.
Property and Equality: Public Accommodations and the Constitution in South Africa and the United States
(1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
78. In fact, Bartholet urges the creation of policies that might prompt more %%hite parents to adopt
transracially. "There can be no doubt that the current racial matching regime, by barring and discouraging
white parents from transracial adoptions, rather than welcoming them in the agency doors, denies adoptive
homes to minority children." Bartholet, supra note 10. at 1206. She also suggests that many adoptive
parents' attitudes about adoption, including the disinclination to adopt across racial lines. "are shaped and
conditioned by messages they receive from adoption workers and the broader society, as ,ell as by the
adoption process." Id. at 1249.
79. Id. at 1251 n.245.
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE OF FACILITATIVE ACCOMMODATION
In this part, I analyze the constitutionality of current facilitative
accommodation policies in order to dramatize further the significance of the
scant attention paid to facilitative accommodation policies and to argue that
such policies are at least arguably unconstitutional. 80 That the question of the
constitutionality of facilitative accommodation affords no quick and easy
answer is part of what makes the relative lack of attention focused on the issue
so troubling. If such policies were clearly constitutional, the fact that they have
not been scrutinized would have little significance. If, on the other hand, such
policies are at least arguably unconstitutional, one would expect some
discussion of the issue. The cessation of current facilitative accommodation
policies is but a first step in ridding adoption of the racial preferences that
produce racial inequality.8' As background to this inquiry, Section II.A
provides a brief overview of the adoption process.82 Section II.B explains the
80. Because my analysis of current equal protection doctrine is a positivist inquiry, my conclusion that
its application would likely invalidate current facilitative accommodation policies should not be taken as
a normative endorsement of the doctrine. The reasons the Supreme Court would oppose current facilitative
accommodation policies are not the same as my own reasons. In my view, the current Court's colorblind
equal protection jurisprudence is deeply and fundamentally flawed in two primary ways. First, it fails to
distinguish those instances of race-based state action that promote and reinforce racial inequality from those
aimed at furthering racial equality. Second, in taking for granted the background social conditions and
processes through which ostensibly race-neutral law may produce race-based outcomes, current doctrine
fails to grapple with the extent to which racial inequality may be promoted by laws that are ostensibly race
neutral. Nonetheless, the fact that I believe current doctrine to be flawed should not suggest that I believe
it to be useless. Even pernicious doctrine may be strategically employed to further salutary goals. My
analysis might thus be termed ruthlessly instrumental.
81. The policies that might arise in response to the invalidation of facilitative accommodation policies
are what I term tacit facilitative accommodation policies. They would not rely on any racial classification
by state agencies. Pursuant to such policies, adoption agencies would neither ask prospective adoptive
parents about their racial preferences nor make children available on a racially selective basis. There would
be no race-based lists of children to facilitate fulfillment of adoptive parents' racial preferences. Instead,
adoption agencies might merely show pictures of each child to potential adoptive parents, who would then
choose a child based on their own idiosyncratic criteria. Many adoptive parents might represent to adoption
agencies that their choice of child was determined by which child seemed to them the most "lovable" and
"cuddly."
Because the revised policy would not explicitly mention race, strict scrutiny would be invoked only
upon a finding of discriminatory purpose. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). For
critiques of the discriminatory intent standard in equal protection doctrine, see Randall L. Kennedy,
McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1404,
1424-25 (1988); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); and Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal
Protection, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105 (1989). The Court would no doubt find insufficient discriminatory intent
to warrant heightened scrutiny, and the new policy would certainly withstand scrutiny under the rational
basis test. The Court would conclude that the new adoption policy assures state neutrality with respect to
race, even as both state officials and members of the Court might acknowledge that the outcomes of the
adoptive process would be just as much determined by parental racial preferences as under the previous
policy. To my mind, however, that the actual outcomes of the adoption process might be the same under
the tacit facilitative accommodation scheme suggests the inadequacy of the discriminatory intent standard
and also raises fundamental questions about the nature and extent of the government's responsibility to
eradicate discrimination that manifests itself through facially neutral governmental policies. Cf Kennedy,
supra, at 1424-25 (critiquing the discriminatory intent standard).
82. I consider adoptions between unrelated parties rather than between relatives. Neither facilitative
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current status of adoption law with respect to racial discrimination." Section
ILC provides a constitutional critique of facilitative accommodation.
A. Overview of the Adoption Process
Adoption, which is generally governed by state law,"' occurs through one
of three channels: public, private, and independent.8 5 Each of these channels
corresponds to a different degree of government involvement. Public adoption
agencies are those governmental units that manage the process of adoption,
typically child welfare agencies.86 Private agencies are nongovernmental units
licensed and regulated by the state.87 Independent adoptions are organized by
private intermediaries, such a lawyers, who establish the links between
adoptive and birth parents. 8' The three different channels through which
adoption occurs vary considerably. At one extreme, independent adoptions,
although regulated by the state, occur with the least amount of governmental
control. The independent adoption system does not rely on government
funding, nor do the intermediaries assume any custodial responsibility over
children. At the other extreme, public adoption agencies are usually run by
state child welfare departments. Such agencies, which also manage foster-care
systems, are funded and regulated by the government. Private adoption
agencies fall between these two extremes. Although nongovernmental, they are
often heavily dependent on government funding. They frequently assume
responsibility for children who have entered public child welfare systems. Both
private and public agencies are involved in the adoption process in a more
accommodation nor race matching usually arises in the case of adoptions beisseen related panics (of course.
if the child's family includes members of different races. the race-matching issue might arise) Unlike
adoption between unrelated parties, familial adoption often merely legally recognizes an existing
relationship between adoptive parent and child. See CLARK. supra note 16. at 648 (stating that in adoptions
between relatives there is often "'every reason to grant the adoption decree")
83. As part of my research into facilitative accommodation policies and parental racial preferences.
I interviewed dozens of individuals involved in adoption placement, research, and policy These individuals
and their organizational affiliations include Richard Barth. School of Social Welfare. University of
California at Berkeley; Cheryl Carter-Shoits. Americans for African Adoptions; Felix Fornmo. Adoptive
Parents Committee; Susan Freivalds, National Adoption Foundation. John Gaudiosi. Children's Bureau.
Department of Health and Human Services; John Hargrove. Children's Bureau. Department of Health and
Human Services; Carolyn Johnson, National Adoption Center. Joe Kroll. North American Council on
Adoptable Children; Betty Laning, Open Door Society; Ernesto Loperena. Ness York Council on Adoptable
Children; Penny Maza, Children's Bureau, Department of Health and Human Serices. William Pierce.
National Council for Adoption; Patrick Purtill. National Council for Adoption. Carolyn Smith.
Massachusetts Adoption Resource Exchange; Ann Sullivan. Child Welfare League of America; and Toshio
Tatara, American Public Welfare Association.
84. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 1165 (noting that "laldoption is largely governed by state law.
and specific statutory requirements vary significantly from state to state").
85. See id. at 1179-84.
86. See id. at 1180.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 1179.
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ongoing fashion than the adoption intermediaries who arrange independent
adoptions.
The parents and children served by independent, private agency, and public
agency adoptions differ along a number of dimensions: race, socioeconomic
status, and, for the children, age and health status. Public agencies generally
work with children who have entered the child welfare system because of some
problem at home. Independent adoption, in contrast, involves children who are
voluntarily placed for adoption, usually as infants. Parents who pursue
independent adoption are on the whole of higher socioeconomic status and
more likely to be white than parents who adopt through the public system.89
Infants, black or white, are more likely to be placed through private or
independent adoption than through the public system.90 The public system
also serves relatively more racial minority children than does independent
adoption.9' As this description suggests, the adoption "market" is highly
segmented, with many agencies serving only particular types of children and
parents.
There are two stages to the adoption process. First, there must be a
termination of the parental rights of the child's biological parents. 92 The
termination can either be voluntary (e.g., where the parent willingly
relinquishes the child for adoption) or involuntary (e.g., where a child is
removed from the home due to abuse or neglect). 93 Second, parental rights
must be legally vested in the adoptive parents. Both steps require a judicial
proceeding.94 Only a court with proper jurisdiction can terminate the rights
of the biological parents or create rights in the adoptive parents.
Adoption agencies play a crucial role in this process. Through the exercise
of its broad authority,95 an agency oversees and manages the process through
which adoptive child and parent are matched.96 The agency decides which
89. Cf RICHARD P. BARTH Er AL., ADOPTION IN CALIFORNIA: CURRENT DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILES AND
PROJECTIONS THROUGH THE END OF THE CENTURY 64 (1995) (noting that in California "since 1989, public
agencies have been increasingly less likely to place children in families earning $50,000 or more, and more
likely to place them in families earning less than $30,000"). This same study notes that those adopting from
agencies have lower education levels than those adopting independently. See id.
90. See HARRIS Er AL., supra note 8, at 1183 (citing Center for the Future of Children, Adoption:
Overview and Major Recommendations, 3 FtrrURE OF CHILDREN 4, 14 (1993)); cf. BARTH Lr AL., supra
note 89, at 42 (finding that in California, "children adopted independently tend to be less than one month
old when adopted").
91. See HARRIS Er AL., supra note 8, at 1183; cf BARTH ERT AL., supra note 89, at 40 (reporting that
in California, "Caucasian children comprise the largest proportion of independent adoptions" while "African
American children consistently have had low representation in independent adoption").
92. See HARRIS Er AL., supra note 8, at 1165.
93. See id. at 1165-67.
94. See CLARK, supra note 16, at 905.
95. See id. at 651 (noting that agencies possess "considerable legal power over the grant or denial of
adoptions"); HARRIS Er AL., supra note 8, at 1179-80.
96. See CLARK, supra note 16, at 650-51 (describing the responsibilities of adoption agencies as
consisting of "investigations and evaluations by trained persons of the child, his natural parents, and the
adoptive parents [and the provision of] counseling services to the natural parents ... and to the adoptive
parents"); HARRIS Er AL., supra note 8, at 1179-80; ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD,
[Vol. 107: 875
Racial Preferences in Adoption
family the child should be placed with or, if necessary, places the child in
foster care and assumes legal custody of the child. 97 The agency interacts
with both adoptive parents and birth parents. The agency counsels birth
parents, assures that voluntary relinquishments meet the legal requirements of
voluntariness, and performs other functions as necessary. The agency screens
adoptive parents to assess their suitability for adoption, considers the parents'
preferences for a child, and matches adoptive parents and children. As the
arranger of the adoption, the agency makes recommendations to the court
regarding the desirability of the adoption." Typically, courts follow these
recommendations." Thus, the judiciary customarily validates and gives legal
effect to the process and outcome that result from the agency's management
of the adoption process.
B. Current State of Adoption Law
Currently, no state or federal statute explicitly regulates facilitative
accommodation. Accordingly, observers assume that the law permits adoption
agencies to classify children on the basis of race and to accommodate the
racial preferences of adoptive parents.' As with race matching, a survey of
statutory law yields little insight into the prevalence or effect of facilitative
accommodation.' 0 ' Facilitative accommodation flourishes through lack of
prohibition because it is deeply embedded in the institutional practices of
adoption agencies.
To promote suitable matches, adoption law is strongly oriented toward
fulfilling the preferences of adoptive parents. "2 Adoption agencies attempt
to ascertain and fulfill the preferences of adoptive parents as a means of
determining and creating an appropriate placement. 10 3 Prospective adoptive
parents are generally allowed to express preferences in a wide variety of areas.
Health, age, sex, appearance, and prior experiences are all areas in which
FAMILY AND STATE 691-94 (1989) (discussing agency adoptions and companng them to independent
adoptions).
97. See CLARK, supra note 16, at 651-55.
98. See id. at 652 (concluding that "ultimately the adoption decision rests in the sound discretion of
the trial court as guided and informed by the agency's reporl" about the appropriateness of the placement).
99. See HARRIS Er AL., supra note 8. at 118 1.
100. This observation is based on my conversations with a wide range of researchers. policy analysts.
government officials, and adoption agency personnel. See supra note 83.
101. As Bartholet notes, "Unfortunately, there has been no systematic documentation of the specifics
of current racial matching policies .... They are generally unwritten, and what is written may give few
clues or even false clues as to the unwritten reality." Bartholet. supra note 10. at 1184-85
102. Cf Fenton, supra note 2. at 39 ("Adoption developed in this country to meet the needs of rich.
white, infertile couples who wished to have a family.").
103. During earlier eras. it was thought that agencies could create the most appropriate placement by
matching adoptive parents and children based on a host of characteristics, an approach that comported with
adoptive parents' preferences in that most adoptive parents have always preferred to adopt child who is
"like" them. See supra note 8; supra note 44 and accompanying text
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parents may say what type of children they want. Race is recognized as one
of many reasonable preferences parents are likely to hold.
The only laws that proscribe the consideration of race in adoption apply
to race matching. At the state level, laws regarding race matching vary from
one jurisdiction to another.' 4 At the federal level, the Multiethnic Placement
Act'0 5 prohibits race matching by agencies that receive federal funding for
adoption or foster care. Although the Multiethnic Placement Act has been
widely discussed as an effort to make the adoption process
nondiscriminatory, °6 the Act does nothing to prohibit facilitative
accommodation by adoption agencies that receive federal funding. 7
C. Challenging Facilitative Accommodation
The prevalence of race matching has masked the significance of facilitative
accommodation. Nearly all of the cases involving race and adoption have
involved challenges to race matching.'0 8 No court has had the opportunity to
rule on the constitutionality of current policies of facilitative accommodation.
1. Harm of Facilitative Accommodation
The first step in evaluating the constitutionality of facilitative
accommodation policies is to identify the harm that the practice causes. The
harm of current facilitative accommodation policies, in short, is that they
enable adoptive parents to consider children by racial group, rather than
individually. Thus, they allow, indeed encourage, parents summarily to exclude
from consideration an entire race of children in need of adoption. This could
not occur in the absence of facilitative accommodation.
Although facilitative accommodation applies whether parents prefer black
children or white children, its apparent symmetry is more the semblance than
104. California, for example, established placement preferences, including race, that adoption agency
personnel should consider in making a placement. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708 (West 1997); see also
Chiles, supra note 2 (discussing Arkansas); Glynn, supra note 2 (discussing Minnesota).
105. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1996b (West Supp. 1997). The originally enacted version of the Multiethnic
Placement Act prohibited delay in the placement of a child caused by attempts to race-match, but it also
explicitly contemplated the consideration of race as long as doing so did not result in delay. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 5115a(a)(2) (West 1995) (repealed 1996). The Act as amended now reads:
A person or government that is involved in adoption or foster care placements may not-
(A) deny to any individual the opportunity to become an adoptive or a foster parent, on
the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the individual, or of the child, involved; or
(B) delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into foster care, on the basis
of the race, color, or national origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child, involved.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1996b(l) (West Supp. 1997).
106. See, e.g., Chiles, supra note 2, at 505.
107. The Act's sponsor, Senator Howard Metzenbaum, failed even to mention the issue of facilitative
accommodation in his discussions of the Act. See, e.g., Metzenbaum, supra note 5.
108. A fairly comprehensive listing of the cases involving race and adoption can be found in Zitter,
supra note 8.
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the substance of equality.' 9 Because most adoptive parents are white, and
because most potential adoptive parents prefer to adopt children of their own
race, most black children are categorically excluded from the opportunity to
be considered individually for inclusion in the families of many adoptive
parents." The denial of individual consideration made possible by adoption
agencies' policies of facilitative accommodation is significant because that
harm is precisely the type of harm that the Supreme Court has previously
identified as an evil of racial classification."' Racial classifications are
wrong, according to the Court, because they promote the treatment of citizens
on the basis of the groups to which they belong rather than as individuals." 2
The widespread policy of accommodating adoptive parents' racial
preferences burdens a subgroup of black Americans-namely, black children
placed for adoption-who are uniquely powerless, isolated, and unrepresented
in the political process. The group that current facilitative accommodation
policies most burden does not include white children. Although white children
are harmed by facilitative accommodation, they are not harmed to the same
degree that black children are. White children are categorically excluded on the
basis of race from consideration for inclusion in those families that state
preferences for black children, but the magnitude of this injury is not as great
as the respective harm to black children given the racial composition of the
pool of adoptive parents. Because black parents (who typically want black
children) constitute only a small portion of the total pool of adoptive parents,
109. Even if white children did suffer a magnitude of injury similar to that of black children. that
would not immunize the racial classification from strict scrutiny or otherwis validate it as
nondiscriminatory. As the Supreme Court has noted. "Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through
indiscriminate imposition of inequalities." Shelley v. Kraemer. 334 U S. I. 22 (1948)
110. There is no serious dispute that the overwhelming majority of whites would not want to adopt
black children. See supra note 20.
Ill. See. e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. 515 U S. 200. 239 (1995) (Scalia. J. concumng
in the judgment) (emphasizing "the Constitution's focus upon the individual"); Northeaster Fla. Chapter
of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville. 508 U.S. 656. 666 (1993) (describing
the injury of racial classification as a "denial of equal treatment ... not the ultimate inability t) obtain the
benefit"); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.. 488 U.S. 469. 493 (1989) (plurality opinion) (describing
the evil of the affirmative action plan at issue as denying cetain cittzens "the opportunity to compete for
a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race"). Many legal scholars have also
embraced the view that racial classifications by the govemment are inherently wrong See., e g. CHARLES
FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTion 90 (1991) (stating that one of the core
principles of the Constitution is "the basic right of every person to be considered as a distinct individual
and not in terms of the groups to which the government says he belongs").
112. Justices Scalia and Thomas have been the most outspoken proponents of this stance, As Justice
Scalia stated in Croson:
The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discnmination is as nothing compared wvith the
difficulty of eradicating from our society the souree of those effects. which is the tendency-
fatal to a Nation such as ours--to classify and judge men and women on the basis of their
country of origin or the color of their skin.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J.. concumng). Or as Justice Thomas stated in Adarand. "[Raciall
classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on the indi'idual and our society [Rlacial
discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious
prejudice. In each instance, it is racial discnmination. plain and simple." Adarand. 515 U S at 241
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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white children as a group are categorically excluded from only a small portion
of adoptive families. Current facilitative accommodation practices do not result
in an overwhelming majority of adoptive parents who decline, on the basis of
race, to consider any white child for adoption.
Moreover, facilitative accommodation does not burden blacks generally
because black adults and black children not placed for adoption are unaffected
by it (at least directly). Black prospective adoptive parents are offered the same
right as white parents to express a racial preference. Whether facilitative
accommodation legally burdens the biological parents of black children placed
for adoption is uncertain, in that those parents retain no legally cognizable
interest in their biological children's welfare after relinquishment of their
parental rights." 3
A more generalized and diffuse harm of current facilitative accommodation
policies is that they promote and reflect racial bias to the extent that they arise
from the desire to allow adoptive parents to shield themselves from the social
disapproval that might accompany the parents' adoption of a child of another
race. The Supreme Court has held that state actions may be unconstitutional
if they take account of race in such a manner as to promote, reflect, or further
racial bias. As the Court announced in Palmore v. Sidoti:t1 4 "Private [racial]
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect.""'5 In Palmore, a husband sought custody from
his former wife of their small child based on the fact that, after the wife got
custody, she began to live with and later married a black man. The trial court
held that the "social stigmatization" that the child would face as a result of
growing up in a biracial household demanded an award of custody to the
father."t 6 Without disputing the trial court's finding that racial prejudice
would make the child's life difficult, the Court unanimously held that the trial
court's consideration of race violated the Equal Protection Clause." 7 The
Court reasoned that "[t]he effects of racial prejudice, however real, cannot
justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the custody of its
natural mother."'"18  Allowing such classification would impermissibly
countenance bigotry. "The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but
neither can it tolerate them.""' 9
113. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 1165-67 (discussing termination of the rights of the
biological parent). In voluntary adoptions, however, the child's biological parent is increasingly given a
voice in the selection of the adoptive parents. See Mark T. McDermott, Agency Versus independent
Adoption: The Case for Independent Adoption, 3 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 146, 146-47 (1993) (stating that,
from the birthparents' perspective, one advantage of independent adoptions is the ability to play an active
role in the selection of adoptive parents).
114. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
115. Id. at 433.
116. Id. at 431.
117. See id. at 433.
118. Id. at 434.
119. Id. at 433. The general principle of Palmore is essential to judicial evaluation of statutes or other
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2. Strict Scrutiny of Facilitative Racial Classification?
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
governmental policies and practices constituting racial classifications are
subject to strict scrutiny and are generally invalidated as unconstitutional.' 2
In the past, racial classifications were subjected to less than strict scrutiny if
they were intended to promote diversity,'"' to benefit historically
disadvantaged racial minorities by combating persistent discrimination, 2  or
to remedy the lingering effects of past discrimination.'2 3 More recently,
however, the Court has subjected even purportedly benign racial classifications
to strict scrutiny, 12 in part based on the view that racial classifications are
inherently stigmatizing.'2 As a plurality of the Court has stated: 'There is
simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial'
and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial
inferiority or simple racial politics.' 2 6 Alternatively stated, the Court
"subject[s] racial classifications to strict scrutiny precisely because that scrutiny
governmental action premised on racial sentiments. If courts had allowed the racial sentiments or
preferences of private individuals to be the basis for state action. Brown %- Board of Educatwn. 347 U S
483 (1953), and its progeny might never have come to pass. As evident in the Court's opinion in Plessv
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the invocation of "*natural" private racial sentiments served for many
years as a reliable justification of de jure segregation. If the state could give public effect to private racial
sentiments, the constitutional prohibition of racial discnmination %,ould be eviscerated
120. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors. Inc. v. Pena. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to
a purportedly remedial racial classification by the federal government); City of Richmond v J A Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to a remedial racial classification by
a city government); Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. I. 11 (1967) ("ITIlhe Equal Protection Clause demands
that racial classifications ... be subjected to the *most rigid scrutiny.' (quoting Korematsu v United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944))).
121. Justice Powell first articulated the diversity rationale for racial classifications. See Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265. 313-14 (1978).
122. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (subjecting a benign racial
classification by the federal government to intermediate scrutiny).
123. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448. 484 (1980) (plurality opinion) (approving the use
of a racial classification to remedy past discrimination). Even if these exceptions to strict scrutiny were still
valid, accommodation of adoptive parents' racial preferences would be difficult to justify as either remedial
or diversity-based. Racial classification of adoptive children does not promote diversity in that it facilitates
adoptive parents' preferences for same-race families. Instead, such a classification may impede integration
by entrenching and contributing to the perpetuation of racial homogeneity %,ithm the family
Accommodation does not fare much better under the remedial rationale. The adoptive classification helps
to limit a child's opportunity to be considered individually for inclusion in the families of the majority of
adoptive parents. It is difficult to imagine a rationale according to which the classification is meant either
to remedy the effects of past discrimination or to counter the persictence of racial bias
124. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (plurality opinion) (applying stict scrutiny in
finding unconstitutional a redistricting plan creating majonty-minonty congressional districts). Miller v
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (same). As Justice Scalia stated in his concurrence in Adarand"
To pursue the concept of racial entitlement---even for the most admirable and benign of
purposes-is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced
race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of goermment. %%e arc just one race
here. It is American.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia. J., concurring).
125. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion)
126. Id.
The Yale Law Journal
is necessary to determine whether they are benign ... or whether they misuse
race and foster harmful and divisive stereotypes without a compelling
justification."' 127 If current facilitative accommodation policies constitute a
racial classification, therefore, they should be subjected to strict scrutiny.
Moreover, they should arguably be subjected to the "strictest" scrutiny in light
of the powerlessness of the black children they affect and the likelihood that
such children's interests would not be protected by, or even represented in, the
political processes that condone facilitative accommodation policies.2'
Nevertheless, the threshold question remains: Do current facilitative
accommodation policies represent a racial classification? Most of these policies
undeniably rely upon race: Adoption agencies assign children to racial groups
and then affirmatively use that information to satisfy the racial preferences of
adoptive parents. Adoption agencies routinely and of their own accord frame
the choice of a child in terms of race. In general, the courts have treated such
instances of governmental reliance on race as a racial classification. Supreme
Court precedent yields three categories of justifications for not treating
governmental reliance on race as a racial classification subject to strict
scrutiny. The state's racial reliance may not call for strict scrutiny if (1) race
is considered only as one factor among many; (2) the maintenance of racially
identified information serves recordkeeping purposes; or (3) the state's reliance
on race is not formalized in writing so as to become an official aspect of state
policy. 2 9 I will analyze each of these exceptions in turn.
The race-as-one-factor-among-many exception has been relevant to cases
regarding legislative districting, criminal profiles, and, ironically, race matching
in adoption. Although the distinction between race as "a factor" and "the
factor" once enjoyed wider judicial application and acceptance than it currently
does, 30 recent decisions by the Court in the context of legislative districting
underscore its continuing vitality. In litigation under the Voting Rights
Act,' 3' the Court has accepted the view that a legislative district in the
drawing of which race was only one of many factors should not be viewed as
a racial classification. 32 Although the members of the Court disagree on the
threshold use of race that triggers strict scrutiny, a majority of the Court seems
to embrace the view that a minimal reliance on race does not trigger the racial
127. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1963 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
128. Although the current Court does not appear to embrace such a political process approach to
judicial review, I believe that such an approach is still a good one. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST (1974) (advocating an approach to judicial review based on United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938), in which courts intervene on behalf of "discrete" and "insular"
minorities lacking adequate political representation).
129. The typology is mine, of course, not the Court's.
130. Justice Powell, for example, seized on the distinction in Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-19 (1978).
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973 (1994).
132. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1941 (plurality opinion); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
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classification rule. 33  Similarly, in criminal profile cases, courts have
countenanced law enforcement officers' reliance on race so long as it was not
the primary or sole factor motivating the decision to detain a suspect."
Finally, with respect to race matching in adoption, courts have generally
allowed agencies to consider race in both foster care and adoptive placements,
so long as they do not use race categorically to preclude the possibility of
transracial placements.'
35
Under current facilitative accommodation policies, race is typically
sufficient, by itself, to exclude a child from being considered by a prospective
adoptive parent. Far from treating race as one of many factors, facilitative
accommodation involves the use of race as a determinative factor in the
selection of children by adoptive parents. Current facilitative accommodation
policies allow adoptive parents to exclude an entire race of children purely on
the basis of race. Most parents take the opportunity to do so.' Race is
generally not considered by parents in conjunction with other factors; there is
no balancing of myriad concerns, no comparison of competing considerations.
Instead, those parents who avail themselves of the agency's racial classification
typically use it to exclude all children of the races that the parents disfavor.
This is precisely what adoption agencies expect and is part of why race plays
such a prominent role in the application process.
Other factors, such as age, sex, and handicap status, may supply a basis
for exclusion as well, and no doubt some black children would have been
excluded on the basis of these other factors, irrespective of race. But the fact
that these children might have been excluded on the basis of other factors
should not obscure that they might have been excluded on the basis of race
alone. Admittedly, facilitative accommodation is not a prototypical case of
race-based state action in that the state's racial classification does not mandate
the ultimate use to which race may be put. That race is typically a basis on
133. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1951 (O'Connor. J.. concumngl (Stnct scrutiny does not apply merely
because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race. Nor does it apply to all case-, of intentional
creation of majority-minority districts." (citations omitted)): see also id. at 1974 (Ste% ens. J , dissenting)
134. In United States v Martfmez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543. 563 (1976). the Court reasoned that United
States border patrol agents could take apparent Mexican appearance into account in detcrtnining %% ich car'
to stop in the effort to halt the flow of illegal aliens into the United States from Mexico In United States
v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc). the Sixth Circuit upheld the stopping of a blalk man
exiting an airport terminal after arriving from another state in spite of eidence that the man % as suspected
of being a drug courier at least in part based on his race
135. See, e.g., ]i re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982) (upholding a Distrct ol Columbia statute
authorizing the consideration of race in adoption proceedings). see" also J H H %Ollara. 878 F 2d 240
(8th Cir. 1989) (allowing the consideration of race as a factor in foter care placements). Drummond
Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Sen's., 563 F.2d 1200. 1205 (5th Cir 1977) (concluding that
"'the difficulties inherent in interracial adoption' justify the consideration of 'race as a rnlecsant factor in
adoption"' (quoting Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F Supp 264. 266 (E D La 1972t)). In r" Dav is. 465 A 2d
614, 624 (Pa. 1983) (noting that race may not be "undul) emphasized" by the placement agenct) The
Supreme Court has never ruled on race matching
136. It might be a different case, of course, if race only entered the process at the behest of adoptive
parents. In fact, it is typically the agency, not the parents. that first frames the choice in terns of race
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which children are excluded from consideration is, one may argue, a private
matter of parental choice rather than a public matter of state agency policy.
This distinction is accurate but, perhaps, not so important. The argument is not
that adoptive parents' choices constitute state action but that the state's framing
the decision in racial terms is race-based state action. While the mere
presentation of the opportunity to choose on the basis of race does not require
parents to choose in this way, parents would not be able categorically to
choose on the basis of race without facilitative accommodation. Without
facilitative accommodation, parents' race-based decisionmaking would have to
proceed one child at a time.
The second exception to the rule that racial classifications are subject to
strict scrutiny pertains to recordkeeping. In Tancil v. Woolls, 3 7 for example,
the Court summarily affirmed a lower court judgment regarding Virginia
statutes that required the state to maintain voting, property, and divorce records
on the basis of race. The lower court had invalidated portions of the statute
that required the maintenance of racially designated property tax voting
records, but upheld those that required racial designations on divorce records.
The court did not apply strict scrutiny to either set of provisions, an approach
with which the Supreme Court agreed.
A justification for the court's decision not to subject the Tancil statutes to
strict scrutiny is that no government action, services, benefits, or decisions
flowed from the statutes' racial designations. The case involved no claim that
the state's racial recordkeeping would be used to effect differential access to,
or distribution of, government services or benefits. This rationale suggests that
the government's simply taking account of race is not sufficient to create a
racial classification; some additional action must turn on the classification.
This exception to the norm of colorblindness allows racial recordkeeping
to enforce antidiscrimination laws. 3' Such practices are warranted under a
rationale similar to that in Tancil: The state does not intend to use race-based
records to distribute government benefits or services or to perform government
functions in a racially selective manner. To the extent that such records do
alter the provision of government services, benefits, or functions, it is to
correct for infringements of constitutionally protected or statutorily created
rights that the race-based recordkeeping identifies. Race-based recordkeeping,
in some contexts at least, is essential to the enforcement of our nation's
antidiscrimination laws.
Under current facilitative accommodation policies, however, government
services and benefits turn on the racial listing of children in need of adoption.
Public adoption agencies provide state services. If part of such services is the
137. 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (per curiam).
138. Cf. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971) (acknowledging that in
school segregation cases race must be taken into account not only to determine whether a constitutional
violation has occurred, but also to fashion an appropriate remedy).
[Vol. 107: 875
Racial Preferences in Adoption
opportunity to be considered individually for adoption, then the state's racial
classification differentially affects, on the basis of race, a child's receipt of that
service. Indeed, the agencies' racial classifications cannot be justified on the
grounds that they are simply for recordkeeping purposes or that they facilitate
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws; the classifications represent
government complicity in widespread discrimination that denies children, on
the basis of race, the opportunity to be considered individually."3 9
The third exception to the rule that racial classifications are subject to
strict scrutiny is where state actions are not the result of a formal, written
policy. In the suspect profile cases,4 for example, there was no formal,
written policy on the role of race in investigatory work.'" In contrast,
current facilitative accommodation policies are formal. The racial designation
is written into adoption agency applications as part of the screening through
which adoptive parents first enter the process. And to comply with prospective
adoptive parents' stated preferences, agencies racially classify the children who
are waiting to be adopted.
The policy of facilitative accommodation cannot, therefore, avoid the
application of strict scrutiny under any of the Court's existing exceptions. The
Court has not proclaimed any exception for classifications that facilitate private
racial preferences. In fact, the Court has subjected to strict scrutiny and
invalidated just such classifications. In Anderson vi Martin,4 " for example,
the Court invalidated, as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, a state law
that mandated that "the nomination papers and ballots . . . designate the race
of candidates for elective office."' |4 3 The law applied to white and black
candidates alike. As with current facilitative accommodation policies, voters
were free to disregard the racial designation. The Court struck the law down
nevertheless, reasoning that "by placing a racial label on a candidate at the
most crucial stage in the electoral process . . . the State furnishes a vehicle by
which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to operate against one group
because of race and for another."'"
139. Under the Tancil exception, an agency's mere compilation of the race of children it place, for
adoption would not be a racial classification subject to stict scrutiny Nor should a racc-based ht of
adoptive parents maintained in order to track the experiences of different racial groups in the adoption
process. It would be ironic indeed if the antidiscnmtnation norm precluded maintenance of the race-based
records necessary to measure the effectiveness of other antidtrscnmination measures.
140. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
141. In both United States it Martinez-Fuerte. 428 U.S. 543. 563-64 (1976). and United States v
Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 578 (6th Cir. 1972) (en bane), the courts noted that the la%% enforcement officers had
declined to commit to writing any suspect profile that included race.
142. 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
143. Id. at 400.
144. Id. at 402. The Court's ruling did not rely on the notion of discnminatory intent since the Court
did not define intent as the constitutional standard for racial discnimination until ltVahington v Davis. 426
U.S. 229 (1976).
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As with facilitative accommodation, the constitutional challenge to the
statute at issue in Anderson did not implicate voters' right to select the
candidate of their choice. As the Court noted:
[I]t is well that we point out what this case does not involve. It has
nothing whatever to do with the right of a citizen to cast his vote for
whomever he chooses and for whatever reason he pleases or to
receive all information concerning a candidate which is necessary to
a proper exercise of his franchise. It has to do only with the right of
a State to require or encourage its voters to discriminate upon the
grounds of race.'45
Similarly, the constitutional infirmity of current facilitative accommodation
policies does not depend on whether prospective adoptive parents should be
able to consider race in selecting children. Instead, the constitutional infirmity
pertains to the government's role in the perpetuation and encouragement of
race-based private decisionmaking. The invalidation of facilitative
accommodation would clearly prohibit only public adoption agencies from
affirmatively framing the choice of a child in terms of race.
In sum, because facilitative accommodation is a systematic, formalized
practice that encourages parents to rely on race as a decisive factor in
determining which children they will individually consider for adoption, the
current facilitative accommodation policies of public adoption agencies should
be treated by courts as a racial classification and subjected to strict
scrutiny. 146
3. Application of Strict Scrutiny
When strict scrutiny is applied, a policy that classifies citizens on the basis
of race is upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling
governmental interest. 4 7 Do current facilitative accommodation policies
further any compelling state interest? If so, are they narrowly tailored with
respect to promoting that interest?
Facilitative accommodation policies are perhaps intended to further the
best interests of children in need of adoption by precluding their placement
with adoptive parents who do not want them on account of race. 48 Although
145. Anderson, 375 U.S. at 402 (emphasis added).
146. Facilitative accommodation policies could also be held invalid under federal and state
antidiscrimination statutes. For example, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1994), prohibits racial discrimination by bodies that receive federal funds.
147. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995).
148. An argument that embodies a perhaps more realistic expression of the goals and sensibilities that
animate adoption law and policy is that facilitative accommodation serves the interests of adoptive parents.
To the extent that the public adoption system depends on the support of potential adoptive parents, the
system must be attuned to their desires and preferences. But stating the compelling interest in these terms
merely begs the question of whether adoptive parents' racial preferences are the sorts of choices that the
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the best-interests-of-the-child standard is the central principle of child welfare
policy,'49 the Supreme Court has declined to hold that furtherance of the
standard is a compelling government interest. Instead, the Court has held only
that furtherance of the standard is a "substantial government interest. " ",
Lower courts, however, have treated the best-interests-of-the-child standard as
a compelling state interest.1St
Even assuming that serving the best interests of adoptive children is a
compriling state interest, facilitative accommodation policies must also be
narrowly tailored to promote that interest if they are to survive strict scrutiny.
There is little reason to conclude, however, that current facilitative
accommodation policies are necessary to avoid inappropriate placements. Being
placed with a parent who does not want him or her is clearly adverse to a
child's best interest, but current facilitative accommodation policies play no
role in avoiding such adverse outcomes. The cessation of facilitative
accommodation policies would not in any way lessen prospective adoptive
parents' ability to select children on whatever basis they choose. Adoption is
about matching a parent to a child, not a parent to a race. The best interests
of adoptive children are furthered by matching individual children to parents,
not by allowing prospective adoptive parents to preclude consideration of an
entire group of children on the basis of race. Adoption agencies could avoid
adverse placements by allowing prospective parents to spend time with a
prospective adoptee. If the match seems to be a bad one or if the parent rejects
the child, for whatever reason, then the adoption should not go forward.'
5 2
The cessation of current facilitative accommodation policies, therefore,
would not coerce parents to adopt any child against their will, on the basis of
race or otherwise, or any child whom they felt unsuited to parent properly.
Moreover, adoption agencies have an obligation to assess the suitability and
fitness of prospective adoptive parents, and they would continue to do so in the
absence of facilitative accommodation. If an agency determines that a
law should reflect and promote.
149. See. e.g., Eubanks, supra note 2, at 1233-35 (-Fhe best interests standard has been wtdely used
as the appropriate test in deciding child placement, both in custody and adoption proceedings. Generally,
the best interests standard holds that the sole guideline in determining placement of the child should be
furtherance of the welfare of the child." (footnote omtted)). An excellent analysis of the best-interests
standard in the context of transracial adoption is Howard. supra note 2
150. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429. 433 (1984).
151. See, e.g., In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776. 786 (D.C 1982)
152. No doubt, at least some adoptive parents would decline to adopt a particular child on account of
race. The state, however, would not be involved in promoting or legitimizing such rae-based
decisionmaking. In any event, one wonders whether potential parents who feel strongly enough about race
to reject a child solely on that basis should be allowed to adopt a child at all The racial sentiments that
animate such a choice might not create a positive and loving environment for any child. To take an extreme
example, the racial views of white supremacists who reject a black child on the basis of race might also
harm any white child they adopt. Perhaps the racial views of all parents should be in estigated. whether
they adopt transracially or not. Indeed, attitudes toward a child on account of race are as reasonable a basis
for disqualification of an adoptive parent as the socioeconomic and lifestyle standards upon % hich agencies
currently rely. I owe this insight to Rachel Moran and Ruth-Arlene Hosse.
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particular child should not be placed with a particular adoptive parent, it would
decline to make such a placement.
Facilitative accommodation might also be thought to further the best
interests of children by promoting the systemic goals of efficient and accessible
adoption. If adoption agencies were prohibited from making children available
on a racially selective basis or from providing racially identifying information
about children, the adoption process might become more burdensome and
inefficient, resulting in fewer adoptions. The additional burdens might be
substantial enough to cause some portion of adoptive parents to leave the
public system or not to adopt at all. Either way, children would lose because
the aggregate number of adoptions would decrease. As I discuss in Part V,
however, the adverse outcomes of ending current policies may not be as dire
as many people would imagine.
Facilitative accommodation might also be justified as furthering adoptive
parents' interest in establishing an adoptive family modeled on the biological
family. The policy and adoptive parents' preferences, in this view, may in fact
be less about race than about establishing an adoptive family that mirrors as
closely as possible the biological family that the parents might otherwise have
had. Both the policy and the preferences could thus be justified on nonracial
grounds. As I demonstrate in Part IV, however, the way in which "biological"
goals take on a racial cast only becomes intelligible in light of the racial
assumptions of American society. Adoptive parents' means of modeling their
adoptive family on the template of the biological family ultimately collapses
back into race.
4. Liberty, Privacy, and Personhood Defenses
The most intuitively compelling argument against invalidation of current
facilitative accommodation policies is that such policies are necessary to secure
adoptive parents' rights to liberty, privacy, or personhood. 53 Under this
view, if current facilitative accommodation policies are essential to furthering
adoptive parents' privacy or liberty interests, they are not only constitutionally
permitted, but constitutionally required. The Court has recognized two types
of constitutionally protected privacy interests relevant to the race-and-adoption
issue: associational and decisional interests.154 Both interests acquire special
153. I make no attempt to draw analytical distinctions between these overlapping concepts, which I
understand to encompass associational interests as well. Throughout this section, I use the terms privacy
and liberty almost interchangeably. The scholarly literature in the area is voluminous. For an insightful
analysis of such rights, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15-1 to -21 (2d ed.
1988). See also Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989); Kendall Thomas,
Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (1992).
154. The Court has recognized constitutionally protected privacy interests in numerous cases. See, e.g.,
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (striking down a state law interfering with the fundamental right
to marry); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion) (striking down a
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importance in the context of the family. Indeed, the Court has long recognized
a "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.
" 15
The Court has, on many occasions, recognized the importance of
decisional privacy, most notably in the landmark abortion case Roe v:
Wade.156 Roe and its progeny can be read to stand for the proposition that
some matters are so inherently personal and integral to one's personhood that
decisions bearing on such matters must be made by the individual rather than
by the state.'57
The Court has repeatedly held as well that government action may not
unduly interfere with one's right to associate with whomever one desires.' 5
Associational interests prohibit not only laws that directly proscribe
associational freedom, but also any law that exerts a "deterrent effect on the
free enjoyment of the right to associate."' 59 Moreover, such interests obtain
a special significance in the context of the family. In Moore v. Ciry of East
Cleveland,'6° for example, the Court invalidated a local zoning law that
defined "single family" in a manner that excluded two cousins and their
grandmother, thus prohibiting them from living together in a house zoned for
a "single family." In distinguishing the East Cleveland regulation from other
zoning ordinances that the Court had previously upheld, 16' the Court noted
that East Cleveland chose "to regulate the occupancy of its housing by slicing
deeply into the family itself."' 62 Similarly, in Loving v Virginia, 163 the
Court invalidated on both due process and equal protection grounds a Virginia
miscegenation law that prohibited whites and nonwhites from marrying each
other. The Court emphasized the importance of the family context: "The
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."'' "
zoning ordinance that limited residential occupancy to a statutonly defined family). Roe '% Wade. 410 U S
113 (1973) (striking down state laws prohibiting abortion): Eisenstadt % Baird. 405 U S 438 (19721
(recognizing the privacy right of unmamed persons to use contraception), Boddie % Connecticut. 401 U S
371 (1971) (holding that states must permit access to courts if they are the only means for dtssol'ing
marriages); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967) (strking down statutes prohibiting interracial marnage),
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the use of contraception by mamed persons
falls within the zone of privacy): NAACP v. Alabama. 357 U.S 449 (1958) (upholding associational
interests). But see Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a statutory prohibition on
consensual homosexual sodomy).
155. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (plurality opinion) (citing Prnce v Massachuseus. 321 U S 158. 166
(1944)).
156. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
157. See. e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 505 U S. 833. 852 (1992)
158. See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 505-06 (plurality opinion); NAACP v. Alabama. 357 U S at 460
159. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 466 (invalidating a state statute that required the NAACP to
disclose its membership lists).
160. 431 U.S. 494 (1997) (plurality optnion).
161. In Village of Belle Terre it Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974). the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that
regulated occupancy of residences by unrelated individuals.
162. Moore, 431 U.S. at 498 (plurality opinion).
163. 388 U.S. I (1967).
164. Id. at 12.
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Freedom of choice may well be the byword of constitutional jurisprudence
regarding state constraints on individual associational and decisional rights.
Individuals must be allowed to choose; the state may not choose for them.
Indeed, nearly all of the state statutes invalidated on the grounds of decisional
or associational privacy interests have been prohibitive, usurping individuals'
right to choose. 165 The right to choose is nowhere more important than in the
intimate realm of family. 166 Because matters of family formation in particular
can implicate both associational and decisional interests, individuals' liberty
interests are especially weighty in that context. Adoption is one such mode of
family formation; therefore, adoptive parents' interests seem especially
weighty.
As a threshold matter, however, it is not clear that prospective adoptive
parents would be able to assert any legally cognizable privacy- or liberty-based
interest. The Court has never recognized a constitutional right to become an
adoptive parent. Nor do foster parents have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest with respect to their foster child. 167 Of course, parents who have
adopted a child possess the same liberty and privacy rights as biological
parents. But the issue of facilitative accommodation concerns the rights of
prospective adoptive parents, who have no preexisting legally recognized
interest in a relationship with any particular child.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that prospective adoptive parents
have decisional and associational rights to choose, the cessation of current
facilitative accommodation policies would not violate those rights. In a post-
accommodation world, prospective adoptive parents would remain able to
select a child as they see fit. Ending facilitative accommodation would not
coerce any adoptive parents into unpreferred family arrangements. The
withdrawal of one basis of government facilitation of private choice would not
substitute state orthodoxy. The scope of individual choice of prospective
adoptive parents would remain as broad as under current facilitative
accommodation policies. Only explicit state facilitation of race-based choices
165. The Court is especially solicitous with respect to government actions that impede or distort the
political process. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (holding that a law
limiting the approved uses of busing imposed substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities); Hunter
v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (striking down the portion of a city charter requiring the approval by the
city council and a majority of voters to pass any ordinance regulating housing discrimination based on race
or religion); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (affirming the California Supreme Court's
invalidation of a housing law designed to allow private discrimination). The Court has noted, however, that
even statutes that facilitate, rather than require, private choice based on race may be constitutionally invalid.
See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (striking down a Louisiana election law that mandated the
inclusion of each candidate's race on nomination papers and election ballots); see also supra text
accompanying notes 142-145.
166. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("IThe Court has long
recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
167. See Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1207 (5th
Cir. 1977) (concluding that foster parents' relationship to their foster child "is not a protected liberty
interest, but [is] an interest limited by the very laws which create it").
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would be eliminated. Indeed, the cessation of current facilitative
accommodation policies could only infringe adoptive parents' interests if the
state were required to facilitate the racial decisionmaking of prospective
adoptive parents. The Court has never recognized any such affirmative state
duties. Constitutional rights are negative; they define where the state may not
go, not where it must.16 8
Moreover, the argument against facilitative accommodation is not that it
infringes the rights of prospective adoptive parents but that it violate the rights
of the children awaiting adoption. However important the permissive-coercive
distinction with respect to parents' rights, its relevance to children in need of
adoption is minimal. That adoptive parents may choose not to avail themselves
of the opportunity offered by agencies' racial classification of children does not
negate the harm that black children suffer as a result of being racially
classified by the very governmental agencies that have assumed responsibility
for their well-being. Black children have little "choice" but to suffer the
discriminatory practices that government policy promotes.
D. Summary
One cannot be certain how the Court would rule on facilitative
accommodation. The Court's stance toward racial classifications suggests that
it would invalidate such a policy. Although not identical to the types of
classifications that the Court has struck down in the past, facilitative
accommodation fits within no recognized exception to the racial classification
rule. But the Court might not treat facilitative accommodation as a racial
classification at all. The Court might hold, for example, that the state's action
merely facilitates parents' preexisting preferences and that the policy does not
effect any particular outcome. The racial designation would be emphasized as
a basis of private, but not government, decisionmaking. The Court might
identify the intimate and personal nature of adoption, a means of family
formation, as justifying the priority of parents' preferences and might argue
that any stigma suffered by children from the classification would be less than
the stigma associated with individual rejection. The Court might even justify
facilitative accommodation on the ground of administrative convenience in that
the policy makes the adoption process less expensive than it would otherwise
be. However the Court would rule, the constitutionality of facilitative
accommodation is uncertain enough that the failure of commentators to address
the issue is noteworthy.
168. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 268 U.S 510 (1925) (onalidating a statute that required
parents to have their children educated in public schools). M~e)r % Nebraska. 262 U S 390 (1923)
(invalidating a law that forbade the teaching of modern languages other than English to young
schoolchildren).
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III. SOURCES OF THE ANOMALY
How can we account for the paucity of attention that facilitative
accommodation has received? Given the volume and apparent thoroughness of
the scholarly attention focused on race matching,' 69 and the complicated
constitutional character of facilitative accommodation, how could facilitative
accommodation have been overlooked? What accounts for this anomaly? What
are its implications?
In the first half of this part, I identify the cause of this anomaly. I locate
it in a widely held implicit conception of the individual as autonomous,
private, and self-deliberating, an understanding characteristic of the social
vision of contemporary liberalism.170 Our conception of the nature of the self
and the role of the state vis- -vis the individual shapes our understanding of
both "private" racial preferences and the state action that promotes them. It
causes us to view adoptive parents' racial preferences as natural and not as the
products of particular legal rules, social practices, or the dynamics of racial
group competition.171 Relatedly, we tacitly posit individual autonomy in
opposition to state action such that state policies that constrain individual
choice in personal matters are perceived as state action while those that
promote it are not. Consequently, we suppress awareness of the extent to
which state action facilitates the racial preferences of adoptive parents.
In the second half of this part, I consider how the anomaly shapes
understandings of the race-and-adoption debate. That we perceive race
matching, but not facilitative accommodation, as an instance of race-based state
action is more significant than it might seem, for facilitative accommodation
and race matching are not simply alternative adoption policies. As outcomes
of race politics and expressions of symbolic racial group conflict, they are also
race-based claims. 72 Facilitative accommodation is a white race-based claim;
race matching, a black race-based claim. Our asymmetrical identification of the
race-based claims of blacks and whites in adoption policy shapes public
interpretation of the debate. Proponents of transracial adoption are seen as
advocates of racially egalitarian adoption who place the needs of children
above the demands of race politics. Supporters of race matching, in contrast,
169. See sources cited supra notes 2-5.
170. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. I (1995).
171. It is as though adoptive parents' racial preferences constitute a background rule. As Duncan
Kennedy notes:
We assert that something that is background for others is causally important in the hope that
if we are right, and we can make people see it, we will make it plausible that there are more
ways to change the status quo than previously appeared. We argue against that part of its
legitimacy that derived from its appearance of inevitability.
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 248 (1997).
172. Race-based claims are those policy positions whose appeal stems in part from the fact that they
further, or are perceived to further, a particular racial group's interests, either in symbolic or practical terms.
See infra Section III.B.
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appear as an ideologically rigid, politically oriented interest group who may be
willing to sacrifice the well-being of children for the sake of promoting a
racially separatist agenda.
A. Individualism: An Interpretive Prism
Our conception of the nature of the self and of the role of the state vis-,-
vis the individual is reflected in two widely shared intuitions. First, those
aspects of the self most central to identity are thought to exist separate and
apart from legal rules and the social processes they engender. Second, the role
of the state, and of law, is to allow individuals to choose their life projects and
individual identities as they see fit.' 3 We understand the individual as self-
constituting, self-deliberating, and seeking his own subjectively chosen ends
in life. 74 Those desires most central to individual identity are thought to
derive from individual values and motivations rather than from social processes
and group dynamics. The more personal and intimate the matters to which
racial attitudes relate, the more likely we are to think of them as expressions
of the autonomous and self-deliberating individual, unmoored from social,
historical, and symbolic processes. The more public the subject of the attitudes,
the more likely we are to view them as having been generated external to the
self, perhaps by legal rules and social practices. Racial attitudes about the most
intimate of matters are, in this view, considered both extralegal and natural, an
interpretation that the resistance to change of relative racial attitudes
supports. 175 In matters of legal regulation as well, change in public-regarding
attitudes is generally easier to bring about than change in private-regarding
ones.
The more personal and intimate the issues to which racial attitudes relate,
the less likely we are to evaluate them morally. Attitudes regarding those
matters considered to be uniquely within the province of individual discretion
are insulated from moral scrutiny and are less likely to be viewed as
173. Robert Nozick provides a paricularly strong defense of this notion. See ROBERT NOZICK.
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 29-35 (1974); see also RONALD DWORKIN. A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 205-06
(1985) ("[L]iberalism as based on equality justifies the traditional liberal principle that go'crnmcnt should
not enforce private morality."); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 190 (1993) (noting that "'one common
theme of liberal thought is that the state must not favor any comprehensive docirines and their associated
conception of the good"); N\illiam Hohengarten. Note. Samne-Se.% Marriage and the Right of Privacy. 103
YALE L.J. 1495, 1527-31 (1994) (arguing that the right of privacy is a shield against state standardization
of individuals' life patterns and choices). A well-known critic of this view of liberalism is Michael J
Sandel. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCON,7TE.N (1996) thereinafter SANDEL. DEMOCRACY'S
DISCONTENT]; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LiMrrS OF JLSTICE (1982) [hereinafter SANDEL.
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE].
174. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 265 (1986) (describing the ideal of autonomous
persons creating their own lives through progressive choices from a multiplicity of valuable options).
175. See Emory S. Bogardus, Measuring Social Distance. 9 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL 299.299-308 (1925).
For a more recent investigation of social distancing, see J. Daniel Cover. The Effects of Social Contact on
Prejudice, 135 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 403 (1995); and Suzanne Nickolai-Mays & Beverly Grottkau. Attitudes
Toward Social Distancing, EDUCATION. Fall 1991. at 144.
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expressions of bias, prejudice, or stereotyping, all of which are morally
disfavored. Attitudes about public issues, in contrast, attract moral judgments.
The result is that we may think less of someone who believes that blacks and
whites should not work together or attend school together than we would of
someone who preferred to marry within his own race. Thus, people are less
likely to make moral evaluations about precisely those issues that are most
resistant to change.
Attitudes seem more a matter of individual choice and identity the more
they diverge from the norm. Personal beliefs and attitudes become perceptually
salient to the extent that they are differentiated from the social
background. 176 We do not seek the causes of an attitude or belief in the
absence of an individual who has differentiated himself from the social
background. Nonconforming attitudes and beliefs function more as a marker
of individual character and values than the same beliefs would if they were
widely held. We attribute significance to uncommon personal views.
177
Conversely, insofar as one expresses an attitude about which there is near
consensus, the attitude will not be seen as worthy of notice.7 8 Nor would it
elicit moral evaluation. Because individual choices integral to identity are
personally chosen, based on subjective values, we expect the social outcomes
of these intimate choices to be varied, irregular, and unsystematic, an
expression of the idiosyncratic elements that make up each individual's unique
personality. 17
9
Those aspects of autonomy,80 identity, and privacy that are thought to
be integral to the individual are all deemed of value to society. Those
preferences, values, and choices that are integral to or seem to affirm
individual autonomy, privacy, or identity are viewed as important as well.
They become objects of state protection or interests that the state attempts to
further. Because they are subjectively chosen and integral to individual
identity, we are hesitant to criticize them morally. We distinguish morally
between those attitudes articulated in a manner that suggests the affirmation
of individual dignity and worth and those attitudes that we interpret as denying
individual social worth or derogating individual uniqueness. Attitudes that are
framed as preferences based on race are not equated with attitudes that premise
176. See Reid Hastie, Causes and Effects of CausalAnribution, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
44, 44-56 (1984); Bernard Weiner, "Spontaneous " Causal Thinking, 97 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74, 81-83 (1985).
177. See Weiner, supra note 176, at 80-81.
178. See Edward E. Jones et al., Role Playing Variations and Their Informational Value for Person
Perception, 63 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 302, 303 (1961); Harold H. Kelly, Attribution in Social
Interaction, in A1-rRIBUT1ON: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR 1, 19 (Edward E. Jones et al. eds.,
1972).
179. Cf Rogers M. Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEx. L. REV. 175 (1982) (linking
autonomy to a relativist conception of value choice).
180. See STEVEN LUKES, INDIVIDUALISM 56 (1973) (arguing that autonomy is a value that has always
been central to liberalism). The classic account of individual autonomy is JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY
(David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1975) (1859).
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rejection on the basis of race, even though there is little logical distinction
between the two.' 8 ' Attitudes expressed as preference are insulated from
scrutiny because they seem to affirm individual worth. Conversely, attitudes
framed as dispreferences are understood as denial of the worth of the other.
Thus, our moral response to a sentiment results in part from whether it is
expressed as a preference (which we interpret as affirming individual autonomy
and identity) or as a dispreference (which we interpret as negating the value
of individual identity). Preferences for people in intimate settings are not
subjected to moral scrutiny, even if dispreferences elicit moral censure. "
Constitutional law protects individuals' rights against the state.' State
action, not private action, raises the specter of orthodoxy; state action, not
private action, therefore, represents the sort of power that the Constitution
seeks to constrain. Indeed, we intuitively situate individual autonomy in
opposition to state action. The infringement of choice underscores the presence
of the state while the promotion of choice obscures it. The measure of state
uninvolvement, of state neutrality, is understood as the range of discretion
through which individuals are allowed to realize their privately formulated
desires, goals, and values."" The presence of choice obscures the extent of
affirmative state involvement. State action deemed constitutionally
impermissible usually constrains, rather than promotes, individual choice.,
Yet, while individual choice is central to our perception of state action, the
most intimate of individual choices are not understood as a product of state
policy at all. Instead, they are assumed to be chosen personally and to be a
reflection of subjective values and goals that express each individual's unique
181. Cf. Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Bias in the Minumal Intergroup Situauton A Cognitive.
Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 307. 321-22 (1979) (noting that people are more willing to
express in-group favoritism than out-group derogation)
182. One may, however, have a moral and legal right to make choices that would themselves be
evaluated as immoral. See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong' Biases.
Preferences, Stereotypes. and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 149. 156 (1992) (noting that "having the moral
liberty to do X does not mean that doing X is either morally correct or free from moral criticism")
183. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I. 22 (1948) (noting that "'Itlhe rights created by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual landi are personal
rights"). Many legal scholars question whether rights should be conceived of as individual possessions See.
e.g., Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PIIIL. & PUB. AFIF 107 (1976) (arguing that
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause should rely on a principle of group diadvantage rather than
of antidiscrimination); Charles Lawrence Ill, Foreword: Race. Multiculturalism. and lie Jurispridence of
Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1995) (urging that the law focus not only on procedural fairness
for individuals, but also on issues of substantive equality for groups).
184. See RAWLS, supra note 173, at 192 (describing, as one meaning of state neutrality, the view "'that
the state is to ensure for all citizens equal opportunity to advance any conception of the good they freely
affirm"). Thus, adoption policies that promote individual choice imply the absence of tate involvement.
or at least preclude the possibility of state infringement of anyone's rights Therefore. unless a state policy
explicitly constrains individual choice, as with race matching. %%e assume away state invol'.ement.
185. This is not to say that all state burdens or limitations on inditidual choice are considered
unconstitutional state action. The Supreme Court has allowed, for example. prohibitions on homosexual
sodomy. See Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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personality."8 6 Thus, those private preferences and attitudes most integral to
individual autonomy and identity are understood neither as a product of social
dynamics nor as a proper object of legal regulation.
1. Individualism and State Action
Although I have argued that both race matching and facilitative
accommodation constitute state action under current judicial standards, the
presumably traditional perception of whether state action exists turns on the
link between the state's role and individual autonomy. Facilitative
accommodation promotes individual choice, while race matching thwarts it.
Race matching is seen as state action because it prohibits adoptive parents'
exercise of their racial preferences, while facilitative accommodation is not
viewed as state action because it merely facilitates parents' racial preferences.
Facilitative accommodation is seen as neutral state deference to private choice,
while race matching is perceived as the imposition of orthodoxy through state
action. "'
With facilitative accommodation, the state's assent to private choices about
family formation, whatever the basis of these choices, blinds us to its active
entanglement with racial preferences. 8 Agencies' acquiescence to a wide
range of adoptive parent preferences, racial ones among them, is understood
as simply a means of providing a service in a way calculated best to meet the
needs of the likely consumers. Race matching, in contrast, presents the state
as regulator rather than as service provider.'89 Indeed, race matching
interferes with the expression and fulfillment of the individual preferences of
adoptive parents. Thus, race matching is understood by proponents and critics
alike as intervention in, and regulation of, the adoption process, whereas
facilitative accommodation is perceived as mere market facilitation and
efficient service provision.
For similar reasons, we view supporters of race matching as a special
interest, a race-based group with a political agenda, while we view supporters
of facilitative accommodation as lacking an organized political agenda, let
alone a race-based one. The most visible and effective supporter of race
186. See LUKES, supra note 180, at 52 (describing autonomy as a condition in which "an individual's
thought and action is his own, and not determined by agencies or causes outside his control").
187. This characterization is adopted by both proponents and critics of transracial adoption. They share
the view that race matching is state involvement and, by implication, that facilitative accommodation is not.
They differ only about whether race matching is a justifiable or prudent form of state regulation.
188. This analysis suggests that one criticism of a proposal for nonaccommodation is that it unduly
"interferes" with the natural functioning of the adoption process. Prohibition of racial preferences would
seem more like government regulation than facilitative accommodation, even though there is no logical and
defensible distinction between the two.
189. Race matching could be understood as providing a service to adoptive children, but unfortunately
the adoption process, in spite of claims to the contrary, is generally understood more through reference to
the needs of adoptive parents than of children in need of adoption. See Howe, supra note 2, at 140.
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matching has been the National Association of Black Social Workers
(NABSW). In 1972, the group issued a position paper that has been described
as a manifesto in support of race matching.' 90 As the group readily admits,
the issue is both political and race-based. In fact, the group's success at
politicizing the issue has resulted, in part, from its assertions regarding the
issue's racial dimensions. NABSW casts the issue in terms of group interests,
describing transracial adoption as a threat to the welfare of the black
community. Not only does the group make the issue racial, the group is
explicitly racial-it is the National Association of Black Social Workers.
In contrast, the supporters of facilitative accommodation would likely
include prospective adoptive parents who would not comprise an organized
political group, much less one with avowedly racial aims or composition. One
could not imagine their issuance of a "manifesto" in favor of facilitative
accommodation. Nor would they be likely to advocate an explicitly racial
position. Their argument in favor of facilitative accommodation would be
couched almost wholly in terms of the importance of individual choice, the
intimate nature of decisions about family formation, and the overriding
significance to children of being wanted by the families that adopt them-all
rationales that appear not to bear on race at all.
As individual decisionmaking becomes more salient, the role of the state
becomes less noticeable. It is as though we understand the world through
reference to an equation in which individual action and state action are
inversely related.' 1 Stated most generally, rules of prohibition are understood
as involving the state, but rules of permission are not.'92 The realization of
individual preference implies the absence of state orthodoxy and hence of state
regulation. We remain alert to the uses and potential abuses of state power, but
190. NABSW Position Paper, supra note 9. reprinted in SIMON & ALTSTEIN. TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION.
supra note 3, at 50. The position paper described transracial adoption as a form of "'genocide," SIMON &
ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION, supra note 3. at 52; see supra note 9. NABSW has periodically
reaffirmed this position. As the President of the NABSW stated in 1985:
We are opposed to transracial adoption as a solution to permanency placement for Black
children. We have an ethnic, moral and professional obligation to oppose transracial adoption.
We are therefore legally justified in our efforts to protect the rights of Black children. Black
families, and the Black community. We view the placement of Black children in white homes
as a hostile act against our community. It is a blatant form of race and cultural genocide.
Barriers to Adoption: Hearings Before the Senate Comn. on Labor and Human Resources. 99th Cong. 214
(1985) (statement of William T. Merritt, President, NABSW).
191. This is not always true, of course. Invalid state action is not always identified as that which limits
individual autonomy. In the areas of politics especially, the Court has struck down laws that expand the
scope of at least some citizens' autonomy. See. e.g.. Reitman v. Mulkey. 387 U.S. 369. 380-81 (1967)
(affirming a state court's invalidation of a law that prevented the state from limiting private rights to
discriminate in the housing market); Anderson v. Martin. 375 U.S. 399. 402 (1964) (invalidating a state
law that required ballots to identify the race of candidates because it effectvely "encouraged]. voters
to discriminate upon the grounds of race").
192. We tend not to see state involvement as long as the state is not mandating that we do something;
state involvement is equated with state prohibition. Duncan Kennedy notes. "we don't think of ground rules
of permission as ground rules at all, by contrast with ground rules of prohibition." DUNCAN KENNEDY.
SEXY DRESSING ETC. 90 (1993).
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we are disinclined to view individual choice as a form of public power
appropriately constrained through constitutional doctrine.
2. Individualism and Racial Preferences
Although adoptive parents' preferences are viewed as race-based, the
policy that supports them is not. Even as the racial element of the preferences
is undeniable, we suppress awareness of the racial nature of the policy of
facilitative accommodation. The invisibility of the policy of facilitative
accommodation is linked in part to our perception and evaluation of the racial
preferences that the policy presupposes. Although we are aware of the racial
character of adoptive parents' preferences, we do not understand them as
having been generated by legal rules, state policy, and the social practices that
state policies legitimate. It is as if racial preferences in adoption come from
outside the law. Taking account of them through law is, then, if not the natural
thing to do, at least a presumptively legitimate course of action.'93
Alternatively, if we saw racial preferences as generated by the law, we would
scrutinize both the preferences and the legal framework within which they
arise. They could not be treated as a preexisting and unalterable feature of the
social terrain.
Not only are racial preferences in adoption understood as extralegal, but
they are not seen as inherently troublesome or problematic. We take for
granted that an individual would want to adopt a child of his own race. We see
little reason to question the assumptions, beliefs, and values that underlie such
preferences. We are unlikely to characterize an adoptive parent's preference for
a white child as a type of racial bias, prejudice, or stereotyping. Because racial
preferences in the context of intimacy and family life, including adoptive
parents' preferences, seem so quintessentially personal and so much a matter
of individual choice, we unself-consciously sever such preferences from the
sociohistorical processes of group conflict and racial ideology 94 that have
helped to generate them.' 95 Adoptive parents' racial preferences, then, are
193. Because same-race preferences are not critiqued, no questions arise as to the wisdom of policies
of facilitative accommodation. Conversely, because facilitative accommodation is not seen as a policy
choice, the contingency of racial preferences is never recognized. Causality is difficult to disentangle. Our
attitudes toward same-race preferences probably cause us not to scrutinize facilitative accommodation, and
the naturalness of the facilitative accommodation policy provides no impetus to question the nature of our
own racial preferences. Indeed, if racial preferences were genuinely unalterable, then there would perhaps
be only one sensible policy. Because racial preferences seem so inevitable and unavoidable, a policy that
defers to them does not seem like a policy at all.
194. Ironically, attitudes toward matters of intimate interracial affiliation, such as sexual relations, may
reside at the core of sociohistorical patterns of racial conflict and inequality. See CALVIN C. HERNTON, SEX
AND RACISM IN AMERICA passim (1965); CHARLES HERBERT STEMBER, SEXUAL RACISM: THE EMOTIONAL
BARRIER TO AN INTEGRATED SocIETY passim (1976).
195. To her credit, Bartholet asks more questions in this regard than most prospective adoptive parents
probably do. She wonders about the nature of her racial choices and what they say about her. See
BARTHOLET, supra note 10, at 169-70.
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regarded as expressions of individual choice akin to preferences based on hair
color, eye color, or age.
19 6
The failure to scrutinize the nature of racial preferences is nowhere more
evident than in the designation of some children as having "special needs." On
a widespread basis, racial minority children are labeled as having "special
needs" because, on account of their race, most adoptive parents do not want
to adopt them.'97 Black children are therefore classed with blind children,
deaf children, children with cerebral palsy, drug-addicted children, and so
forth. As one scholar notes: "Black children, by the mere fact of their racial
status, are labeled as 'hard-to-place' or 'special needs' children. [These terms]
have focused the problem with the child rather than with the system that does
not adequately serve their [sic] needs. '" ' The preferences of adoptive parents
are recast as the "needs" of black children. This designation shifts attention
away from the adoptive parents to the children in need of adoption; the desires
of parents are recast as the deficiencies of children, deflecting all attention
from the nature, motivation, and origin of the choices made by prospective
adoptive parents.
The (mis)perceptions produced by our implicit understanding of individual
choice and autonomy are self-perpetuating. The failure to see the legally
problematic nature of facilitative accommodation removes from the debate any
policy option that does not presume the naturalness and immutability of racial
preferences. In turn, failure to consider policies that challenge racial
preferences in adoption reinforces the preferences' appearance of inevitability,
which is part of what insulates them from critique in the first place. Beliefs
about individual racial preferences, therefore, exclude from debate the very
policies that might undermine them' 99
196. Cf. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Faintly & Children's Scrs. 563 F 2d 1200. 1205-06
(5th Cir. 1977) (analogizing race in the adoption context to hair color. cye color, and other physical
attributes).
197. See Alice Bussiere & Ellen C. Segal, Adoption Assistance for Cluldren iith Spetal Needs. in
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.01 (Joan Hollinger ct al. eds.. 1994). As Bu.siere and Segal s, ntc
A child is considered a child with special needs when the state has determined that there
exists with respect to the child a specific factor or condition (such as ethnic background, age.
membership in a minority or sibling group, or the presence of factors such as medical
conditions or physical, mental, or emotional handicaps) because of vhich it is reasonable to
conclude that the child cannot be placed with adoptive parents suthout prosiding Ifinanciall
assistance ... or medical assistance ....
Id. § 9.01[l], at 9-3; see also McKenzie. supra note 42. at 62 (noting that the delinition of children with
special needs includes "older children, children of color, children with ph)sical. mental, or emotional
problems, and children who are part of a sibling group") Individuals sho adopt a child vuth "special
needs" are eligible for subsidy payments that are not available to other adoptise parents in order to
encourage such placements. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 670-679a (West 1991 & Supp 1997)
198. Fenton, supra note 2. at 46.
199. Moreover, the debate about race and state neutraliy in the adoption contruer,) influence-, our
understandings of race and state neutrality in law and policy more generall) The absence of analysis of
facilitative accommodation also shapes the application of legal doctine and thereby, molds our
understanding of the concepts of nondiscrimination and state neutrality In placing particular policy options
beyond the realm of debate, the anomaly contributes to shaping the application and interpretation of legal
1998]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 107: 875
B. Definition and Identification of Race-Based Claims
Race-based claims are those policy positions whose appeal stems from the
fact that they further or are perceived to further a particular racial group's
interests, either in symbolic or practical terms. This definition of race-based
claims is, admittedly, not a rigorous one. It is imprecise and potentially
overbroad.2° In part, this reflects the subtle way in which race shapes
contemporary American politics and debate. One of the assumptions of this
Article is that it is not always easy to identify race-based claims. Most policies
that are forthrightly premised on race are race-based claims, 20' but many
policies that reveal no hint of race on their face or provide for symmetrical
race-based treatment are also race-based claims.
Race matching and facilitative accommodation are race-based claims in
two respects. First, they further the realization of black and white adoptive
principles such as the antidiscrimination norm. If legislatures and courts accept the argument that race
matching constitutes prohibited racial discrimination and announce that adoption should be colorblind, the
resulting antidiscrimination norm would implicitly sanction policies that forthrightly accommodate the racial
preferences of adoptive parents. This reconstruction of the meaning of antidiscrimination would reinforce
a particular consciousness regarding the meaning of state neutrality with respect to race. Consciousness is
important because policy debate is shaped by our understanding of the meaning of core principles such as
antidiscrimination. Legal doctrine's prohibition of state-mandated race matching, as evidence of race
neutrality by the state, would reinforce the tacit understanding of race neutrality as deference to "private"
racial prerogatives.
This particular conception of the meaning of race neutrality in adoption is especially evident in the
debate about and understanding of the Multiethnic Placement Act. As initially enacted, the Act explicitly
allowed race to be considered for purposes of race matching. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 5115a(a)(2) (West 1995)
(repealed 1996) (stating that adoption agencies receiving federal funding "may consider the . .. racial
background of the child and the capacity of the ... adoptive parents to meet the needs of a child of this
background as one of a number of factors"). There was much criticism of this version of the Act because
it represented the first federal endorsement of race matching in adoption. See, e.g., Randall L. Kennedy,
Yes: Race-Matching Is Horrendous, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1995, at 44, Partly in response to such criticism, the
Act was amended so as to prohibit all manner of race matching by adoption agencies that receive federal
funding. The amended Act was unfailingly discussed as a means of ending racial discrimination in the
adoption process. See, e.g., Douglas R. Esten, Transracial Adoption and the Multiethnic Placement Act of
1994,68 TEMP. L. REv. 1941 (1995); Daphne Nell Wiggins, Note, The Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994:
Background, Purpose, Interpretations and Effects of Legislation Regarding Transracial Adoption, 20 LAW
& PSYCHOL. REV. 275 (1996). Although the revised Act could be read to prohibit facilitative
accommodation, it is clear that the Act's sponsors did not intend it to proscribe policies relating to the
facilitative accommodation of adoptive parents' racial preferences. The amended Act states: "A person or
government that is involved in adoption ... placements may not ... delay or deny the placement of a
child ... on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of ... the child .... 42 U.S.C.A. § 1996b(l)
(West Supp. 1997); see also id. § 671(a)(18) (containing similar language with respect to state eligibility
for federal adoption assistance). This is precisely what many adoptive parents do; adoptive parents, as
persons involved in adoption, deny the placement of children solely on the basis of race.
200. Given the likelihood that support for any policy will differ along racial lines, for example, might
not any government policy be classified as a race-based claim?
201. Affirmative action programs giving preferences to racial minorities, for instance, are undeniably
race-based claims. By itself, this characteristic does not counsel for or against the implementation of
affirmative action programs. Race-based claims may embody policies that are desirable or undesirable for
completely independent reasons. Designating a political position or policy proposal as race-based is a
descriptive rather than evaluative label. For an overview of arguments relating to affirmative action, see
generally DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994); and RACIAL PREFERENCE AND
RACIAL JUSTICE (Russell Nieli ed., 1991). For a defense of affirmative action, see Randall Kennedy,
Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1986).
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parents' desires, respectively. Second, they promote racial group status through
the placement of black and white children. ' 2 Exercising parental authority
over a child of another race is an assertion of group power. Prohibiting others
from exercising authority over children of one's own race is also an expression
of group power. Both whites and blacks pursue this sort of symbolic group
power, albeit through different means. Whites as a group and white parents
individually gain the most under facilitative accommodation;-" blacks as a
group and black parents individually gain the most under race matching.
There are three types of adoptive placement schemes: random racial
placement, race matching, and facilitative accommodation. Under a random
racial placement program, neither the state nor the adoptive parent could
specify the race of the child to be adopted. Prospective parents' access to
adoptive children would be based on adoption agencies' assessments of
parental suitability and fitness to adopt, which, in practice, correlates with the
parents' socioeconomic status. Because of the aggregate differences in the
socioeconomic status of blacks and whites, white parents, as a group, would
be better situated in the adoption queue than black parents, as a group. But
neither blacks nor whites would have any assurance of being matched with a
child of the same race. Thus, both groups would confront the possible
frustration of their race-based desires for an adoptive child. A random
placement policy, therefore, would not reflect the race-based claims of either
blacks or whites.
Under race matching, black adoptive parents are granted exclusive access
to black children. Because the number of black children available for adoption
exceeds the number of blacks waiting to adopt, prospective black adoptive
parents are able to choose from a wide variety of black children without
competition from whites. Race matching allows white parents access only to
white children. Given the racial demographics of adoption, this means that
many white adoptive parents are either unable to adopt at all or have to go to
great lengths to do so.
Facilitative accommodation, in contrast, ensures white parents' nearly
exclusive access to white children, while also allowing them access to black
children. Because most potential adoptive parents are white and white adoptive
parents, as a group, are better situated to adopt than black adoptive parents,
white parents would be the prime candidates for placement of white
children.2°4 Blacks, meanwhile, would compete with whites for black
children but would have no genuine access to white children (because of the
202. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Generic Tie. 62 U. Ciii. L. REV 209 (1995) (discussing the role of
familial racial purity in racial group conflict and power dynamics).
203. See Howe, supra note 2, at 161-64.
204. See Perry, supra note 16, at 104 (observing that esen without race matching adoption should not
become colorblind because white parents would still maintain nearly exclusise access to shite children and
would be able to decline to adopt black children),
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relative lack of white children and the socioeconomic disparities between
whites and blacks).20 5 Only through a facilitative accommodation regime,
therefore, would whites have nearly exclusive access to white children and
access to black children. z° In fact, under a pure facilitative accommodation
regime, white parents, as a group, would be better situated than black parents,
as a group, to adopt black children.
The benefits of race matching and facilitative accommodation not only
accrue to individual black and white parents, respectively, but also to blacks
and whites as groups engaged in symbolic competition and group status
struggle.20 7 "Control" of the children of one's own racial group is a measure
of group status and power, as is "control" over the children of another racial
group. Both whites and blacks strive for this type of symbolic group status and
power. But the racial demographics of adoption mean that they are likely to
pursue different strategies and also to realize different degrees of success.
Whites are able, through facilitative accommodation, to control both their
"own" children and some portion of black children. Blacks, in contrast, seem
to have little prospect of parenting white children at all; consequently, their
strategy focuses on not allowing black children to be parented by whites. Black
children who are parented by whites are perceived as a "loss" to the black
community. Race matching, on the other hand, confers symbolic benefits on
blacks relative to whites in that it assures that all black children placed for
adoption will end up with black adoptive parents, an outcome no other
adoption policy would produce.208 Race matching presumes the importance
of racial commonality for black children and parents, such that race matching
is thought to provide a symbolic benefit to the black community as a
whole.209
205. Whether through facilitative accommodation or race matching, black parents are likely to be
provided with black children. Black adoptive parents might be indifferent between facilitative
accommodation and race matching. Under either policy, they will adopt black children and would not be
forced to adopt a white child. Only through race matching would black parents have exclusive access to
black children.
206. See Perry, supra note 16, at 104. Perry suggests that "the transracial adoption debate is really
about ... the right of white people to parent whichever children they choose." Id. at 107.
207. This analysis assumes, without attempting to prove, that race politics is laden with symbolism
and that racial group conflict is often carried out through symbolic means. Cf id. at 65-77 (describing
whites' potential subordination of blacks by adopting black children); Roberts, supra note 202, at 257-68
(noting the symbolic and practical role of white parental preferences in the maintenance of racial
inequality); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color Equaliy,
and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1436-44 (1991) (recounting the historical use of control
of the black family as an instrument of racial oppression). See generally J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of
Status, 106 YALE LJ. 2313, 2321-42 (1997) (arguing that groups compete for social status and prestige
through symbolic politics).
208. See Perry, supra note 16, at 53.
209. See Howard, supra note 2, at 530-45 (noting the benefits that accrue to black children and the
black community from same-race placement); Perry, supra note 16, at 68-72 (noting the importance of
same-race placement to the black community).
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Although both white and black race-based claims are present in the
adoption debate, they are not similarly perceived. The white race-based claim
is rarely understood to be a race-based claim at all while the black race-based
claim is thought of, by its supporters and critics alike, in terms of race. ' '0
Their different forms should not, however, be allowed to obscure their
common function and purpose. As we shall see, the differing perceptions of
the race-based claims of blacks and whites have racial implications even
though biased perceptions may not be motivated by racial prejudice."" The
fact that we do not perceive facilitative accommodation as a race-based claim
contributes to a widely accepted interpretation of the race-and-adoption
controversy.
Narratives212 of the race-and-adoption controversy in the news media
portray one of two related images. First, many stories of race and adoption
involve a family, usually white, that seeks to adopt a child of another race,
usually a black child.2'3 Such stories typically recount the adoptive family's
struggles to overcome the barriers placed in its path by a racialist adoption
bureaucracy and, to a lesser extent, by societal attitudes. " The family
struggles valiantly to transcend the racialist thinking embedded in an adoption
system that opposes transracial adoption. Policies of race matching threaten to
prohibit the white family from adopting a black child and thereby to consign
black children to foster care.
Contrary to what the abundance of news coverage may suggest, this type
of story is highlighted in part because it is so unusual. It is news. White
210. Bartholet, for example, identifies the social workers' position wsith a separatist ideology See
Bartholet, supra note 10, at 1248. She does not identify the racial preferences of white adoptive parents
with any "ideology." The race-based claims of white adoptive parents are simply an expression of
individual preferences or perhaps, less charitably, racial bias. The black social sorkers hase a "sparatist
agenda," but no such "'agenda" is imputed to the thousands of race-conscious white adoptive parents Their
racial attitudes are simply the (unfortunate) state of the world, bias that is mdiidual and diffuse (in spite
of its prevalence). As a result of her different interpretations of their nature. Bartholet pronounces one form
of race-based claim, but not the other, as out of step with Amencan values and sensibilities One becomcs
a focus of her legal critique while the other nearly disappears as a social phenomenon uorth) of analysis
Ironically, the specific race-consciousness that is more influential in shaping the outcomes of adoption is
the one that Bartholet ignores.
211. t use the term "biased" here in a purely descnptiv.e srise and intend no moral or subjective
evaluation of the nature of the bias. For a discussion of a wide range of cognitise biases. see RICHARD
NISBET & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JLDGMiEN.T (1980)
212. Narratives are important because they influence public consciousness and popular perceptions as
well as legal debate and doctrine. For one of the best explanations and demonstrations of the importance
of narrative, see Richard Delgado, Story telling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative. 87
MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989). For other examples of the significance of narrative to societal understandings.
see DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); and RICHARD DELGADO. RODRIGO'S CHRONICLES
(1995).
213. See, e.g., Kids Need Good Adoptive Faniies of Whatever Color. supra note 4. Lockman. supra
note 4; Pamela P. Novotny, Children Paying Price of Adoption Politics. CIi. TRIB.. Apr 30. 1995. at 6.
Sue Anne Pressley, Texas Interracial Adoption Case Reflects National Debate" Fanulv Waged a Legal
Fight for 2 Black Youngsters, WASH. POST. Jan. 2. 1997. at AI; Edward Robinson. Judge Lets Black
Woman Keep Girl During Adoption Battle, PHILA. INQUIRER. Sept. 23. 1995. at B I
214. See. e.g., Rezendes, supra note 4.
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parents who want to adopt a black child are perceptually foregrounded.215 In
contrast, the stories of the multitudes of white parents who desire only a white
child are not seen as presenting a racial story at all. Stories about white
families in pursuit of white children typically do not mention race, as though
racial considerations arise only when parents attempt to adopt across race lines.
The second story line offers no hero or villain. These articles probe the
issue of whether transracial adoption "works. 21 6 They focus on the outcomes
of transracial adoption and ask how transracially adopted children fare in an
atypical family situation. They look to see whether transracially adopted
children are well-adjusted. They examine transracial adoptees' own struggles
regarding their racial identities, their attempts to establish connections with
members of their own race, and their efforts not to feel estranged or isolated
from the culture and community of their racial group. These stories may also
focus on whether parents are able to parent a child of a different background
properly and what strategies a parent might use to promote the development
of a child of another race. These stories proceed from the assumption that
transracial adoption is fraught with difficulty.
Neither of these narratives identifies adoptive parents' racial preferences
and facilitative accommodation policies as matters of racial inequality. In these
accounts, white adoptive parents are presented as potential saviors217 and are
not implicated for creating any manner of racial inequality. We see those
individuals who seek to adopt transracially, but we do not see the vast majority
of white adoptive parents who, if pressed, would categorically refuse to adopt
black children.
The resultant images of black adoptive parents and white adoptive parents
are starkly different. White adoptive parents appear to have embraced a
nonracialist self-conception while black adoptive parents appear nowhere near
as racially open. We hear few if any stories of black parents adopting across
racial lines. 2t8 That this absence results largely from the demographics of
adoptive parents and children does not diminish the power of its imagery or
215. See Weiner, supra note 176, at 81-82 (demonstrating that attention and causal attributes are
elicited by unusual or unexpected events).
216. See, e.g., Ronald K. Fitten, Transracial Adoption-Mixing Color and Family-Can We
Successfully Integrate Issues of Race and Culture with Issues of Child Rearing? A New Law Says We Must
Try, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 22, 1995, at Al; Rabin, supra note 4; Paul Shepard, Transracial Adoption
Debate Comes of Age: First Blended Kids Reach Adulthood, NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 24,
1995, at A 12; Karen Uhlenhuth, Adoption and Race: Do Children Suffer or Benefit from Being Placed with
Parents of a Different Color?, KAN. CITY STAR, Jan. 22, 1995, at HI; Lena Williams, Should Race Figure
in Adoptions? At Stake Can Be a Child's Cultural Identity, Esteem, ST. Louts PoST-DISPATCH, Mar. 29,
1995, at 4E.
217. See, e.g., Pressley, supra note 213.
218. See Townsend, supra note 2, at 181 (noting that, in spite of the rhetoric regarding Phe wonderful
symbolism of transracial families, "no one suggests Black parents adopt White babies to create the
proverbial melting pot").
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symbolism. Blacks are depicted as espousing nationalist race politics, elevating
ideology above the welfare of children.1 9
The different images of blacks and whites, and of race-matching supporters
and transracial adoption proponents, produce a dynamic that virtually
guarantees a move away from race matching. Race matching is seen as
counterproductive, if not racist. Transracial adoption is seen as a noble effort
to transcend race, to surmount the racial barriers that have always divided us.
That children will benefit by being adopted rather than by remaining in foster
care is a great impetus to embracing transracial adoption. That innocent
children would be the victims of race matching fuels rejection of it.
The move away from race matching does not decrease the prevalence of
facilitative accommodation. As the power of adoption agency personnel to
decide placements on the basis of race diminishes, the power of individual
adoptive parents to consider race expands. White parents' propensity to choose
white children perpetuates racial disparities comparable to those that race
matching has been derided for accentuating and transracial adoption has been
applauded for redressing. Yet the persistence of the problem does not promote
an examination of adoptive parents' preferences, which remain neatly offstage,
as if irrelevant to the drama that attracts everyone's attention.
The one possibility that does not arise in this scenario is that of placing
adoptive parent preferences at the center of debate. Facilitative accommodation
policy allows such preferences to structure the racially disparate outcomes of
the adoption process. The differing likelihood of adoption on the basis of race
becomes an important instance of racial inequality. This racial inequality is
produced by the ostensibly race-neutral policy of facilitative accommodation
in conjunction with the exercise of the racial preferences of adoptive parents.
This outcome might result even in the absence of explicit facilitative
accommodation policies, however. The procedural discrimination of facilitative
accommodation promotes the substantive inequality of disparate adoption
outcomes due to race, but the substantive outcome does not arise wholly from
the procedural defect. The inequality comes about in major part as a result of
the individual attitudes of those who seek to adopt children.
IV. MODELING RACE POLITICS
In this part, I generalize the analysis put forth in Part III. This approach
is premised on the assumption that adoption policy and debate, as one instance
of our nation's seemingly interminable and pervasive race problem, embodies
a characteristic pattern of contemporary race politics and of the mechanisms
of racial inequality. I propose that facilitative accommodation and race
219. See, e.g., All in the Family, NEw REPUBLIC. Jan. 24. 1994. at 6 (cnticizing harshly the stance of
the NABSW).
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matching are typical of the race-based claims of whites and blacks,
respectively. The race-based claims of whites are typically colorblind while
those of blacks are often race-conscious. The race-and-adoption controversy
thus suggests a model of race politics in which race-based claims predominate,
but in which the race-based claims of whites are often not perceived as being
race-based. Our asymmetrical identification of race-based claims produces a
cycle of race politics in which the race-based claims of blacks appear ever
more illegitimate for transgressing the colorblind ideal, while the race-based,
but ostensibly colorblind, claims of whites appear ever more morally
commendable and politically legitimate. This model of race politics shows how
and why, in the post-Jim Crow era, ostensibly race-neutral legislation may in
fact predictably produce racial inequality.2
20
Because of the differential success of the race-based claims of blacks and
whites, policies that embody a vision of formal equality may promote
substantive inequality. Policies premised on the notion of formal equality
typically take for granted background social processes or preexisting baselines
of resource distribution and allow the racial inequality that results from them.
In this part, I recount the contemporary and historical processes that culminate
in the different forms of the race-based claims of blacks and whites. I then
describe the model of contemporary race politics produced by the intertwining
of the race-based claims of blacks and whites with the dominant norms of
American law and politics. The resulting cycle of race and politics necessarily
produces racial inequality.
A. Contemporary Basis of Race-Based Claims
Race is a primary element of self-definition for both blacks and whites.
Race-based claims are prevalent in contemporary American society for two
reasons. 22' First, the concrete economic and political concerns222  that
comprise individual interests run along lines of race.223 Second, individuals
act in a manner that reflects or furthers the status and well-being of their racial
220. This theme has been extensively discussed in the literature produced by critical race theorists.
See, e.g., Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimization in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Lawrence, supra note 81.
221. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 212 (using allegorical narratives to assess the economic and political
issues affecting blacks since the founding of the United States); Balkin, supra note 207 (discussing group
conflicts over social status and structure in defining America's cultural debates).
222. The intertwining of race and political interest should not be surprising, given that race as we
know it was created and manipulated in furtherance of political and economic ends. See GEORGE
FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND (1979); Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery, Race and
Ideology in the United States of America, 181 NEw LEFT REV. 95 (1990).
223. Cf. MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH (1996) (analyzing
the sources and implications of the substantial wealth disparity between blacks and whites of all
socioeconomic levels).
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group as a group.224 In the first case, individual interests are aggregated into
racial group interests because of the structuring of American society along race
lines. In the second case, racial group interests are reflected in individual
behavior. Consequently, racial group interests are understood, often implicitly,
as individual interests by virtue of one's stake, both symbolic and practical, in
the status and well-being of one's racial group.22
Socioeconomic stratification, 26  residential segregation, --7  and the
differential racial impact of particular laws all contribute to the confluence of
racial and political interest. Even if individuals act purely on self-interest, we
would still see members of racial groups acting as though in concert because
their individual interests are structured along lines of race. 2 ' This is more
apparent with blacks than whites because whites' political behavior evidences
more differentiation along socioeconomic lines than that of blacks. 221
Nonetheless, racial hierarchy means that individual interests usually run along
race lines.
Individuals understand themselves as having a stake in the well-being of
their racial group such that they promote policies to bolster or protect racial
group status, separate from such policies' effects on concrete individual
interests. 3° Individual interests are thus defined as a function of group
interests. 21t The fact of race itself creates a separate political interest.
Individuals might be said to have an interest in the status, reputation, power,
or standing of their racial group. As a member of a group, one gains (and
suffers) vicariously from changes in the status of the group. This interest exists
apart from, and in addition to, the concrete personal interests that also
contribute to racial group claims.
224. See generally DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS. DIVIDED BY COLOR. RACIAL POLITICs
AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS (1996) (discussing the characteristics of self-interest and group-unanimity in
racial public opinion polling and research).
225. Cf. MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AF-RICAN-AMERICAN
POLITICS 77-88 (1994) (developing a model linking blacks' indi'dual interests vwith their perceptions of
groups interests).
226. See GERALD DAVID JAYNES & ROBIN M. WILLIAMS. JR.. A COMMON DESTINY BLACKS AND
AMERICAN SOCIETY 35-45 (1989) (citing socioeconomic statistics showing disparities betwseen blacks and
whites).
227. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON. AMERICAN APARTHEID SEGREGATION AND TiE
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 221-23 (1993) (describing the substantial degree of residential segregation
in American society).
228. See CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES. BLACK INTERESTS TIlE REPRESEN'TATION OF AFRICAN-
AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 7-10 (1995) (describing the factors that cause blacks' individual interests to run
along race lines).
229. See id. at 193 (citing statistics suggesting that white ,oiers do not "oe along race lines)
230. See KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 224. at 81-91 (suggesting that collectic and group interests
are at the basis of black public opinion rather than self-interest); cf. EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A
STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLmCS 14 (1989)
(documenting how race has become perhaps the defining issue of American politics)
231. See DAWSON, supra note 225, at 77-88. For two of the besi analyses of how whites come to
define their interests, see DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS (1994); and David Rocdigcr. White
Workers, New Democrats, and Affirmative Action. in TIlE HOUSE THtAT RACE BUILT BLACK AIERICANS.
U.S. TERRAIN 48 (Wahneema Lubiano ed., 1996)
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Underlying this phenomenon is the social psychological process of social
identity formation. 32 Social identity theory posits that an individual's self-
regard and sense of well-being are affected in part by the status and well-being
of the group of which the individual feels himself a member.2 33 Thus,
individuals will act in ways that promote the well-being of their group.2"
This tendency is likely to be especially powerful with respect to race because
race is such a dominant social category. 35 Once again, this tendency is more
obvious with blacks than whites because blacks are more likely to formulate
forthrightly their own interests in terms of the interests of blacks as a
group.23
6
Whites' political stances may reflect the dynamics of real and symbolic
intergroup conflict2 37  rather than personal prejudice.238  White voting
behavior, for example, reveals the way in which social identity and perceptions
of relative group status affect individual political behavior. White voters are
much more likely now than before the civil rights movement to vote for black
candidates. 239 White voters in several majority-white cities, for example, have
elected black mayors in recent years.240 Yet racial group competition does
inhibit white support of black politicians. Whites are less likely, for example,
to vote for black candidates in cities with substantial black populations. 24'
In such cases, symbolic group conflict influences individual political
preferences. As one scholar puts it, "An individual's attitudes toward other
groups are formed by perceptions of the threat that the other groups pose for
the individual's own group, even though the individual may not feel personally
232. See HENRI TAIFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES: STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
(1981); Henri Tajfel & James L. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, in
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 7 (Stephen Worchel & William G. Austin eds., 1986).
233. See Tajfel & Turner, supra note 232, at 15-18.
234. See id. at 8-13 (describing individual identity as a function of group identity).
235. See Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, African-American Women's History and the Metalanguage
of Race, in FEMINISM AND HIsTORY 183 (Joan Wallach Scott ed., 1996) (describing how the category of
race subsumes and gives meaning to other social categories, including gender).
236. See DAWSON, supra note 225, at 10-I1 (describing the importance of racial group status for black
Americans).
237. For a description of the distinction between real and symbolic group conflict, see Jim Sidanius
& Felicia Pratto, The Inevitability of Oppression and the Dynamics of Social Dominance, in PREJUDICE,
POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN DILEMMA 173, 181 (Paul Sniderman et al. eds., 1993).
238. Undeniably, racial prejudice has declined remarkably during the past half century. See HOWARD
SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA 8-14 (1985) (describing the historical change in racial
attitudes).
239. See SWAIN, supra note 228, at 208 (noting that from 1970 to 1990, 24 black Representatives were
elected to Congress from districts that were less than 65% black, including eight Representatives from
majority-white districts). Some whites nevertheless remain disinclined to support a black candidate. See
KATHERINE TATE, FROM PROTEST TO POLITICS: THE NEW BLACK VOTERS IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 3
(1993).
240. See Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1366 n.41 (1995) (book
review).
241. See id. at 1368-69.
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threatened. ' 42 White voter behavior, then, is not so much a function of
prejudice or racial bias, as of group politics and symbolic group conflict.
Group-based behavior can also be prompted by the symbolic manipulation
of racial imagery. During the 1970s, the Republican party managed to capture
much of the southern vote by linking particular social policies with race.4 3
More recently, attacks on affirmative action and immigration have gained force
through identification of those policies with low-status racial groups.2'" The
campaign against affirmative action in California, for example, created an
image of affirmative action beneficiaries as black, even though white women
have arguably benefited more from affirmative action than blacks. White
resentment of affirmative action could not have been mobilized effectively if
it were understood as resistance to the gains of white women rather than those
of blacks and other minorities.245 Whites may not be consciously aware of
the race-based nature of their political behavior, but the influence of racial
identity and symbolic group conflict is undeniable.
The two factors that promote race-based claims246 are not easily
separable. Each reinforces the other. The fact that objective individual interests
run along lines of race encourages people to conceptualize their political
interests in terms of race. Racial group interests could serve as a proxy for
individual interests. 24 The greater people's tendency to rely on the proxy of
racial group interests, the more likely their behavior will be to promote
political outcomes that tie individual interests to race, making it ever more
rational to rely on the group interest proxy. By defining their interests in terms
of race, people act in ways that strengthen the link between interests and race.
Disentangling these two factors is not as important as recognizing their
existence, their conceptual distinctiveness, and their relationship.
242. DAWSON, supra note 225, at 62.
243. See THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL. CItAI\ REACTIO,, TEtt IPACT" OF RACE.
RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 81 (1991); see also TATT. supra note 239. at 22 (noting "the
Republican party's easy use and manipulation of civil nghts and race as campaign issues")
244. See R. Richard Banks, The Power of Racial Imagery. S.F. CIIRON.. Apr. 3. 1995. at A19
245. Cf. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr.. Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectuonal of Oppression:
Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 162 (1994) (arguing that Americans
equate racial justice and colorblindness, with the result that race is seen as an illegitimate basis for
affirmative action programs). White resistance to the group-bascd claims of blacks is frequently explained
as a preference for individual rather than group-based rights. See PAUL SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIArLA.
THE SCAR OF RACE 177-78 (1993). In this view, the political stances of whites are really not race-bascd
so much as they are principle-based. If this were true. we would expect whites to be equally averse to
group claims no matter on whose behalf the claims were asserted. In fact. ho,,ever whites are less
favorably disposed to group-based claims when offered in the interests of blacks than when offered on
behalf of other groups, such as women. See Culp. supra, at 169.
246. See text accompanying notes 222-224.
247. Political scientist Michael Dawson describes this process among African Americans as the "black
utility heuristic." DAWSON, supra note 225. at 10. For a descnption of this process among whites, see
SCHUMAN El" AL., supra note 238. at 179 ("Once issues are defined in terms of political conflict between
racial groups, political threat does become 'personal.')
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B. Historical Origins of Contemporary Race-Based Claims
The different forms of the contemporary race-based claims of blacks and
whites are a historically specific product of American political and legal
culture. The changing political and legal context of the past half century has
produced black and white race-based claims that take dramatically different
forms. For blacks and whites alike, the forms of their race-based claims reflect
the interplay of their historically formed collective racial identities and their
differing positions in American economic, social, and political structures.
The divergence in contemporary forms of race-based claims can be traced
to the social and cultural changes that began in the early- to mid-twentieth
century. During this time, attitudes toward race shifted markedly. The notion
of innate racial differences fell into disrepute. The idea of racism was
born.245 Racial divisions in American society became a subject of scrutiny
rather than an unquestioned given. Issues of racial injustice moved to the
forefront of the American political agenda. In the aftermath of World War II
and during the Cold War, events that highlighted the contradiction between
America's racial practices and its democratic ideals, we began to examine our
racial character.249
American legal culture embraced a notion of colorblind individualism.25
The doctrine of equal protection would no longer tolerate racial distinctions in
the law. Ostensibly race-blind law would soon become a constitutional
necessity, as well as a moral ideal."5 This political process reflected the
ascendant yet embattled view that race should not be a basis of political
mobilization. The widely embraced ideal is that politics should not be an arena
of racial group conflict.5 2 Although race matters a great deal in politics,
most people believe that it should not. Political agendas articulated in order to
advance the welfare of a particular racial group are frowned upon as racially
partisan and divisive. We believe both that racial groups, ideally, should not
enter politics as groups and that claims put forth on behalf of racial groups are
undesirable,2 3 atypical rather than usual aspects of the political process.254
248. See ROBERT MILES, RACISM 42-43 (1989) (noting that the word "racism" first appeared in 1938).
249. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988).
250. See Perry, supra note 16, at 43.
251. Cf R. Richard Banks, Nondiscriminatory Perpetuation of Racial Subordination, 76 B.U. L. REV.
669 (1996) (book review) (discussing colorblindness as a moral ideal); Lino Graglia, Racial Preferences,
Quotas, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1117, 1118 (1992) (arguing that race-
consciousness is immoral).
252. See NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUITY AND PUBLIC POLICY
1-32 (1975) (describing the American ethnic pattern as embodying the belief that race and ethnicity may
matter in private life but should not be a basis of political rights).
253. Although the general sentiment is undeniably averse to group rights, there are many supporters
of the notion. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1989).
254. Relatedly, our legal culture values neutrality. The very idea of the rule of law embodies the
notion of the law as the neutral arbiter of conflict. The antidiscrimination principle prohibits the disparate
treatment of individuals on the basis of their racial group membership. The discriminatory intent standard
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The civil rights movement capitalized on the ascendance of the moral vision
of colorblindness by wrapping appeals for racial transformation in the cloak
of the colorblind ideal. The triumph of the civil rights movement, however,
affected whites and blacks differently. Race-consciousness became less salient
for whites and more salient for blacks. Whereas the Holocaust, World War II,
and the civil rights movement caused whites outwardly to abjure race
awareness, the unprecedented success of the race-based civil rights movement
caused blacks unabashedly to embrace race as a source of identity and political
mobilization.
In part as a result of these changes, blacks and whites understand their
racial identity differently and have different degrees of self-conscious racial
identity. Whites often believe that blacks are obsessed with race and that they
filter everything through its prism. They are right, insofar as the observation
reflects an implicit comparison with whites' (lack of) self-conscious racial
identity. Blacks often believe that whites are unwilling to notice their own
race. They too are right.25 Black racial identity is self-conscious. White
racial identity is transparent.26 Blacks experience themselves as black in a
way that whites do not experience themselves as white.25 Neither way of
being is right or wrong or necessarily better or worse. But the ways are
different, and it is that difference that partially accounts for the different forms
of race-based claims.
Blacks' race-based claims are usually formal, organized, and explicit. Their
racial presuppositions are clearly articulated. Their goals are usually announced
through groups formed explicitly to push race-based claims or through racial
representatives 58 Whites also act in a race-based manner, but their race-
of equal protection doctrine is the means of identifying legislative or state action that unfairly disadvantages
individuals on the basis of group membership. See. eg.. Washington v. Davis. 426 U S. 229 (1976) For
a description of the discriminatory intent standard, see Kennedy. supra note 81. at 1404-05
255. See Barbara J. Flagg. "Was Blind. But Now I See": Wute Race-Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953 (1993) (discussing the need to recognize white
racial identity as one of many possible identities, rather than as an unspoken racial norm)
256. See Barbara J. Flagg. Fashioning a Tile VII Remedy for Transparrntlv Whute Subjective
Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009 (1995).
257. These differences in white and black identity are the result of the ways in which race has and
has not impinged upon individual consciousness throughout history. Blacks developed more of a self-
conscious racial identity than did whites because race limited blacks. Race created a caste-like social
structure that conferred upon them their identity and status. No amount of individual initiative or social
mobility could diminish the extent to which they would be defined by their race. The old joke asking, in
one variation, "'What do you call a black man with a Ph.D.?' expresses this truth. For whites, race created
no limitation that forced awareness of their own race upon them. Although their experience was every bit
as racialized as that of blacks, because race offered them benefits rather than constraints. whites were not
likely to become self-conscious of it. While race was a ceiling for blacks, it provided a platform for whites.
258. Support for these assertions can be found with even the most cursory historical review, During
the 1960s, for example, black nationalists' claims were wedded to notions of the importance of black
autonomy and black control of black community institutions. See TATE, supra note 239. at 152. See
generally STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON. BLACK PoWER (1967). Racec-baa claims
were not, of course, confined to blacks of a particular political inclination; Martin Luther King. Jr.. for
example, also articulated race-based claims.
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based claims are rarely expressed in racial terms and are not articulated as
means of advancing whites' racial interests.5 9 Instead, they are often
ostensibly premised on values and goals unrelated to race. Individualism,
autonomy, limited government, states' rights-all have been vehicles for the
expression of white race-based claims.260
The recent rise of the moral ideal of colorblindness has thus combined
with blacks' and whites' unchanging structural positions to produce divergent
types of race-based claims. In contemporary society, blacks' race-based claims
are typically explicit whereas whites' race-based claims are most often covert
and ostensibly race-blind. Whites are able to effectuate their race-based claims
through ostensibly neutral rules. 261 White racial goals are implemented
through state mechanisms but not in a way that underscores the role of state
action; white race-based claims may even rely on an apparent withdrawal of
government presence.262
Group claims can be effectively cloaked within, and concealed by,
assertions of the importance of individual liberty because liberty is an
important American value. Liberty-based arguments are not simply a pretext
for race-based positions. Many assertions of the importance of personal
autonomy do not implicate race or are not about race exclusively. Yet, in a
society in which race remains perhaps the deepest and most enduring fracture,
race frequently animates debates about liberty and autonomy. Whites appear
simply to favor individual initiative, personal autonomy, and other values
rooted in political liberalism.2 63 They are, by all indications, content with the
natural functioning of the market, the idiosyncratic nature of private
preferences, the enforcement of contractual rights, and the delegation of power
to localized rather than centralized control.2" Blacks, in contrast, are always
calling upon the government to do something.265 They want the state to
259. For example, the southern strategy of the Republican party tacitly linked white racial identity to
a concrete political agenda. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 243, at 74-98.
260. See generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996) (discussing the history of the legal process with
respect to race).
261. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1133, 1153-54 (1993).
262. Cf Ira Nerken, A New Deal for the Protection of Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Challenging the
Doctrinal Bases of the Civil Rights Cases and State Action Theory, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 297. 317-
19 (1977) (noting the legislative repeal of particular rights in several states when it became clear that the
Reconstruction Amendments required that blacks as well as whites be protected by whatever rights were
recognized).
263. See Paul Sniderman et al., The Politics of the American Dilemma: Issue Pluralism, in PREJUDICE,
POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN DILEMMA, supra note 237, at 212, 232-36 (emphasizing the extent to which
white Americans promote policies based on aspects of the American creed, including individualism,
autonomy, and initiative).
264. See Crenshaw, supra note 220, passim.
265. Cf Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(describing race-based affirmative action programs as "racial paternalism" that "stamp[s] minorities with
a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are
'entitled' to preferences").
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assert its power by "intervening" in the functioning of the free market,
"disrupting" the division of power characteristic of federalism, 2' and even
attempting to inhibit the "natural" expression of "individual" preferences. 67
Blacks are less able to effectuate covert race-based claims because of their
relative economic powerlessness, social isolation, and political insularity.2"
C. Modeling Race Politics
The different forms in which the race-based claims of blacks and whites
are likely to be articulated generate a predictable dynamic of race politics, a
process that is self-reinforcing across time. Because blacks' claims are
explicitly race-based and so self-evidently at odds with the colorblind ideal,
they are regarded as presumptively illegitimate. Because whites' covert race-
based claims appear to comport with the colorblind ideal, they are regarded as
presumptively legitimate and are more likely to be successful than are blacks'
race-based claims. Whites are successful in pursuing their race-based claims
without appearing to be racial at all. Blacks' race-based claims are less
successful for being at odds with the colorblind ideal of American law and
politics. But even when blacks' race-based claims do prevail, their success,
which is perceived as having resulted from the assertion of a racial demand,
undermines the possibility of future success by fueling white resentment and
reinforcing blacks' embrace of race as a political identity.
Black political action must constantly contend with charges of
inappropriate racialism. The white community demands that blacks' race-based
claims advocate inclusion and colorblindness rather than race-based treatment.
Yet, as a result of blacks' self-consciously racial identity, it is only through
organization on the basis of race that blacks are able both to gain support
among their own group and to exert effective pressure for political change. The
precondition of their ability to put forth a claim (i.e., organizing on the basis
of race) simultaneously undermines the claim's effectiveness. Blacks recognize
that outward racialism does not give them the moral high ground, but many
hesitate to endorse colorblind politics because they do not believe it will be
effective, either due to their history of success with explicitly race-based
claims or their social, economic, and political status. The prevailing view that
politics should be nonracial dooms blacks' explicitly racialist appeals to limited
and diminishing success over time, as each attempt to effectuate an openly
race-based claim fuels the resistance and resentment of whites who thwart such
claims.
266. See The Civil Rights Cases. 109 U.S. 3. 13 (1883) (arguing that proposed civil nghts legislation
would "make Congress take the place of the State legislatures and ... supersede them").
267. This is perhaps how many people would charactenze my argument in this Article
268. Cf. Sniderman et al., supra note 263 (assuming that white adhere to neutral values while blacks
push a racial agenda).
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When blacks are successful in their race-based claims, they are perceived
as having pursued a racial demand. Every formulation of a political claim in
terms of race, whether successful or not, heightens whites' perception of the
race-based nature of blacks' political activism and deepens blacks' own sense
of the significance of race as a political identity. This reinforces whites'
negative valuation of blacks' political activity and heightens the salience of
blacks' racial identity for blacks and whites alike. White resentment erodes
political support for black initiatives,269 and this in turn may cause some
blacks to redouble their efforts at racial organization. This deepens white
resentment, propelling blacks into ever greater race-consciousness. To counter
the presumption of illegitimacy, black political activism must divert much
energy to the process of justification, among both blacks and whites. Over
time, blacks may become less able to prevail on their race-based claims, both
because of mounting public criticism of, and withering internal support for, a
race-based agenda.
Whites, meanwhile, continue to exert race-based claims without appearing
to do so.2 7a They realize their racial goals without ever articulating those
goals in terms of race or seeming to subvert the normal functioning of various
"neutral" legal rules and policies. Their exercises of racial power do not seem
to be expressions of power at all. Their racial identity does not become
socially salient because they have no need to politicize it. That their racial
identity is not salient makes it less likely that policies they promote, even those
that produce disparate racial outcomes more extreme than those of blacks'
race-based claims, would be identified as racially motivated or race-based.
This process also shapes whites' understanding of themselves. The
legitimating effect of a nonracial expression of racial power means that those
who obtain the benefits of the power can reproduce a system that works to
their advantage without ever experiencing themselves as having made a racial
demand. They have (genuinely in their minds) done nothing more than
advocate for individual liberty, the enforcement of contract rights, or
associational freedom.2
Yet, even as whites do not experience themselves or their politics in racial
terms, the fact that nonracial policies work in their favor predisposes them to
favor such policies; blacks may oppose such policies for the converse, and
equally logical, reason that they so often seem to work against them. These
contrary responses only exacerbate the cycle of race politics. Thus, while the
race-consciousness of whites remains transparent, that of blacks becomes a
269. See id. at 229-31 (suggesting that whites may come to resent blacks because of blacks' repeated
pleas for special treatment).
270. See Flagg, supra note 255, passim; see also David Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986
Sup. Cr. REv. 99, 130-32.
271. As expected, political analysts often unintentionally provide excellent examples of the failure of
whites to understand themselves politically in racial terms. See, e.g., Sniderman et al., supra note 263.
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source of controversy itself, creating debate about the value of blacks' race-
based identity. The race-consciousness of blacks becomes the focus of debate
and is frequently thought itself to be a problem. 7
2
Blacks could, of course, abandon their race-based strategy and thereby
assuage white suspicions of the legitimacy of their methods and goal. Yet the
salience of blacks' racial identity would remind blacks and whites alike of the
possibility of blacks' reverting explicitly to race politics. This would raise
questions about whether blacks' abandonment of race-based politics was
genuine and in good faith. Whites would remain distrustful. Blacks' efforts to
reassure whites of the sincerity of their embrace of colorblind politics would
leave blacks resentful at having repeatedly to prove themselves. Some blacks
might abandon race-based politics, and some whites would point to such blacks
as models of nonracial leadership. These colorblind blacks would proclaim the
superiority of their approach, admonishing other blacks that they too could
advance if they would only abandon their racialism. 2 3 To the extent that
blacks' rejection of race-based politics brought about an equilibrium, it would
be an unstable one, capable at any moment of reverting to explicit racialism
and the polarization it tends to produce. 274
D. Race Politics and Racial Inequality
The differential success of the race-based claims of blacks and whites
predictably produces racial inequality. Whites' race-based claims, animated as
they are by group interests, create racial inequality in spite of their formal
neutrality. The ostensibly colorblind policies that reflect such race-based claims
typically defer to background social processes and preexisting baselines of
resource distribution. The irony, then, is that policies that instantiate a vision
of formal equality systematically promote substantive inequality. Formally
neutral, colorblind policies produce racial inequality, not because they
necessarily do so, but because the particular colorblind policies enacted are
themselves the products of the symbolic group conflict of race politics.
272. The transracial adoption debate. for example. suggests that what stands in the %%a) of black
children's placement in permanent adoptive homes is the organized opposition of a group of black social
workers who misguidedly espouse a radical racial separatism. The children's salation lay in the laudable
desires of those white families who would eagerly adopt them skere it not for the effectieness of the
opposition mounted by nationalistic race-consctous groups such as the black social %orkcrs While those
colorblind whites who wish to adopt black children assume the foreground of our perceptual field, the
attitudes of the overwhelming majority of white adoptise parents are relegated to an unscen background
See supra notes 210-219 and accompanying text.
273. Cf Orlando Patterson, Going Separate Ways: The Hisors of aft Old Idea. NE%%'SwiK. Oct 30.
1995, at 43 (arguing that "black separatism" is destructive and ineffectisc)
274. Ultimately, this process would reinforce the aspects of blacks' and % hites indi% idual identity and
social status that gave rise to the process in the first place. Blacks become race-conscious and %hites
colorblind. Whites become more able to realize their group interests through neutral and nonracial policies
linked to individualism, autonomy, and freedom of choice. Blacks remain unable to effect change, except
through the sort of race-based organized activity that it becomes increasingly difficult to orchestrate
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The same characteristics of American society that give rise to race-based
claims cause background social processes to function systematically with
respect to race. Racial preferences in adoption, for example, are both intimate
and systematic. Because background social processes function in a systematic
fashion and because the baseline established by preexisting resource disparities
systematically favors whites rather than blacks, the state cannot be neutral with
respect to race. As long as race maintains its force in American society,
neutrality is only possible in a formal equality model that emphasizes the
state's relation to the individual rather than the substantive conditions that the
state's action or inaction promotes or allows. I describe the inequality produced
by the background social processes or preexisting resource distributions as
"atomistic inequality."
Atomistic inequality is less the intended result of any formal policy by a
single entity than the outcome of the values, preferences, and decisions of a
combination of autonomous, private actors within an ostensibly neutral legal,
political, or economic framework. If, as I assume, the racial dynamics of
adoption are characteristic of the racial dynamics of American society more
generally, then atomistic inequality may be a meaningful and helpful way to
conceptualize contemporary racial inequality. Put simply, atomistic inequality
may typify the current production of racial inequality. The outcomes of
contemporary race politics may predictably give support to individual choice
and autonomy in a manner that perpetuates racial inequality. This view may
explain how racial inequality persists and is recreated in spite of the triumph
of the Equal Protection Clause over overtly race-based policies.
The reproduction of racial inequality is not merely an unfortunate by-
product of the implementation of neutral rules and universal principles. Instead,
racial inequality is the necessary outcome of a process that systematically
denies black race-based claims and gives effect to white race-based claims.
The colorblind ethos combines with the different forms of white and black
race-based claims to legitimize outcomes that would be viewed in a more
suspect light were they recognized as resulting, in part, from the assertion of
race-based claims. 275 From this perspective, the racially disparate and
disadvantaging impact of "neutral" policies is not merely an unfortunate and
unintended outcome of such rules. Nor is it necessarily the expression of
covert biases of either politicians or voters. Instead, it is a predictable
consequence of racial group politics. The racial outcome of "neutral" rules is
part of what determines their political support, not because voters are
necessarily prejudiced, but because legislative outcomes are the expression of
real and symbolic racial group conflict.
275. Cf Mari Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297, 299 (1992)
(calling for "legal concepts that challenge the citadel of neutrality").
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Atomistic inequality also does its work because constitutional standards are
directed to the problem of state power rather than to the problem of private
power. The state action doctrine only awkwardly redresses the racial inequality
that results from the exercise of individual choice. This tension is reflected in
the Supreme Court's state action decisions. The Court's holdings implicitly
recognize the importance of private power in creating racial inequality. At the
same time, the state action concept itself is at odds with the recognition of the
need to constrain private power. The Court's state action decisions in race-
related cases reveal the Court's reliance on what I believe to be accurate
intuitions about the racial nature of individual choice and autonomy. At the
same time, the assumptions embedded within the state action inquiry itself
highlight the inadequacies of current equal protection doctrine with respect to
race. The Court's tendency to stretch to find state action in those cases alleging
a race-based violation of rights276 indicates the Court's (correct) intuition that
race-based individual choice is not the same as other discriminations. The
classic example of this, of course, is the most famous of all state action cases,
Shelley v. Kraemer.27' Thus, the state action inquiry both denies, by
searching for state rather than private action, and recognizes, by invalidating
essentially private conduct, the significance of the pronotion of racial
inequality through private means. My goal is not to advocate reform of the
state action doctrine. Others have tackled the task much more effectively than
I could hope to do.275 Instead, my goal is to reformulate our understanding
of the politics of race.
Debate about how far the law should go to curtail private discrimination
is usually envisioned as a balancing test. On one side is society's interest in
276. The Court identified state action in several race-based cases. See. e.g . Norwvood % liamson. 413
U.S. 455 (1973) (holding that discriminatory private schools are not entitled to state-purchased textbooks).
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (finding an equal protection 'iolation b) a
restaurant in a state-owned building); Shelley v. Kraemer. 334 U.S 1 (1948) (holding raciall) rcstrictic
covenants unconstitutional). But see Moose Lodge No. 107 v Irvis. 407 U S. 163 (1972) (linding no state
action in alleged discrimination at a private club).
277. 334 U.S. I (1948). Shelley concerned a racially restrictive covenant In % iolation of the coscnant.
a black family purchased and moved into a home. The white neighbors' attempt to enforce the covenant.
if successful, would have dispossessed the black homeowners for siolating the covenant The Court held
that, although the covenant was privately created, its judicial enforcement constituted impermuissible state
action. See id. at 18-20. This analysis left the Court in the awvkward position of ackno%%edging that the
covenants were valid so long as they were purely voluntary. Under this reasoning, an agreement b) white
homeowners among themselves never to sell to a black would not be actionable
The Court's decision can be understood as a tacit recognition of the nature of race politics, an
awareness of the fact that whites typically express racial group power through processes that seem to occur
naturally without the aid of the state. Shelley may not have presented an issue of state action so much as
of racial group action. This understanding of Shelley can become part of a broader theory that recognizes
the special nature of race politics and the special threats posed by racial group claims This approach is
consistent with a political process theory of judicial reviess, in which legislation that burdens racial
minorities is intensively scrutinized because it suggests a possible defect in the processes that produced the
legislation. See ELY, supra note 128.
278. The literature on the state action concept is extensise. See. .g . Charles L Black. Jr. Forerord
"State Action," Equal Protection. and California's Proposition 14. 81 HARv. L RE% 69 (1967). Erwin
Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action. 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503 (1985). Nerken. supra note 262
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stamping out racial discrimination. On the other side we find individual
autonomy, freedom of choice, and the ideal of unfettered individualism. Within
this framing, the idea is often proffered that the state should be neutral with
respect to private behavior. Any attempt to eradicate private discrimination
would mean constraining individual autonomy in a way most Americans find
offensive.
The analysis offered in this Article suggests that this framing of the issue
is radically mistaken. The balance to be struck is not between state-imposed
racial orthodoxy on one hand and atomized individual actions on the other.
Private discrimination may be justified through reference to norms of
individual choice and the importance to personal flourishing and well-being of
maintaining a realm of autonomy, but private race-related choices are anything
but personal and idiosyncratic. More often, they are systematic. Posing the
dilemma in this way does not guarantee different answers, but it does require
different questions and different discussions. In Part V, I address the different
questions that facilitative accommodation in the adoption context raises.
V. STRICT NONACCOMMODATION: A PROPOSAL IN OPPOSITION
TO RACIAL PREFERENCES
[T]he master's tools can indisputably be used both to deconstruct the
house and to complicate the master's own sense of precisely whose
house it is anyway.27
9
In this part, I put forth a proposal to rid the state-funded adoption process
of those individual racial preferences representative of the type of race
consciousness that promotes racial inequality.28 ° My proposed policy, which
I term strict nonaccommodation, is not constitutionally required, but it is
constitutionally permitted. My concern here is not with what the Constitution
compels us to do so much as with what our understanding of race politics and
racial inequality counsels that we should do. Given the impossibility of state
neutrality with respect to race, strict nonaccommodation offers one method of
confronting the inequality-producing racial dynamics of American society. In
Section V.A, I explain the purposes of strict nonaccommodation and how the
policy should be understood. Section V.B explains the mechanics of strict
279. Houston A. Baker, Jr. et al., Representing Blackness/Representing Britain: Cultural Studies and
the Politics of Knowledge, Introduction to BLACK BRITISH CULTURAL STUDIES 1, 15 (Houston A. Baker,
Jr. et al. eds., 1996). This statement is an indirect response to Audre Lorde, who, in the context of
challenging "racist patriarchy," remarked that "the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house.
They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about
genuine change." AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 112 (1984).
280. My proposal does not fully consider the issue of race matching because race matching is already
illegal for those agencies that receive federal funds. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. My
proposal does, however, assume a non-race-matching regime; otherwise, facilitative accommodation is, in
effect, a non-issue.
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nonaccommodation. Section V.C analyzes the policy in terms of the best-
interests-of-the-child standard. Section V.D assesses the constitutionality of
strict nonaccommodation. Section V.E considers the nature of adoptive parents'
racial preferences. Finally, Section V.F sketches the possible practical
consequences of implementing strict nonaccommodation, highlighting the
political and social forces that may make successful implementation of the
policy difficult.
Admittedly, deep-seated resistance to strict nonaccommodation may create
unintended adverse consequences so severe as to preclude the policy's
implementation. Yet, the proposal's significance does not turn wholly on its
feasibility. The analysis presented in this Article provides a way of interpreting
a decision not to implement strict nonaccommodation that itself would shed
light on the raw nature of race politics and the durability of the impediments
to racial inequality.
A. Purposes of Preference Eradication
Strict nonaccommodation, if successful, would expand dramatically the
number of homes available to black children in need of adoption and would
diminish the racial disparities in adoption rates. Moreover, strict
nonaccommodation would express the message that we will not countenance
unjustified racial inequality, in adoption or elsewhere. As Bartholet observes:
"Adoption puts the state, or state-licensed agencies, in the position of
structuring the uniquely private relationship involved in a family."2"'
Whether adoption is free of troublesome racial discrimination or fundamentally
shaped by it, the impact of racial considerations reflects the character of a
largely state-run and regulated process that bears greatly on the welfare of
children at the most vulnerable and defenseless point in their lives. The state
is embroiled in adoption as it is in no other process so integral to intimate
association and decisionmaking.
I invoke colorblindness here as a means rather than as an end. That it is
useful here does not mean that it is the answer to most, or even many, race-
related dilemmas. 282 My proposal reflects a vision of race that might be
described as culturally pluralist but nonessentialist. It does not prohibit all
individual racial preferences in adoption but is directed instead at the most
unjustifiable and harmful type of individual racial preference. It does not, in
principle, proscribe those preferences that are expressions of group identities
that we might promote as a means of maintaining a diverse, culturally plural
281. Bartholet, supra note 10, at 1244.
282. See Culp, supra note 245, at 162 (noting that racc-neutral policies arc only as good as the results
they produce).
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society. Such identities benefit society and do not create inequality. The
proposal is thus asymmetrical and does not purport to be neutral.
The policy is fundamentally animated by the goal of substantive racial
equality, which often requires disruption of background social practices or
alteration of preexisting baselines of resource distribution. In some cases,
colorblind state policy and private action will further the goal of equality; in
other cases, race-conscious policy and private action will. The case against
individual race consciousness in adoption is not that it violates abstract moral
principles,2 3 but that it produces the concrete outcomes of racial
inequality.284 Relatedly, although many multiracial families would result from
successful implementation of strict nonaccommodation, the policy should not
be read as promoting multiracial families as a normative good. Racial
integration in the family would be an expected by-product of strict
nonaccommodation, not its goal.
Strict nonaccommodation is one aspect of a broader effort to undermine
the mechanisms of racial inequality and reorient our national debate about its
nature. Challenging parental preferences is the solution to the particular
problem of racial inequality in adoption that best illuminates the nature and
causes of racial inequality more generally. This approach assumes that
adoption may be profitably viewed as a particular example of processes that
produce racial inequality in American society. It does not assume, however,
that the characteristics of the particular and systemic problems of racial
inequality, in adoption and society, respectively, are identical. For example,
other potential solutions to the particular problem-such as complete cessation
of race matching or expanded and improved recruitment of black adoptive
parents-may obscure or even entrench the social processes that produce
systemic racial inequality.
Strict nonaccommodation does not embody the full implications of the
argument that this Article advances. While I identify private racial preferences
as systematically producing inequality, strict nonaccommodation applies only
to those adoptions that are linked to public funding.285 The proposal is thus
animated by the very notions of state involvement and of the public-private
283. See generally K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUrMAN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL
MORALITY OF RACE (1996) (exploring the personal and political significance of racial identity); George
Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REv. 117 (1995) (describing the expansion of
the concept of discrimination during the civil rights era).
284. See David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. C04. L. REV. 935,
940-46 (1989).
285. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 1179-80. Although private adoption agencies are not directly
subject to constitutional standards because they are not state agencies, they are indirectly affected by
constitutional norms against discrimination through state regulation. Constitutional norms are not directly
applicable to private adoption agencies under the public function test because adoption is not an inherently
governmental function traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state. See Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (determining that supplying electrical service was not a public function);
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (treating provision of a park as a public function).
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divide that this Article's analysis of racial inequality suggests should not be
accorded much significance. This disjunction between critique and proposal
strikes a pragmatic rather than principled balance between the implications of
the analysis and the societal resistance that the proposal is likely to engender.
In light of the critique, the proposal is quite minimalist, calling for much less
than the analysis suggests it should.
B. Mechanics and Substance of Strict Nonacconmmodation
My proposal is a simple one: Adoption agencies that receive any
government funding should not accommodate adoptive parents' racial
preferences. Beyond ceasing the classification of children by race in order to
facilitate the satisfaction of adoptive parents' racial preferences, adoption
agencies should make clear to prospective adoptive parents that their racial
preferences are to play no role in the parents' selection of a child to adopt.
2
'
My vision of strict nonaccommodation consists of two elements. First,
prospective adoptive parents would generally be prohibited from discriminating
on the basis of race in their selection of a child to adopt, and birth parents who
participate in the selection of adoptive parents would generally be prohibited
from discriminating on the basis of race in doing so. Prospective adoptive
parents and birth parents would be informed at the outset that the adoption
process is not one in which racial discrimination is allowed. Parents would be
encouraged to withdraw from the process if they did not think that they could
abide by that rule, and adoption agency officials would have the authority to
remove parents from the process if they determined that the parents in fact
were discriminating on the basis of race. Parents could even be asked to sign
a nondiscrimination agreement just as do other parties who do business with
or enter a relationship with the government. Admittedly, this approach runs the
risk of unintentionally underscoring the importance of race by constantly
proclaiming that it must not matter. Nonetheless, the extent to which race
currently matters in adoption suggests that mere governmental blindness to race
would not decrease its significance.
Second, the general principle of nondiscrimination is qualified by my goal
of promoting the maintenance of particular groups in the interest of cultural
pluralism. Notwithstanding the law's focus on the rights of individuals and the
286. I have no illusion that this proposal will meet with immediate and widespread acceptance.
Nonetheless, I believe that it is worth fighting for. Judith Butler says it best:
To make trouble was, within the reigning discourse of my childhood. something one should
never do precisely because that would get one ti trouble. The rebellion and its repnmand
seemed to be caught up in the same terms, a phenomenon that gave ise to my first cntical
insight into the subtle ruse of power. The prevailing law threatened one with trouble, even put
one in trouble, all to keep one out of trouble. Hence. I concluded that trouble is inevitable and
the task, how best to make it, what best way to be in it.
JUDITH BUTrLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND TIlE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY at % i (1990).
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primacy of the individual rather than the group in liberal political and social
theory, our society has an important interest in maintaining cultural diversity.
In American society, racial identity for minority groups is linked, though not
identical, to a distinctive set of cultural characteristics, a nomos.287 To the
extent the nomos is race-linked, racial minorities would be allowed to choose
a child on the basis of race as a means of furthering that nomos. If one
embraces cultural pluralism and accepts the inevitability of the state's either
suppressing or promoting such communities (given the impossibility of
neutrality), then -such racially identified choices should be promoted in
principle. The claim of contributing to the cultural pluralism of American
society through their own race-consciousness is a claim that blacks and other
racial minorities, but not whites, can make. 88 The nomos of whiteness as a
racial identity is nothing more than a historically generated and self-
perpetuated set of privileges, expectations, and entitlements that are
implemented through and reflected in the dominant norms, processes, rules,
and structure of American society. There is no white race-based culture
separate from mainstream American culture. In principle, then, strict
nonaccommodation should allow fulfillment of the racial preferences of racial
minorities, but not those of whites.
The demands of race politics, however, may make it difficult to enact a
policy that allows blacks, but not whites, to choose a child of their own race.
Whites might argue that such an asymmetry is unfair, perhaps even
unconstitutional, a conclusion the Supreme Court might adopt as well. Even
as it strives to undo the most pernicious race-consciousness, such a policy
might itself be decried as a pernicious type of race-based treatment. More
debate might ensue about the justice of the asymmetry than about the idea of
nonaccommodation itself. If the merits of the policy were obscured by
contentious debate about whether groups should be treated differently, I would
advise the practical solution of not allowing any expression of same-race
preference.
A blanket prohibition on the expression of racial preferences would not be
detrimental to cultural pluralism in American society. No racial minority group
would be in danger of disappearing as a result of random racial placement in
adoption, negating neither racial community nor individual racial identity.289
287. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REv. 4, 4 (1983) (describing a nomos as a "normative universe ... [,1 a world of right and
wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and void").
288. Cf DAVID R. ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF WHITENESS 13 (1994) ("Whiteness
describes ... not a culture but precisely the absence of culture. It is the attempt to build an identity
based on what one isn't and on whom one can hold back.").
289. A possible exception is Native Americans, whom I would except from my proposal. Race
matching of Native-American children might be said currently to operate through the Indian Child Welfare
Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1923 (1994). The Act vests exclusive jurisdiction over placement decisions
involving Indian children in Indian tribes and establishes preferences for adoptive placement. I do not
intend to suggest that the policy established with regard to Indian children should be treated as analogous
[Vol. 107: 875
Racial Preferences in Adoption
Transracially adopted individuals, both black and white, would still be racially
identified in accordance with their appearance and ancestry. They would
continue to understand themselves as white or black, as the case may be.'
Although the policy would seek to make race independent of the
assignment of children to parents, race would remain relevant in the adoption
process under strict nonaccommodation. Racial attitudes warrant attention. That
people may be willing to forego their preferences does not exempt their
attitudes from scrutiny. As this Article has demonstrated, race profoundly
shapes both individual values and social processes. In principle, then, we
should investigate the racial attitudes of all individuals who wish to adopt,
whatever the race of the parent and whatever the race of the child.
The practical difficulties of implementing this principle, however, would
be substantial. What constitutes healthy racial attitudes on the part of adoptive
parents? Should social workers be granted the discretion to make such a
determination? In order for a racial attitude assessment policy to be
administrable, it would have to be formulated at a fairly general level. But the
more general the specification of a racial attitudes standard, the less useful and
meaningful it would be. General standards would expand social workers'
discretion. On the other hand, specific standards that attempted to narrow the
range of social worker discretion would be nearly impossible to formulate. As
contentious as the controversy about race matching is, and as divergent as
views about individual preferences are, the likelihood of reaching any policy
agreement about the racial attitudes necessary for proper socialization seems
exceedingly slight. Sufficient agreement might be attainable only for a policy
so general as to be of little use. Thus, the meaningful assessment of adoptive
parents' racial attitudes may be essential in principle but unattainable in
practice.
Strict nonaccommodation would not preclude adoptive parents' expression
of non-race-based preferences. That racial preferences are not honored does not
mean that adoptive parents' preferences based on sex,- age,-- or
to race classifications. Although the analogy may seem appropriate, the situations arc quite distinct. For
example, the case of Indian children is sui gencris given that Indian trbes are formally recognized as quasi-
independent groups with fights of sovereignty. For a discussion of the concerns implicated by the Indian
Child Welfare Act, see Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Be ond the Best Interests of the Tribe The Indian Child
Welfare Act and the Adoption of Indian Children, 66 U. DET. L REV. 451 (1989): and Patnce Kunesh-
Hartman, Comment, The Indian Chid Welfare Act of 1978. Protecting Essential Tribal Interests. 60 U
COLO. L. REv. 131 (1989). The Supreme Court discussed the Indian Child welfare Act in Mi.st55tppi Band
of Choctaw Indians v. Hol)field, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
290. The situation might be different if. say. 80% of black children were up for adoption and ,ere
likely to be placed with white families. Under such a scenario. transracial adoption could mean that the
majority of black children would be raised in white families. This would not necessarily be undesirable.
but it would warrant a rethinking of the probable outcomes in terms of the group's identity.
291. I have found no evidence that girls are systematically disadvantaged in the adoption process or
that adoptive parents are resistant to adopting girls. For example, more Korean girls are adopted by
American families than any other national/gender combination. See Stolley. supra note 6. at 34-35
292. The fact that most adoptive parents desire infants unquestionably disadvantages older children.
This observation should not, however, lead to the conclusion that such preferences should be condemned.
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religion293 should not continue to be honored. My recommended prohibition
on some racial preferences derives from my analysis of the role and impact of
race-consciousness in American society. This Article does not apply this type
of analysis to other characteristics on the basis of which adoptive parents might
express a preference.
Race can be singled out in this manner precisely because it is different
from other social groupings. Without attempting a detailed analysis of other
characteristics, such as age, religion, sex, and health status, it is fair to say that
in American society, as a matter of historical fact, race is unique. Race is the
only basis on which millions of people were enslaved, and then, after having
been granted a nominal freedom, were physically segregated, politically
disenfranchised, physically brutalized, socially stigmatized, and economically
oppressed. The special significance of race compared to other characteristics
is mirrored in the adoption process. The available evidence suggests that girls
are adopted at nearly the same frequency as boys. Jews are adopted at nearly
the same frequency as Christians. 294 Age and health status are, of course,
extremely important in adoptive outcomes. All of these characteristics have
played a different role in American politics and history from that played by
race, a fact that constitutional law recognizes.295 I do not contend that
There are at least three factors that differentiate age preferences from race preferences. First, age is not a
discrete, unchanging category. No child remains an infant. Second, as a normative matter, age is a
characteristic to which parents can rightly accord importance. The orthodox view with race, in contrast, is
that it should not matter. And, it should matter less with children than in any other context, given that
children only become racialized as they develop. Third, the age issue will become less significant as we
address the race issue. Specifically, because black children are disproportionately represented among older
children in need of adoption, increased adoption of black children (when they are young) will diminish the
ranks of older unadopted children in years to come.
293. Religious matching currently occurs in practice although it is not statutorily required. See CLARK,
supra note 16, at 915 (observing that a "substantial number of... states have statutes which contemplate
in some form or other that religion will be brought to the attention of the court in adoption proceedings
or that the adoption shall be awarded 'when practicable' to a person of the same religious faith as the
child"); HARRIS Er AL., supra note 8. at 1201 ("Legally, religious matching in adoption and foster care ...
has been transformed from a mandatory rule to a discretionary policy.").
Aside from the constitutional distinction between classifications based on race and those based on
religion, the social effect of religious matching is not comparable to that of race matching. Indeed, religious
matching may be most objectionable due to its likely racial impact. See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, State-
Supported Foster Care: The Interplay Between the Prohibition of Establishing Religion and the Free
Exercise Rights of Parents and Children: Wilder v. Bernstein, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 603, 605 (1990)
(discussing a case in which a challenge to religious matching was in part based on the racial impact of
denying black Protestant children access to placements in adoptive families). More generally, in American
society, race has been and continues to be a basis for discrimination, exclusion, and group subordination
in a way that religion is not. Nevertheless, while there may be less reason to prohibit religious matching
constitutionally, the case for religious matching as social policy is not especially persuasive, See, e.g.,
CLARK, supra note 16, at 661-67 (criticizing religious matching as unsound social policy). At any rate, my
assumption of no race matching carries no necessary implications for religious matching.
294. If children in need of adoption are disadvantaged on the basis of religious factors, it is likely to
be as a result of mandatory religious matching by the adoption agency, rather than adoptive parents'
religious preferences. See generally Don F Vaccaro, Annotation, Religion as a Factor in Adoption
Proceedings, 48 A.L.R.3d 383 (1973) (listing cases discussing whether, and to what extent, religion is a
proper factor to be considered in adoption proceedings).
295. See TRIBE, supra note 153, § 16-25, at 1558 (noting that "the Supreme Court treats state
classification by race, national origin, or, in some cases, alien status or illegitimacy, as suspect and therefore
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adoptive parents should be given no choices in the adoption process, simply
that they should not be able to exercise race-based choices.
An irony of strict nonaccommodation is that it would in some ways
disadvantage black prospective adoptive families. Because black adoptive
parents are generally less socioeconomically advantaged than white adoptive
parents, black parents are less well-positioned to adopt. Thus, a policy that
counters white race-based claims raises the prospect of harming black adoptive
families. This possibility is a recurrent paradox of racial justice efforts. In
matters of race, gains rarely come without losses.
C. Best-Interests-of-the-Child Standard
The best-interests-of-the-child standard is widely accepted as the guiding
principle in child placement decisions. 2 My proposal is not contrary to this
standard, but I do not attempt to justify it in those terms. With respect to race,
no proposed adoption policy could be accurately described as a necessary
implication of the best-interests-of-the-child standard. Neither the policy
recommendations of race-matching proponents nor those of transracial-adoption
proponents are derived from a careful application of the standard. The standard
is almost wholly indeterminate with regard to race and is therefore of little
help in selecting the race-related principles that should guide adoption policy.
Nonetheless, since it seems natural to frame the debate in terms of the best-
interests-of-the-child standard, both supporters of race matching and proponents
of transracial adoption have done so.
297
subject to strict scrutiny"); see also Kennedy. supra note 81. at 1410 (noting that "im the United States
racial prejudice-particularly that which is anti-black---displays an intensity and persistence that is
distinguishable from all other biases").
296. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text Bartholct. along vth other proponents of
transracial adoption, removes any trace of race from the best-interests-of-the-chid standard.
Notwithstanding disclaimers regarding the political contingency in evaluating the destrabtlty of any
particular racial identity, Bartholet smuggles an integrationist bias into her formulation of the best-interests.
of-the-child standard. After noting the political contingency of an) esaluatton of findings of transracial
adoption's impact on racial attitudes, see Bartholet. supra note 10. at 1216. Bartholet later suggests that
race matching is inappropriate because "the preservation and promotton of a separate black culture and
community ... have not been incorporated in the bastc law of the land on race." id. at 1234. A few pages
later, she rejects the assertion "that growing up with same-race parents is a benefit of overding importance
to black children" based on judicial hostility to similar claims. Id. at 1237. After admitting uncertainty as
to whether "black children will be significantly better off with 'their own kind."' id. at 1238. Bartholet
completely disposes of the possibility by observing that "it is not the kind of assumption that has been
permitted under our nation's anti-discriminatton laws." id. Without saying so. she thus (re)defines the best-
interests-of-the-child standard through reference to the antidiscrimnation norm. This allows her. in essence.
to reject a race-conscious interpretation of the best-interests standard under the guise of neutral legal
analysis.
Bartholet's manipulation of the antidiscrimination principle to give content to the best-interests-of the-
child standard begs the question of what one has to do with the other. A formulation of the best-interests-
of-the-child standard can no more be justified through reference to a legal ideal of colorblindness than an
employee's best interests can be adequately defined through reference to labor law- Any conception of a
child's best interests must rely upon a descniptive and normative analysts of children's emotional.
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There are two plausible bases from which to argue that my proposal is
contrary to the best interests of children. First, one might argue that increasing
the number of transracial adoptions would be detrimental to children's
interests. Of course, this argument must confront the fact that there is no
empirical evidence that transracial adoption harms children, nor any logical
reason to expect that it would. One can draw no one ideology-based conclusion
about the relative merits of transracial, as opposed to same-race, adoption. The
best-interests standard is logically indeterminate with respect to race, in part
because race shades all intimate relationships, not only interracial relationships.
Although we may not similarly perceive the presence of race in same-race as
opposed to cross-race relationships, racialized identities impact both equally.
Race shapes these relationships in conflicting ways because race shapes
individuals, both black and white, in conflicting ways. The fact that we are
more likely to see race as an issue or to trace aspects of social interaction to
race in interracial as opposed to intraracial settings says a great deal about how
we view race but nothing about any inherent quality of race itself. Race will
matter differently if a child is placed with a black family as opposed to a white
family, but there is no way to evaluate or to compare the relative gains and
losses.198 Extensive empirical study might show that intraracial environments
are in some ways unquestionably superior to interracial environments. In still
other ways, perhaps the majority of ways, the differences would prove
impossible to rank in any manner not hopelessly controversial and disputed.
A common version of the argument that transracial adoption harms
children asserts that the children will develop malformed racial identities.299
Undeniably, some portion of transracially adopted children may grow up to
feel that their racial identity is lacking. Even worse, they may trace various
personal problems to their "inadequate" racial identity and their transracial
family. The causal significance they attribute to their transracial family,
however, might be more a reflection of where our society trains us to look for
causes than of actual causes. If the individual experienced the same problems
but had been adopted by a family of the same race, the racial character of the
psychological, physical, and spiritual needs. A legal principle such as antidiscrimination does not provide
such a foundation.
298. For example, assuming that a child "loses" the opportunity to develop a particular racial identity
when the child is placed with a family of another race, that child will not be left identity-less. Instead, the
child will develop another identity, which may confer both advantages and disadvantages relative to the
identity the child did not develop. Many of the differences between the two identities will be difficult to
evaluate nonarbitrarily. This same sort of argument applies to the issue of coping skills for black children.
Black children placed with white adoptive parents would not fail to develop any coping skills, but they
might have different coping skills from those they would develop if they were raised in a black family. We
could suppose that a black family might teach some coping skills better than a white family but also that
a white family might teach some coping skills better than a black family. This analysis draws indirectly,
but heavily, on the work of Stuart Hall. See STUART HALL: CRITICAL DIALOGUES IN CULTURAL STUDIES
(David Morley & Kuan-Hsing Chen eds., 1996).
299. See, e.g., Fenton, supra note 2, at 61; Howe, supra note 2, at 160; Townsend, supra note 2, at
179-80.
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family would probably not be viewed as a likely cause, even though issues of
racial identity are as present in same-race families. The causal inference, then,
may be a matter of interpretive salience rather than causal significance.
What if, however, particular problems really are more likely to occur
among transracially adopted individuals? In this case, the causal significance
attributed to the transracial family environment might reflect widespread
societal views about transracial families and the social processes to which such
attitudes give rise. If transracial families are socially stigmatized, as intimate
interracial relationships were generations ago, one would indeed expect
individuals in such relationships to experience more difficulties than
individuals in socially approved relationships. This sort of individual harm,
however, hardly justifies a social policy when past and present policies have
engendered the societal views and patterns that caused the problems associated
with interracial affiliations. If societal attitudes and social practices are in part
a function of current and past policies, then the detrimental consequences of
relationships that contravene those attitudes and practices cannot be used as a
justification for the continuation of these policies. If the problems that beset
transracially adopted children are a matter of current social patterns or cultural
values, the task may be to use policy to change those patterns and values.
Alternatively, we could normatively endorse the status quo, but in no case
should we simply surrender as though the current situation were inevitable.
Another potential risk of strict nonaccommodation is the placement of
children with parents who do not genuinely want them. Such adoptive
placements would not provide the loving and supportive environments that
one's family should and might be worse than staying in foster care. Although
the matching of parents with children that they do not want on account of race
could arise with both black and white parents and children, the risk is greatest
that white parents who would prefer to adopt a white child will be put in the
position of adopting a black child.
It is unclear how substantial or common a problem this would be. White
prospective adoptive parents who prefer a white child but nonetheless adopt
through a public or private agency would be gambling that they would not
receive a white child. What proportion of parents would risk this gamble is
uncertain. The stronger a prospective parent's racial preference, the greater the
likelihood he or she would decline to risk nonpreferred placement. Those
parents willing to take the risk would likely not hold as strong a racial
preference as those parents unwilling to take the risk, but there would be a
possibility that parents moderately averse to adopting a child of another race
would adopt subject to the nonaccommodation policy. Thus, there would be
a risk of unwanted placements on the basis of race, but the extent of that risk
would be inversely related to the strength of adoptive parents' preferences.
In any case, "less wanted" placements would not be inevitable for either
black or white children. Adoption agencies would screen adoptive parents, and
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any judged unfit (for reasons including those having to do with racial attitudes)
should be excluded from the process altogether.3' ° Parents' stated willingness
to adopt without regard to race would be a necessary but not sufficient
condition for a child to be placed with them. It would be the adoption agency's
responsibility to ascertain parental fitness with regard to racial views and
attitudes just as with respect to a variety of other considerations.
D. Constitutionality of Strict Nonaccommodation
Strict nonaccommodation as a condition for federal funding in connection
with child welfare and placement would apply to public and private adoption
agencies but not to individuals who arrange independent adoptions. The
proposal is clearly constitutional with respect to public adoption agencies.30'
Even if Congress could not directly enact strict nonaccommodation as applied
to private adoption agencies, my proposal could be enacted as a condition
attached to federal spending.302 The government can condition its spending
on adherence to mandates that it cannot implement directly.30 3 Congress may
not be able to prohibit private racial discrimination in adoption, but it cannot
be required to subsidize such discrimination through its provision of
government funds.3 4
There are two alternative arguments that strict nonaccommodation imposes
no unconstitutional conditions. First, the policy burdens no preferred
constitutional right since there is no constitutional right to become an adopted
parent.305 Second, even if it does burden a constitutional right, that right must
be weighed against children's right to be free from racial discrimination in the
state-funded and state-regulated adoption process. Although the Court has not
300. Most adoption laws allow for extensive screening of prospective adoptive parents by the adoption
agency in order to insure that the parents are suitable for a child placement. See, e.g., UNIF. ADOPTION AcT
§ 11, 9 U.L.A. 46 (1994).
301. Because there is no constitutional fight to become an adoptive parent, see Griffith v. Johnston,
899 F.2d 1427, 1437 (5th Cir. 1990), the government is not required to provide the opportunity to adopt,
much less to make available any particular range of choices to prospective adoptive parents. More
importantly, the furtherance of adoptive parents' asserted right to choose a child on the basis of race may
require the state to do what it cannot constitutionally do: State facilitation of adoptive parents' "right" to
discriminate in the formation of their adoptive family would infringe the right of black children to be free
from invidious racial discrimination by the state. If adoptive parents have the fight to receive affirmative
state assistance in the realization of their racially discriminatory preferences, then black children, by
implication, have no right to be free from racial classifications by the state. This cannot and should not be
the law.
302. For a discussion of the constitutionality of conditioned federal spending, see Richard A. Epstein,
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1988).
303. See Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 85-109 (1976) (upholding the regulation of publicly financed
presidential elections through the setting of minimum vote-capture thresholds).
304. Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980) (noting that, "[a]lthough the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government interference with freedom
of choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such funds as
may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom").
305. See Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1437.
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recognized a constitutional right to become an adoptive parent, the Court has
recognized rights related to family formation. A parent's choice of a child to
adopt, on whatever basis the parent desires, could be accorded constitutional
protection, in which case strict nonaccommodation would create an
unconstitutional conditions problem. In contrast to other scenarios that raise
unconstitutional conditions issues, however, in adoption, the rights of adoptive
parents and the rights of children in need of adoption are in tension.3
Parents' right to autonomy burdens children's right to be free from state-
supported racial discrimination. The state thus cannot be neutral as to the rights
of parents and children in the adoption system. Strict nonaccommodation
rearranges the relative rights of adoptive parents and children. Under strict
nonaccommodation, parents would have less of a right to choose a child on
whatever basis they desire. This policy would not be the first that forced
parental rights to yield to the state's interest in eradicating discrimination."
Conversely, strict nonaccommodation enlarges children's rights to be free
from racial discrimination in adoption. In this regard, strict nonaccommodation
is ideologically consistent with the many proposals that have called for an
expanded recognition of children's rights. 3 s
E. Nature of Adoptive Parents' Preferences
There are two overlapping categories into which most expressions of racial
preference in adoption can be placed. Preferences may represent adoptive
parents' vision of their family, based on their attitudes, values, and beliefs
about race (what I term parent-centered preferences), or they may represent a
concern for the well-being of their adopted child (what I term child-centered
preferences). 309 Both parent-centered and child-centered preferences are, in
part, responses to racial views and patterns that are widespread in American
society. Parent-centered preferences include parents' desire for a child who
looks like them, for an adoptive family modeled on the biological family, for
a child they feel able to parent competently, or for a family that is socially
306. For articles discussing this tension. see, for example. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse. Hatching the
Egg, 14 CARDoZO L. REV. 1747 (1993): Barbara Bennett Woodhouse. A Public Role in the Private Family
The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act and the Politics of Child Protection and Education. 57 Ohio
ST. LJ. 393 (1996); and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse. "Who Owns the Child' Meyer and Pierce and the
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995 (1992)
307. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (rejecting a **freedom of choice-
desegregation plan that perpetuated racial segregation): Griffin v. County Sch. Bd.. 377 U S 218 (1964)
(striking down a plan designed to maintain racial segregation by replacing the public school system with
tuition grants to be used in nonsectarian private schools).
308. See, e.g., Gilbert A. Holmes. The Tie That Binds, The Constitutional Right of Children To
Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Idividuals, 53 MD. L. REv 358 (1994).
309. There is, of course, no sharp demarcation between the two types of desires inasmuch as we are
socially formed and develop "individual" desires only within a particular social context This view accords
with that of communitarianism. See. e.g., SANDEL. DEMOCRACY'S Discor E.%r. supra note 173. SADEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMrrs OF JUSTICE, suipra note 173
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accepted rather than disapproved. Child-centered preferences include parents'
desire for a child who would not be socially stigmatized, racially isolated, or
unable to develop sufficient coping skills or an appropriate racial identity.
Parents' formulate their own values in the context of larger society. An
adoptive parent who desires a family that is socially approved may accede to
the bases upon which approval is granted or withheld in American society.
Similarly, insofar as a child's well-being is a function of how people respond
to the child, assessments of a child's best interest take account of societal
norms and values. Perhaps the most common parent-centered preference is the
desire for a child who allows the adoptive family to mimic the biological
family. Adoption is frequently pursued by those who have been unsuccessful
at having children biologically. Having failed at biological reproduction,
parents may attempt to create an adoptive family on the template of the
biological family. Because racial difference would presumably negate the
biological pretenses of such adoptive families, parents sometimes accept only
a child of their own race. The urge to recreate the biological family is a strong
one. In fact, the notion that adoptive families should approximate as closely
as possible the norm of the biological family has guided adoption policy
historically.31
0
Other parent-centered preferences focus on the difficulties that confront a
parent who adopts transracially, or the impediments to adopting a child of a
different race. Prospective adoptive parents might view the parenting challenge
of transracial adoption as greater than they are willing or able to confront. A
parent who holds this view might harbor no race-related vision of family, but
might simply recognize that parenting across race lines creates formidable
challenges. These parents might gladly adopt across race lines but for the
social disapproval of others. They would note that irrespective of their own
racial views, they must contend with the racial views prevalent in society, and
because of the way society is, adopting across race lines could create a family
circumstance fraught with trouble. Even those parents who would be willing
to put up with the special difficulties of being a transracial family may decline
to pursue such a placement because of the difficulty of being placed with a
child of another race as a result of race-matching policies.
Child-centered preferences focus on the needs of children and are justified
as a matter of what is best for the child. A person whose decision to adopt
within his or her own race expresses a child-centered preference might believe
that being transracially adopted would be detrimental to the child for one of
two reasons. First, the prospective parent might not feel that he or she could
adequately impart coping skills and identity to the child. White parents might
think that they do not know enough about black culture or history and would
be cheating the child out of a culture and a past. Second, a child-centered
310. See supra note 8; supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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preference might arise from the view that to be transracially adopted would be
an inherently troublesome situation that is harmful to the child, irrespective of
the parenting skills of the adoptive parents. In this view, parents may be unable
to counter the ostracization, teasing, or taunting that might plague a
transracially adopted child. In a society riven by race, black children in white
families, or white children in black families, might be unable to find a place.
As matters of individual decision, each of these parent- and child-centered
preferences is understandable. They require no trace of what we might view
as racial animus or bias. But each of these preferences ultimately collapses
back into race; each capitulates or reflects current racial values and attitudes.
The parent-centered racial preference, predicated on a vision of the adoptive
family built on the model of the biological family, accurately interprets the
prevailing understandings of race. Racial difference would in fact be a salient
marker that the adoptive family was not a "real" biological family. Yet the
salience of race, the fact that racial difference would make it "obvious" that
the child was adopted, is a matter of social rather than natural reality. Race
seems to be a proxy for appearance, in large part because the physical features
that are markers of race are more salient than other physical features. The
differential significance of race-based as opposed to non-race-based physical
features is also reflected in the fact that parents' desire for a child who looks
like them generally yields to the force of race-based reasoning in which racial
commonality suggests physical similarity and racial difference precludes
physical similarity. Thus, race is understood as signifying the genetic link of
biological relatedness.
A parent and child of the same race appear to look more alike than a
parent and child of a different race because our implicit theory of race
constrains judgments of similarity, physical and otherwise."' People within
racial groups are not viewed as similar to one another because they share the
same physical characteristics; instead, their physical characteristics are judged
to be similar because they share the same race. The categories produce the
perceived similarity, not the other way around. As long as racial commonality
remains, by itself, sufficient to suggest that a family is natural, and racial
difference remains a guarantee of a family's unnaturalness, could there be any
stronger evidence that race remains the ultimate, irreducible marker of
difference or commonality, the defining boundary of community? Other
instances of parent-centered and child-centered preferences are more obviously
a response to the racial patterns of American society. The difficulties of
transracial adoption, for either parent or child, are a matter of the racial
patterns and attitudes that prevail in American society.
311. See Jennifer Lynn Eberhardt & Jennifer Lynn Randall. The Essential Notion of Race. 8 PSYQCOL
Sci. 198, 199 (1997) (book review).
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Racial preferences also recreate patterns of symbolic intergroup conflict.
The dynamics of intergroup conflict can be observed in the patterns of white
parents' adoption of nonwhite children. All the available evidence suggests that
the majority of white parents who adopt across race lines would rather adopt
a nonblack child than a black child.312 White adoptive parents, in this view,
may decline to adopt a black child because the child is not "like" them. These
same parents may be more likely to adopt an Asian child because the child is
within their imagined community. What this assumes or reflects is that the
stigma and stereotypes applied to black children are not similarly applied to
Asian children.
During the peak of transracial adoption in the early 1970s, approximately
2500 black children were adopted by white families.1 3 Currently, white
families adopt approximately 1100 black children and nearly 6000 Asian and
Hispanic children per year.314 One study showed that during one year 6% of
all adoptions involved a white mother adopting nonwhite children; 1% were
white mothers adopting black children; and 5% were white mothers adopting
nonwhite, nonblack children.1 5 Certainly there are many factors that
contribute to this disparity, including a preference for healthy infants.
Nonetheless, white adoptive parents' willingness to adopt nonwhite children
who are also nonblack suggests that the need to replicate the biological family
may not be as powerful as commonly thought.
Nearly all adoptive parent preferences, whether parent-centered or child-
centered, recognize and capitulate to the racial realities of American society.
No doubt, the social patterns and views to which preferences respond are real
and often potent. Yet these patterns and views are not natural; they are in part
products of individual action, the aggregate expressions of the same choices
that are rationalized as mere responses. Adoptive parents might feel, perhaps
rightly so, that they are responding to, rather than individually responsible for,
the racial dynamics of American society.
However rational one deems adoptive parents' preferences, the racial
conditions to which they respond are a matter of social policy, not individual
choice. The reasonableness of a desire does not determine the reasonableness
of a policy in support of or in recognition of that desire, especially if the desire
is in part the outcome of earlier race-based policies and the social
arrangements that they supported. The desire may be individually reasonable
but socially troublesome. As long as race functions as the ultimate marker of
difference, in the family and elsewhere, racial division in society is intractable
312. See supra note 20.
313. See Arnold R. Silverman, Outcomes of Transracial Adoption, 3 FtrrURE OF CHILDREN 104, 106
(1993) (summarizing a variety of studies on the effects of tmnsracial adoption).
314. See id. at 106.
315. See Stolley, supra note 6, at 34.
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and inevitable." 6 One way to begin to change both the desire and the
background social conditions to which the desire responds is to alter adoption
policy. Estimates of the difficulty of changing preferences should not be
allowed to distort judgments about the desirability of doing so, and indeed, the
prevalence of such preferences may be a measure of the extent to which race
remains the fault line in American society.
F. Feasibility of Nonaccommodation
Attempts to implement a strict nonaccommodation policy would no doubt
encounter numerous practical difficulties. There are at least three
administrability arguments against my proposal. First, one might argue that
there is insufficient political will to enact strict nonaccommodation. Adoptive
parents might oppose it, but who would support it, and why? Second, one
might contend that, as a practical matter, racial preferences cannot be removed
from the adoption process. Third, one might predict that a strict
nonaccommodation policy would prompt so many prospective adoptive parents
to forego public or private agency adoption as to threaten the viability of the
agency adoption system. Each of these three arguments raises important issues,
and I will address each in turn.
1. Political Will
For a policy of strict nonaccommodation to be adopted, the proposal would
have to gain the support of an interest group willing to advance its cause. A
prerequisite of change is that people must first begin to perceive the existence
of the policy and to understand it as a choice of one manner of state action
rather than another. The character of race politics, our implicit theory of
individual autonomy, and the assumption of the possibility of neutrality make
this task a challenging one.
Because strict nonaccommodation does not promote the race-based claims
of either blacks or whites, neither group is likely to support strongly the
policy. Nonaccommodation thus seems to lack a constituency. Instead of
providing benefits-symbolic or concrete-to a particular group, strict
nonaccommodation would at most provide diffuse gains benefiting society as
a whole. Even these gains-the transformation of consciousness and
confrontation with the mechanisms of racial inequality-might seem more
painful than beneficial, more a cost than a benefit. The only discrete group
316. The notion that there is value in mimicking biological families is itself qumlionabic. Adoptive
families should not be seen as poor imitations of biological families, as successful only to the extent they
recreate or mimic the biological model.
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arguably benefited would be children in need of adoption, and they neither
vote in elections nor fund favorite candidates.
Finally, racial preferences in adoption are not disfavored. Notwithstanding
extensive antidiscrimination laws and the transformation of racial attitudes
during the past half-century, racial preferences in matters of intimate
association are perceived as innocuous rather than invidious. Even if people
perceive facilitative accommodation as a social policy that can be changed,
they may not want to change it. And even people who think facilitative
accommodation should be abolished may not feel strongly enough to spend the
energy necessary to change the policy, much less to support strict
nonaccommodation. That adoptive parents' racial preferences discriminate
against black children may be accepted as a necessary cost of personal choice.
The costs to adults of denying racial preferences in adoption may be thought
to exceed the cost to children and society of allowing them.
2. Inevitability of Racial Preferences
Racial preferences in adoption may also be intractable. Even if the state
implemented strict nonaccommodation, adoptive parents could still base their
decisions on race without admitting that they were doing so. If indulging the
preference is important to adoptive parents, it is likely that they would not
state their racial reasons for rejecting a particular child.
Alternatively, racial preferences might persist because adoptive parents
would not be fully aware of their existence.37 Prospective adoptive parents
may choose children in part on the basis of race without being aware that they
are doing so. 3 1 1 They may find some children "cuddly" and "lovable" and
others not, and they might not know why. Many parents who genuinely want
to choose a child other than on the basis of race might not be fully able to do
so.
3. Parental Resistance
Strict nonaccommodation may cause parents to forego agency adoption
rather than renounce their preferences. Those families who are only willing to
accept a child for adoption on the basis of race, but who are not financially
able to adopt through independent placement, might decide to forego adoption
altogether. Many prospective adoptive parents with economic resources would
317. Cf Lawrence, supra note 81, at 330 (arguing that racism is irrational because individuals are not
fully aware of the meanings they attach to race).
318. Cf id. at 335-36 (discussing the role of the unconscious in creating less apparent racial prejudice).
This would be a variant of what social psychologists term "aversive racism." See John Dovidio et al..
Resistance to Affirmative Action: The Implications of Aversive Racism, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN
PERSPECTIVE 83, 86 (F.A. Blanchard & F.J. Crosby eds., 1989).
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pursue independent or international placements. Although black and white
parents might resist strict nonaccommodation, white parents would be more
likely and able to adopt internationally or independently, whereas black parents
would be more likely to forego unrelated adoption altogether. Because of the
racial ratios of prospective adoptive parents, the flight of white parents from
the agency adoption system would pose a greater threat to the stability of the
entire system than the flight of black parents.
319
Two problems might result from parents' decisions to forego agency
adoption. First, fewer families might be available for those children in need of
adoption. Second, government-funded adoption agencies might lose public
support. Although both black and white parents alike would leave, the
proportion of exiting white parents would almost certainly be greater than the
proportion of exiting black parents. The exit of potential adoptive parents from
the agency adoption process would diminish the total number of adoptive
parents. The exodus of white parents would not significantly affect the pool of
parents available for black children because those whites open to adopting a
black children would probably remain in the system. The pool of available
parents for black children, however, would be diminished by those potential
black adoptive parents who decide against agency adoption as a result of strict
nonaccommodation. But the magnitude of the decrease in black parents would
likely be less than the magnitude of the decrease in white adoptive parents,
because of black parents' lesser chance of being matched with a white child
and their lesser financial ability to adopt independently or internationally.
Thus, there is reason to doubt that black children would be substantially
harmed, even if the most dire forecast of white adoptive parents' abandonment
of the agency adoption system came to pass. After all, the parents most likely
to abstain from adopting altogether, or to leave the public system and resort
to independent or international adoption, would not be willing to adopt under
the current policy unless they could specify the race of the child. Fewer
adoptions would occur through public agencies but that does not mean that
319. In fact, a nonaccommodation policy might dramatically expand the number of families asallable
to adopt black children. The largest group of potential adoptive parents currently unavailable to black
children does not consist of those white families who are practically barred from adopting them by race-
matching policies. Rather, the largest group of potential parents for these black children consists of those
who now adopt white children. Based on the information provided by Bartholet and others, more new
homes could be made available to black children if a legal prohibition on public facilitati e accommodation
of parental racial preferences transformed the preferences of only a small portion of %hite families who
would currently adopt white children than if all the white parents who have been seeking to adopt
transracially were immediately allowed to do so. Yet the debate completely bypasses the source of the
greatest number of eventual adoptive homes for black children.
A policy of nonaccommodation of parental racial preferences might contribute to a nonracialist vision
of family that would eventually lead white families who currently do not want to adopt black children to
do so. That such an outcome seems unlikely, if not farfetched, is a testament to our belief in the settled
nature of current expectations, expectations shaped in part by the law. The current racial expectations of
adoptive parents are no more intractable and no less subject to change than the racial expectations of a
century ago. In public schooling, transit, and interpersonal relations, white expectations have been defeated
and transformed, all without the downfall of basic public institutions.
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fewer families would be available for black children. Those white families who
chose to leave the public system or declined to adopt would not have adopted
black children in any case. So while their "loss" may be important for other
reasons, it cannot be decried on the grounds that it harms black children.
There may thus be no net loss in the parents available to black children.
There would be a net loss in the number of parents available to adopt white
children. But the number of white adoptive parents so exceeds the number of
white children currently available for adoption that all white children in need
of adoption would nonetheless be placed successfully. In sum, even if a
significant proportion of potential adoptive parents leave the system, children,
black and white alike, would be no less likely to be placed successfully in an
adoptive family.
But even if the exodus of adoptive parents does not prove detrimental to
individual children in need of adoption, it might contribute to undermining
public support of agency adoption. Publicly funded adoption, and the child
welfare system more generally, might be viewed more skeptically. Advocacy
groups might put forth proposals to decrease government funding of adoption
and child welfare services. Some might even urge privatization of child welfare
and adoption services.
In evaluating the likelihood that parents would desert the agency system,
the analogy of public education comes to mind.320 When white students and
their families fled blacks and the public schools, the schools suffered.
Education suffered. And perhaps the black children on whose behalf
integration was pursued may have suffered as well. But public adoption is not
public education. Schools require the participation of students and their parents
in a way that adoption agencies do not. If fifty percent of parents transferred
their children out of a school district, the educational process would no doubt
be hindered. If fifty percent of white adoptive parents decided not to adopt,
adoption would continue largely unaffected, in fact, the numbers of prospective
adoptive parents and children in need of adoption would be more balanced.
4. Beyond the Feasibility of Nonaccommodation
It is true that the consequentialist argument against nonaccommodation
becomes more persuasive the more dire and negative the outcomes to which
a nonaccommodation policy would lead. But it is also true that the severity of
the adverse consequences is at least a rough measure of the depth and potency
of racial bias in American society. The more pernicious the effects of racial
bias, the greater our obligation to combat it. The more completely existing
320. For discussions of the effects of school desegregation plans on public education systems, see
GARY ORFIELD, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
(1997); and JOSEPH WATRA.S, POLITICS, RACE, AND SCHOOLS: RACIAL INTEGRATION, 1954-1994 (1997).
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racial attitudes undermine the possibility of a nonaccommodation policy, the
more directly we are confronted with the depth of racial division in American
society, and the less we are able to deny the extent to which racial bias
continues to shape both social practices and government policies. Thus, the
case for bowing to instrumental concerns becomes more compelling just as the
necessity of resisting and countering racial bias also becomes more pressing.
This leaves us with a paradox: The greater the reasons to accommodate, the
more urgent the need to alter the conditions that require facilitative
accommodation. The less feasible nonaccommodation seems, the more the
reason to challenge the attitudes that preclude its implementation.
The probable outcome of a nonaccommodation policy also raises a
recurring dilemma of racial justice efforts: The greater the need to change the
system, the less the possibility of doing so because the unintended outcomes
might be more adverse and severe. The extent to which white parents will
leave the public adoption system is at least a rough measure of their race-
consciousness. The greater their race-consciousness, the more white parents
will leave the system. In order to encourage white potential adoptive parents
not to leave the system, adoption policy must not challenge their race-
consciousness. As long as the goals of their race-consciousness can be
effectuated, they will stay.
Yet it is the race-consciousness of white adoptive parents that makes it
necessary to change the system. The expression of their race-consciousness
both produces the outcomes that necessitate changes in the system and
represents the force that resists change in the system. This is the conundrum
of racial justice efforts in America. Reform is more palatable to whites the
more piecemeal it is: The more minimal the change, the more popular the
program. Proposals that embody more than minimal change are often opposed
for that very reason, at least to the extent that the perceived interests of blacks
and whites are opposed.32' Whites would oppose meaningful programs
precisely because of their racial impact. In adoption, the attitudes that have
created and perpetuated the problem are the very things trotted out as
justification not to take actions that would either change those attitudes or
substantively address the undesirable outcome they have created.
Concession to these political realities would seem to leave two plausible
options: Either we can accept race matching and hope that such a policy will
create political pressure to bring more black parents into the adoption process,
or we can accept facilitative accommodation and hope that white parents adopt
black children who would otherwise remain in foster care. Strict
nonaccommodation could be disastrous. It may be the case that white parents
321. Olati Johnson makes a similar pont in regard to efforts to promote residential integration See
Olati Johnson, Integrating the "Underclass": Confronting Americas Endurng Apartheid, 47 ST % L REV
787, 815 (1995) (noting that "'integration is only politicalIl pragmatic to the extent it is tokeist. beyond
that, it.will likely be resisted").
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will leave the system and that public support for a government-administered
adoption system would further diminish. In a sharp departure from the current
scholarly trend, commentators may begin to explore the possibility of
widespread independent adoptions. Think tanks would study the idea. Grass
roots organizations would mobilize support. The President might even pledge
to "end adoption as we know it." The privatized system and the resulting
skeleton of a public system may be unimaginably worse for black children than
the current public one. This scenario, in my estimation, is far from implausible.
Even the slight possibility of its occurrence counsels against hastily enacting
a policy of nonaccommodation, thus unfortunately precluding the only policy
that might offer meaningful positive change.
This forecast may be too dire, for it takes for granted the racial patterns
and attitudes whose transformation would be the purpose of the policy. Law
is symbolic as well as practical. 322 "Legal institutions can express culture, or
they can help shape it. Where legal institutions help shape culture, they do so
in part by instantiating and reinforcing particular conceptions of the nature of
persons and their good. 323 Legal norms are expressions of societal values
and ideals. Even when they fail to remake the world immediately in accord
with their command, legal principles communicate an image of how the world
should be, of how we want our world to be, of the type of society and
relationships among which we want to live.
In the short term, the symbolic benefits of strict nonaccommodation would
have to be weighed against its practical costs. 324 Insofar as the vision of race
embodied in strict nonaccommodation differs from the prevailing racial logic,
there would indeed be costs. Law's symbolic role would then be counterpoised
to administrative and practical concerns. Over the long term, however, the
symbolic impact of law may change the practical consequences of strict
nonaccommodation.
The practical long-term outcomes of any policy result, at least in part,
from the symbolic role of law. Law shapes long-term outcomes in two
respects. First, law is a statement of public values that creates expectations as
well as reflects them.32 Second, law shapes social practices even as it takes
account of them. These two aspects of law's influence reinforce each other. If
adoption policy formalizes the norm that race should not matter, more adoptive
322. See KENNEDY, supra note 192, at 107 (noting that "the legal system creates as well as reflects
consensus").
323. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 173 (1996).
324. Cf. id. at 132-36 (arguing in the context of prostitution that the nonideal nature of our world may
require that we adopt laws that reflect compromise from the ideal).
325. See id. at 222 (observing that "'[plreferences' bring law into being, but law also makes and
changes 'preferences"'); see also Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 109
(1984) ("[Tlhe power exerted by a legal regime consists less in the force it can bring to bear against
violators of its rules than in its capacity to persuade people that the world described in its images and
categories is the only attainable world in which a sane person would want to live.").
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parents would be willing to adopt children of another race.3' 6 And as mixed-
race adoptive families became more common, the stigma attached to them
would diminish, as would the difficulties of being a transracial adoptee. The
lessened stigma would, in turn, prompt more families to adopt children of
different races. Current social practices and expectations cannot be taken as a
given when forecasting the likely impact of a nonaccommodation regime.327
The purpose of nonaccommodation is to change such expectations and
practices, and the measure of its success is the extent to which it does. But no
assessment of the prospects of strict nonaccommodation should take for
granted the very patterns of racial preference and beliefs that such a policy
would seek to change.
A well-articulated policy of strict nonaccommodation might transform our
society so that a generation or two from now no one would view preferring
one infant over another on the basis of race as a reasonable thing to do. Such
a forecast may sound preposterous until one recalls the nature of the arguments
about de jure segregation and recognizes that our society has changed to an
extent that even many of our most racially liberal late nineteenth-century
forbearers would have found completely unimaginable.
One of the defenses of segregation was that it reflected natural racial
sentiments and patterns of social interaction that were immune to the influence
of law.3 28 For whites, segregation reflected firmly held expectations about the
nature of social life. Segregation was so deeply embedded in policy and
practice that many of its defenders expressed genuine fears that any attempt to
delegitimize it would result in catastrophe. There were predictions of racial
unrest and violence. Indeed, efforts to end de jure segregation did provoke
violence, 329 and judicial endorsement of racial integration sparked violent
resistance.330 But few people would conclude that the gains in racial justice
during the past one hundred years were not worth their costs. Social change
is always unsettling.
We have reached the other side of the challenge posed by de jure
segregation: Racial sentiments are no longer invoked to justify racially
segregated education or public accommodations. Even the most traditional of
white southerners have relinquished the racial expectations with which they
may have been raised. Whites who ride the bus no longer expect blacks to give
326. Cf CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGITs REVOLLtno% 64-67 (1990) (arguing that most
preferences are endogenous to legal rules and norms).
327. Cf id. at 41-42 (reasoning that "'when preferences are a function of legal rules. the rules cannot.
without circularity, be justified by reference to the preferences").
328. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. 544 (1896) (asserting that the purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment could not possibly have included the abolition of distinctions based on color
implicit in the natural order of things).
329. See MICHAEL R. BELKNAP. FEDERAL LAW AND SOLTHERN ORDER passim (1987)
330. See id. at 27 (noting that "'the Court's landmark ruling in Brown i Board of Educarton produced
a violent reaction").
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up their seats or move to the back of the bus. Blacks no longer avert their eyes
when whites approach. 331 And whites no longer feel free to call a black man
"boy." Such examples seem quaint reminders of a bygone era-they are, and
that is my point. We have undergone a revolution in racial expectations and
etiquette that would have seemed a fanciful impossibility to most Americans
a century ago.
Although law was certainly not the only factor in this massive social
transformation, without the assistance of changes in the law, changes in our
society and in our racial expectations would not have come about so rapidly.
By not reinforcing whites' expectation that blacks would give up their seats
and move to the back of a crowded bus, for example, the law helped to change
those expectations.332 So effective was the law at this process that now the
expectation itself seems unreasonable. We would think less of a person who
harbored such an expectation and would feel ashamed of ourselves for doing
so. We might come to regard such a view not as a natural racial preference,
but as an example of the pernicious racial thinking upon which the atrocities
of dejure segregation and the Holocaust alike rested. Strict nonaccommodation
is important and meaningful, not because it reflects who we are, but because
it suggests who we might be.333
Although the fact that children may suffer in the short term counsels
caution, I am certain that even if we do not implement a policy of
nonaccommodation for the practical reasons discussed above, the analysis of
race-based claims and race politics presented in this Article should contribute
to an alternative interpretation of why a nonaccommodation policy is
undesirable. Under this interpretation, our decision not to institute a
nonaccommodation policy should not be viewed as a simple reflection of the
importance of individual autonomy,3 4 a recognition of privacy rights in the
context of family formation, or an attempt to promote the best interests of
children in need of adoption. The decision to continue to accommodate
adoptive parents' racial preferences should be seen as a tragic capitulation to
racialism and a tacit admission of the potency, ubiquity, and systematic nature
of the private beliefs and desires that sustain racial inequality.
331. John Dollard observed that such behaviors were integral to race relations in the South during the
first half of this century. See JOHN DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOWN 250-66 (3d cd.
1949) (representing the accommodation of blacks to the southern caste system).
332. For an excellent recounting of the battle against segregated transit, see CATHERINE BARNES,
JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE DESEGREGATION OF SOUTHERN TRANSIT (1983).
333. Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 326, at 67 (stating that often "aspirations form the basis for laws that
attempt to influence processes of preference formation").
334. If race-based claims areexpressed through policies that promote "autonomy" and "individualism,"
then those values cannot be presumed valid and worthy of deference. See supra Part I1. Nor should
"individual" preferences be regarded as legitimate simply because they are deeply and genuinely held and
of long standing. With respect to racial preferences, in adoption and elsewhere, those characteristics may
be precisely the reason to scrutinize such preferences.
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The feasibility of a remedy should not alter our perception of the nature
and depth of the wrong.33 5 The harm is no less severe for being unavoidable.
Black children are harmed by the racial preferences of white adoptive parents.
We should not allow "[t]he absence of a ready legal solution [to] become[]
confused with the absence of a significant social problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
My approach in this Article has followed two intertwined lines of inquiry.
First, I have sought to illuminate and analyze a neglected aspect of adoption
policy. Second, I have sought to understand the dynamics of American race
politics, which shapes policy debate as well as legal doctrine.
The first line of inquiry teaches us about adoption. Adoption policy is
important because it impacts the lives of many tens of thousands of adults and
children each year. This Article has made clear the complicity of state-
endorsed facilitative accommodation policies in the race-based choices that
harm black children. The race-and-adoption debate must involve more than an
examination of race matching. The first step toward remedying racial
inequality in adoption is to bring into view the full range of difficulties and
possibilities that current adoption policies pose. As evident in the adoption
controversy, however, broadly framing the problem does not guarantee a
solution, for it may simply underscore the difficulty of the issue. Nonetheless,
it is better, I think, to have provisional and contingent responses to the right
questions than certain answers to the wrong ones.
The second line of inquiry teaches us about race. Undeniably, race remains
a troublesome issue in American society. But it is also undeniable that tile
nature of racial problems and the mechanisms of racial inequality have
changed. Race does matter, though not in the same way as in years past. The
deliverance from one set of problems has confronted us with another--one that
is perhaps more ambiguous, nuanced, and contradictory than that of any other
era of American history. The dynamics of contemporary race politics
necessarily produce racial inequality in American society.
Prevailing modes of interpreting race politics reinforce the social and
economic conditions that make racial conflict and tension inevitable. The norm
of colorblindness does not permit recognizably race-conscious state action, but
its instantiation of formal equality does defer to nonneutral background social
processes, including private racial preferences, that predictably produce
substantive racial inequality.
335. Randall Kennedy makes this point forcefully. See Kennedy. supra note 81. at 1415. 1429-40
(making clear in the context of capital punishment that the feasibhtliy of a remedy should not obscure the
nature of the underlying wrong).
336. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIEs 276 (1987).
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This Article's two areas of inquiry-adoption and race politics-are, of
course, linked. For adoption policy is one arena for race politics, and the
demands of race politics shape the adoption debate. Consequently, an
understanding of each informs the analysis of the other. The model of race
politics illuminates the contours of the adoption controversy, which, indeed,
can adequately be understood only through reference to the general processes
of race politics. Conversely, adoption debate and policy provide concrete
manifestations of race politics, against which the model can be measured. My
specific approach has been to investigate facilitative accommodation and racial
preferences in adoption policy in order to gain insight into both race politics
and adoption.337
My strict nonaccommodation proposal draws on the link between race
politics and adoption. Its purpose is not only to change adoption.
Nonaccommodation will, I hope, also alter race politics through counteracting
the social processes and racial understandings that perpetuate both racial
conflict and racial inequality. As this hope indicates, particular expressions of
race politics may be turned to the task of transforming the very political and
social conditions that produce them. There is no guarantee that strict
nonaccommodation will be implemented, or even that it is feasible. Its utility,
however, does not turn primarily on its implementation. The character and
force of the resistance to the policy would reveal much about the impediments
to racial equality in American society. Unearthing our own assumptions may
be the essential first step to fashioning responses to the questions we too often
decline to ask.
337. While my analysis regarding adoption is amply supported by evidence, my theory of race politics
and racial inequality is necessarily speculative. I have derived a general theory from a particular case. I
believe that the specific case of adoption embodies patterns and characteristics common to racial debate
and politics more generally, but I have no way of proving as much. The link between the two may be
thought of as an assumption, a premise, or even an intuition.
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